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ABSTRACT 
 
Romantic Ends reinterprets of the origins and legacies of romantic death, the cultural 
spectacle exemplified by the dramatic deaths of young poets like John Keats. Against the 
widespread belief that romanticism ushered in a uniquely theatrical vision of death, Romantic 
Ends traces a long history of death as rhetorical performance, from the early modern ars 
moriendi (“art of dying”) to the neoclassical obsession with the good death. The poetic deaths of 
the romantic period established a new repertoire of tropes and figures out of these longstanding 
and disparate deathbed traditions, set within the emerging discursive arena of “poetry.” Yet 
while romantic death is a recognizable and potent archetype, an underexplored strain of 
romantic-period writing evinces a deep suspicion toward the conventions and meaning-making 
logics of death. The precise function for which romanticism has been credited and blamed—the 
exploitation of death as shorthand for the “poetic”—is in fact subject to strategies of evasion and 
disruption in romantic poetry. 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
THE STORY OF DEATH 
 
In its “List of Deaths for the Year 1750,” the Gentleman’s Magazine included one  
 
Mrs Reed of Kentish Town, aged 81. She had kept a mahogany coffin and shroud by her 
6 years, when thinking she should not soon have occasion for them she sold them, and 
dy’d suddenly the same evening. (20:188) 
 
This brief obituary captures a world of death remarkably distinct from our own. We could begin 
with the common practice of keeping articles of burial near to hand, signaling constant 
preparedness for death. Coffin and shroud are inmates, privileged with domestic intimacy. When 
it comes, death too will arrive like an intimate relation returning home1—until Mrs. Reed 
disposed of these accessories on the assumption that she would live. Though no agency is 
directly attributed, the significance of the fact that death came as soon as she ceased to fear it 
was powerful enough to be left unstated. Readers would understand what her lapse in preparation 
had cost her: sudden death remained an object of terror well into the nineteenth century, as it 
denied the deceased the benefit of last rites. Death may be unknowable, but it seems to have an 
eye for formal irony and narrative resolution. Where we nod, the Gentleman’s suggests, it comes 
winking.
                                                      
1 Margaret Spufford’s study of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century chapbooks shows that “Death was a 
figure who was very well-known by, and very close to, their readers” (201). Historical demography bears 
out Spufford’s claim: life expectancy fell throughout the seventeenth century, hit a nadir in the 1680s, 
began to rise precipitously from 1691 to 1706, and then declined again until the 1730s. Taking a longer 
view, it was not until the seventeenth or eighteenth century that the English population recovered to its 
fourteenth century peak prior to plague and famine (Smith 200, 212-13; Wrigley and Schofield 240-244; 
Houlbrooke 5-6). Of the forty-six chapbooks Spufford surveys, seven even purport to be written from the 
deathbed.  
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Ars Moriendi in the Periodical Age 
 As Mrs. Reed’s example shows, the early obituary was less a posthumous biography than 
a brief narrative of death.2 Seventy years after the passing of Mrs. Reed of Kentish Town, the 
New Monthly Magazine bore witness to the death of the poet John Keats:  
There is something very impressive about the death of genius, and particularly of 
youthful genius. Poets, perhaps, have shared most of this feeling from mankind; indeed 
their labours which survive themselves are for ever creating it. Not only  
By fairy hands their knell is rung, 
By forms unseen their dirge is sung, 
but the beautiful, the tender, and the wise, are perpetual sorrowers over their obsequies. 
(3:258)  
 
The space between these two obituaries seems to reflect a sea change in the representation of 
death, from austere description undergirded by a vast eschatology bound to preparation for death 
to the pathetic spectacle of a beautiful, wilting boy-poet. The New Monthly even suggests that the 
capacity to feel sorrow for Keats is itself a mark of beauty, tenderness, and wisdom, apportioning 
Keats’s own poetic genius out to his perpetual mourners, who inherit the mantle of poetic 
sensibility simply by grieving his death—an apt demonstration of sensibility’s trade in what 
Robert Markley calls the “affective spectacle of benign generosity” (211). The gap between Mrs. 
Reed and Mr. Keats thus registers a transformation from the solemn devotional paradigm of the 
ars moriendi (“art of dying”) to an emerging aestheticization of death, which valorized vicarious 
suffering and the performance of grief. Keats is the child of a sentimental revolution that 
continues into our present.3 
                                                      
2 In the eighteenth century the term obituary meant “register of deaths,” and was originally synonymous 
with necrology, “An ecclesiastical or monastic register containing entries of the deaths of persons 
connected with, or commemorated by, the church” (OED).  
 
3 Placing Keats’s death within a long history of sensibility, I follow Christopher Nagle, Adela Pinch, 
Jerome McGann, Elizabeth Fay, and others who have argued, in Pinch’s words, “It may be more accurate 
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 And yet there are important continuities between these two endings. Keats had sought “a 
grander system of salvation than the chryst<e>ain religion,” and had laughed at his friend 
Benjamin Bailey’s attempts to woo “with the Bible and Jeremy Taylor under his arm” (Letters 
2:102, 2:67), but on his deathbed, he asked Joseph Severn to find a copy of Taylor’s 1651 The 
Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying, the central text in the English ars moriendi tradition. It came 
recommended by William Hazlitt as “more like fine poetry than any other prose whatever,” and 
was, as Severn recorded, “the book he has set his mind upon” (Complete Works 6:342; Keats 
Circle 1:181). Though they do not mention Taylor, his devotional discourse reverberates 
throughout Keats’s obituaries. Taylor framed the suffering that accompanies death as an 
opportunity to demonstrate submission to God’s will, and to share in the glory of Jesus’s 
suffering. “Sickness,” he writes, “is that agony in which men are tried for a crown” (3:327). 
Dying is a test of election: remain tranquil, detach yourself from worldly concerns, and resign 
yourself to judgment. Keats’s obituaries mute Taylor’s eschatology but amplify the sense of 
deathly suffering as a mark of election—to Parnassus, if not precisely heaven. Aglow with the 
fetching pallor of consumption,4 the poet “often talked of his approaching death, with the 
resignation of one who contemplated its certainty without anxiety, and seemed to wish to ‘steal 
from the world’ into silence and repose” (3:257). The tranquil, otherworldly resignation of the 
                                                      
to see Sensibility as a literary movement that preceded, enabled, and coexisted with Romanticism. And 
perhaps Romanticism ought to be seen as simply one phase of a longer Era of Sensibility” (Nagle 4, 16; 
Pinch, “Sensibility” 50; McGann, Sensibility and Fay passim). James Chandler’s An Archeology of 
Sympathy: The Sentimental Mode in Literature and Cinema extends the era of sensibility into the 
twentieth century, positioning the sentimental mode’s virtualization of feeling as “a deep principle of 
intelligibility in the aesthetic and ethical structuring of experience” that recurs in ostensibly the anti-
sentimental modes of romanticism and modernism (330).  
 
4 See Clark Lawlor’s Consumption and Literature: The Making of the Romantic Disease, which finds its 
paradigmatic figure in Keats.  
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New Monthly’s dying Keats was as much a signature of the older tradition of holy dying as of the 
newer currents of sensibility.  
Like the dead themselves, discourses of death do not vanish, but rather disperse, haunt, 
circulate in new shapes. The Keats myth (and myth it was5) reveals shades of still-older 
traditions, hearkening all the way back to Christ, and to Socrates behind him. (Whether the 
Hellene or the Hebrew offered the better model of dying was a hushed but pressing question 
throughout the eighteenth century.) What was distinctive about Keats’s era was the way it made 
dying integral to the work of poetry, and poetry a kind of prophecy of death. Keats’s obituaries 
substantiate their portrait of dying resignation not through reportage, but by appealing to the 
“Ode to a Nightingale,” recast in the New Monthly as conversation: “He is said to have wished to 
‘drink of the warm South,’ and ‘leave the world unseen,’ and his wish was accordingly fulfilled” 
(3:257). In the London Magazine, Barry Cornwall invoked the same lines for the same purpose: 
“His sad and beautiful wish is at last accomplished: it was that he might drink ‘of the warm 
south,’ and ‘leave the world unseen’” (3:426). Keats’s poetry reads his death in advance. It is, 
moreover, a partial reading, abridging the ode’s dialectical movement—which both entertains 
and challenges the possibility of relief in death—to leave a tidy equation of life and text. Death 
                                                      
5 While the obituaries pictured Keats dying “with the resignation of one who contemplated [his end] 
without anxiety,” the letters Joseph Severn wrote from Keats’s deathbed offer a very different 
perspective: “Keats is wanting to say something or have something done every minute in the day…he 
may become irritated—for I can assure [you] his mind is bordering on the insane—” (Letters 2:373). 
Severn’s account suggests a devastating, almost illegible deterioration, in which Keats’s anticipation of 
death reflects not peaceful resignation but rather the unbearable anguish of his condition:  
the mucus is collecting in such quantiti[e]s and the body & the extremity receive no 
nourishment—and above all poor Keatss mind is determined on being worse and worse—nearer 
and nearer his death—that he cannot possibly last but a short time—Keats is desiring his death 
with dreadfull earnestness—the idea of death seem his only comfort—the only prospect of ease—
he talks of it with delight—it sooths his present torture—The strangeness of his mind every day 
surprises us—no one feeling or one notion like any other being—. (2:373) 
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concludes the narrative begun in verse, neatly sealing the casket of the Keats myth for mass 
consumption.  
Of course, Keats did not leave the world unseen, but the idea that he wanted to leave it 
unseen was compelling enough to ensure that his departure would be prolifically advertised. The 
wider public event of his death thus recapitulates a tradition of elegiac irony that extracts poetic 
value from the trope of obscure death, in turn publicizing it. Instances run from the “short and 
simple annals of the poor” valorized in Gray’s “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard,” to 
Wordsworth’s “She Dwelt among the Untrodden Ways” (“She lived unknown, and few could 
know / When Lucy ceased to be”) to Keats’s self-epitaph, “Here lies One whose Name was writ 
in Water.” In an unjust world of obscure elegiac objects, posthumous recognition offers 
recompense—not in a heavenly afterlife, but in poetic posterity. The phenomenon of romantic 
death trades in this kind of give and take, bemoaning the conditions it depends upon.  
Disenchantment, Romanticization, Denial 
The cultural currents we’ve come to call “romantic” hold a notorious place in the 
historiography of dying. As Paul Fry writes,  
Nearly everyone aggress that something happened on both sides of the Atlantic in the 
eighteenth century…. Matter-of-factness gave way to the sort of nervous emotion that 
was euphemistically evasive and yet at the same time helplessly attracted to miasmal 
charnel atmospheres. There was plenty of precedent for the hideous side of this 
fascination; nothing could be more gruesome than the countless medieval artes moriendi, 
and the writers of the northern European Renaissance were no strangers to morbid excess. 
But in the eighteenth century there began to appear a squeamish delicacy in people’s 
preoccupation with death and decay that we have never really outgrown. (Defense of 
Poetry 182) 
 
This “something” Fry describes is the backdrop of Romantic Ends: a transformation in the way 
that death signified and was represented, in the kinds of significance that could be attributed to 
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death. Though Fry endeavors to distinguish romanticism—especially Wordsworth’s—from the 
broader shift he delineates around the turn of the century, the romanticization of death, with 
romantic poetry at its center, features prominently in the wider historiography of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, as well as the more recent emergence of the field of death studies. The 
influential work of Philippe Ariés finds its lapsarian moment in the emergence of a “Romantic, 
rhetorical treatment of death,” wherein a luridly sentimental vision of death as a beautiful 
spectacle displaces the sensible, homely, and intimate early modern approach to death “with no 
theatrics” (Western Attitudes 56, 13). Romantic theatrics are then steadily codified into the 
decadent choreographies of Victorian mourning practice. As death is captured by pageantry over 
the nineteenth century, its homely actuality is derealized, leading inexorably toward what Freud 
would term the modern “denial of death”—death controlled and sanitized, removed from 
common experience in the domestic sphere, and psychically disavowed. These cultural shifts are 
though to coincide with the transferal of authority over death from ecclesiastical to civil powers, 
driven by what Foucault called the “clinical gaze,” in which the body is reconceptualized as 
legible matter. Death loses its metaphysical drama and becomes a medical problem. In the wake 
of these narratives, writers as distinct as Zygmunt Bauman and Jean Baudrillard can affirm a 
transition from, in Bauman’s terms, a world in which “one had no reason to be puzzled or unduly 
excited when death, for the umpteenth time, struck in one’s close vicinity” to a world, as 
Baudrillard writes, organized around the categorical “exclusion of the dead and of death” (97; 
126).  
Walter Benjamin gives the broad social and structural outlines of this story, focused in 
the nineteenth century:  
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In the course of the nineteenth century bourgeois society has, by means of hygienic and 
social, private and public institutions, realized a secondary effect which may have been 
its subconscious main purpose: to make it possible for people to avoid the sight of the 
dying. Dying was once a public process in the life of the individual and a most exemplary 
one; think of the medieval pictures in which the deathbed has turned into a throne toward 
which the people press through the wide-open doors of the death house. In the course of 
modern times dying has been pushed further and further out of the perceptual world of 
the living. There used to be no house, hardly a room, in which someone had not once 
died…. Today people live in rooms that have never been touched by death, dry dwellers 
of eternity, and when their end approaches they are stowed away in sanatoria or hospitals 
by their heirs. (93-94) 
 
According to this story, death’s passage from the intimacy of common life to medical quarantine 
and psychical repression is recouped in the form of poetic spectacle. Death vanishes from daily 
life and loses its eschatological drama to flourish in literature, and its literary representations 
become the standard against which its banally dreadful real-world occurrences are measured. 
Marred by misery, bodily discharge, and dementia, death in its reality begins to look like a bad 
copy. Poetry is the tribute paid for this denial, a virtual representation of what was formerly 
lived. If the denial of death relies upon poetry, poetry in turn needs death. Charles Taylor in 
particular has preserved M. H. Abrams’s reading of romanticism as a desire for post-secular 
transcendence anchored in the profundity of death. In this view, romantic culture seizes upon 
death as the singular event that can generate and guarantee significance in a world where 
meaning must manifest itself within what Taylor calls the “immanent frame.” Death names 
human finitude: it is the condition against which writing takes place and from which it derives its 
significance. In this epoch, poets do not simply die, they fulfill their vocation in death—a schema 
applied not just to Keats but also, in various forms, to the preceding deaths of Chatterton, White, 
Cowper, and Burns, the subsequent deaths of Shelley and Byron, and fictional deaths like 
Goethe’s Werther. 
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 Numerous facets of this broader narrative of disenchantment, romanticization, and denial 
have been challenged. Methods and conclusions have been disputed, as has the heavily leveraged 
concept of denial of death in the twentieth and twenty-first century.6 Still, there is little doubt 
that, as Fry suggests, something happened in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
something related to the cultural developments we’ve come to call “romantic,” incarnate in text-
life composites like “Keats.” If the clinical gaze never evacuated death of its metaphysical 
drama, if disenchantment never truly arrived, then how should we understand the emergence of 
romantic death? Romantic Ends argues that the deathbed had long been conceived as a kind of 
theater, and dying as a kind of performance. Romantic death was a late variation on this 
longstanding motif. And yet romantic poetry, including the poetry of Keats himself, evinces a 
deep discomfort with the immense signifying burden this culture placed on death. This poetry 
often wonders whether death can mean anything in particular—or anything at all.   
At Death’s Limits 
However distinctive the late-eighteenth-century culture of death, the sense of death as 
rhetorical or theatrical spectacle was not, contra Ariés and his peers, the invention of 
romanticism. The first two chapters of Romantic Ends challenge this notion that romanticism 
                                                      
6 Jonathan Dollimore rejects the premise of “denial of death,” from Freud onward, arguing that death “has 
not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex, and productive ways,” and that death has 
never been “tame” in the way that Ariés and the many scholars influenced by his work have supposed. On 
the contrary, he writes, “we can begin to understand the vital role of death in Western culture only when 
we accept death as profoundly, compellingly and irreducibly traumatic” (126). Thomas Laqueur has 
argued that the emerging medical and legal discourses of the eighteenth century gave rise to “a new 
enchantment of the dead,” wherein “the work of the dead in modernity was put on a new foundation 
through a vertiginous number of new and newly reconfigured rituals and practices” (186). “The presence 
of the dead,” he concludes, continues to enchant “our purportedly disenchanted world” (14). See Whaley 
and Smalls for further challenges to Ariés’s historiography, and Cannadine and Ramsay on the question 
of denial of death.  
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pioneered, for better or worse, a uniquely rhetorical treatment of death. Instead, I propose a 
broader genealogy of death as a rhetorical event, following a course from the ars moriendi, with 
its fixation on the “final moment,” to the Earl of Rochester’s sensational deathbed conversion in 
1680, to Joseph Addison’s neoclassical conception of the good death as “the winding up of a 
well-written Play,” to David Hume, the “Great Infidel” who (quite self-consciously) died in the 
manner of a saint. The first chapter gathers these various cultural strands in order to suggest the 
fitful persistence of the past in the phenomenon of romantic death, as when representations of 
Keats’s death filtered the austere idiom of the ars moriendi through the luxuriant lens of 
sensibility. Tracking the decline of the funeral sermon and the rise of the obituary and the elegy, 
I follow the devotional energies of holy dying as they are adapted and reoriented into these new 
generic contexts. Despite shifts in the discourses of dying, the cultural investment in death was 
unwavering, and only intensified over the long eighteenth century. Yet not everyone could abide 
the cultural obsession with the manner of death, as figures from Samuel Johnson to Lord Byron 
proved variously skeptical of the immense interpretive burden loaded on to what was at core, as 
Spenser suggested in the Mutabilitie Cantos, an absence: “Death with most grim and griesly 
visage seene, / Yet is he nought but parting of the breath” (7.46). 
Sectarian theater found a home on the deathbed, which became a site where theological 
convictions were tested and debated—signally, in the flurry of conflicting accounts that emerged 
out of the deathbed of Martin Luther. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the rhetorical 
power of the deathbed was seized by a small but influential lineage of skeptics and freethinkers 
who used the prodigious cultural investment in the meaning of death to demonstrate their own 
arguments. The confrontation with death was a longstanding justification for the necessity of 
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Christianity: it was widely asserted that while one could live without God, dying without him 
was another matter. Facing the prospect of eternity, any “unbeliever” would become a pitiful 
convert. However, it soon became clear that unbelievers could perform tranquil resignation just 
as well as the devout, hollowing out a major pillar of Christian orthodoxy. The second chapter 
makes a case study of Hume’s deathbed performance as a moment of crisis in the interpretation 
of death. His death was a collaborative performance, enacted through a series of letters and 
documents passed and published between his friends and allies that aimed to establish his serene, 
saintly, and unperturbable identity even in death—an identity all the more constant for its lack of 
dependence upon the supernatural fiction of grace. The fallout from this spectacle was swift and 
fierce. Hume’s clerical opponents impugned the carefully constructed account of his death that 
emerged from his circle and scorned his attempts at self-canonization. But the image of a 
virtuous infidel who died in tranquility persisted to haunt the cultural imaginary, even as it did 
little to convert the faithful to Hume’s extraordinary persuasion. Hume’s philosophical death did 
not validate a skeptical worldview so much as destabilize the significance of the moment of 
death, as Christian apologists steadily abandoned the deathbed as an ideological front.  
It was in this climate—in which death was suffused with surplus cultural energy but 
voided of stable interpretive procedures—that romantic death arose. Romantic culture did not 
transform death from a homely and intimate affair into a melodramatic spectacle, but it did 
reorient the spectacle of death from theological dispute toward a developing sense of the “poetic” 
as a space for exploring and aestheticizing profound uncertainties. In a general sense, then, it is 
true that poetry, broadly conceived, became a vehicle for the recovery of death’s significance. In 
this respect, the story of death is bound up with the emergence of poetry’s distinctive 
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epistemological status as what Wordsworth called “the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge” 
(Prose Works 1:167). So even if romantic death, as a poetic trope and historical spectacle, was 
not a unique phenomenon in any strict sense, we might still see romanticism as the apotheosis of 
a long-thriving motif of theatrical death. The second leg of my argument, taken up over the final 
four chapters, is dedicated to challenging this notion—the notion that a reliance on death as a 
reservoir of significance pervades, and perhaps even defines, romantic writing. Instead, I draw 
attention to a sensibility of deep suspicion toward death, in its conventions, tropes, and meaning-
making logics, scattered throughout romantic-period poetry. This textual cluster—too 
heterogeneous to call a tradition—is especially skeptical of the poetic vision of death as the “sad 
and beautiful wish” that Barry Cornwall imagined on Keats’s behalf.  
It is a commonplace that an enlightenment-materialist conception of death as a return to 
inexistence echoes, traumatically, throughout romantic writing. In a world bound strictly to the 
immanent frame, to face death is to face the prospect of nothingness, and so the romantic offers a 
regenerated appeal to transcendence. Yet the writing focused in the second part of Romantic 
Ends often evinces a different—even diametrically opposed—anxiety about death. It is not that 
death leads to nothingness, but rather that death will not deliver the absolute conclusion it 
promises. Too much survives beyond death, whether in the material persistence of a 
decomposing body, the psychical, cultural, and economic persistence of a legacy, or the spectral 
remains of history that persist to haunt an emerging modernity. These concerns are manifested 
even in the most paradigmatic moments of the romance of death. For example, on this reading, 
Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale” looks rather different than it did to his obituarists, who found it a 
perfect divination of Keats’s own end. In fact, the poem outlines a desire for an eradication far 
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more absolute than death. The ode’s “viewless wings of Poesy” may suggest a uniquely 
imaginary discursive realm—a space accessible only through the thinking and feeling practice of 
verse, emblematized by the vexing adjective “viewless”—but my interest lies in the ode’s 
construction of poetry as a movement toward replete inexistence: 
Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget 
    What thou among the leaves hast never known,      
The weariness, the fever, and the fret  
    Here, where men sit and hear each other groan;  
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs,  
    Where youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies (21-26) 
 
Fading, dissolving—these are the tropes of poetic death, which the speaker casts as antithetical to 
human aging. This contrast between the nightingale’s perfect dematerialization and the banal 
horrors of human death qualify the speaker’s various expressions of desire for death. To be “half 
in love with easeful Death / […] / To cease upon the midnight with no pain” introduces a subtle 
gap between death and cessation (52-56). Pain functions here as not just a feeling but also a 
proxy for materiality. What arises is a sense that human death is simply the all-too-worldly 
subsumption into the material passage of time. The incorporeal dissipation the speaker projects 
onto the nightingale is what he desires, but it’s not on offer in this world, or any other. The “Ode 
to a Nightingale” is less a romance of death than an illustration of death’s insufficiency.  
This approach to Keats’s ode represents one strategy pursued in Romantic Ends: a 
rereading of the legacy of what I call either romantic death or poetic death, suggesting how the 
rhetorical, optative dimension of the figure of desire for death evades its own fulfillment. The 
first part of the argument demonstrates how romantic death refashions and synthesizes disparate 
traditions of deathbed performance within the shifting discursive arena of poetry. The second 
part proposes that while romantic death is a recognizable and potent archetype, an underexplored 
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strain of romantic-period writing attempts to withdraw from rhetorical reliance upon death. In the 
writings taken up here, the precise function for which romanticism has been credited (and 
blamed)—the deployment of death as a transcendental signifier that invokes the “poetic”—is in 
fact tested, unsettled, and disrupted. Readings of William Wordsworth, William Blake, Felicia 
Hemans, and Keats himself spotlight a deep suspicion of death’s capacity to create significance 
or ground a cultural legacy. Among the various invocations of death in romantic writing, my 
emphasis will reside with a series of minor variations on the trope of death that forgo both 
sovereign self-assertion and morbid obliteration in favor of gestures of evasion, deferral, 
forgetting, and withdrawal. At times this withdrawal takes the form of skepticism towards death 
as a unified complex of material, ontological, and social processes. At other moments, death 
appears incomplete and unsatisfying in the face of a desire for a more absolute form of 
inexistence.  
Wordsworth is, if nothing else, a poet of mourning—a student of the psychological and 
affective consequences of loss. The third chapter argues that he is also preoccupied with 
ontological dynamics of death: that his poetry seeks to understand not only what death means for 
us, but what it is in itself. Death proves elusive in early poems like “We are Seven” and “Lucy 
Gray,” which in different ways refuse death’s finality, yet outsource that refusal to a “rustic” 
world at once contemporary and antique that enraptures, but cannot wholly persuade, the 
Cambridge poet. 
These reflections upon Wordsworth’s lyrical ballads open an alternate route into what 
Frances Ferguson called his “epitaphic mode,” which has long been identified with a tradition of 
profound confrontation with mortality running from Hamlet to Heidegger. However, in its drive 
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to extrapolate from the phenomenon of human loss to a world of ubiquitous death, this tradition 
of reading finds itself immersed in a vision of death so pervasive and unceasing that death, 
astonishingly, appears nowhere in particular. I argue that Wordsworth’s lyrics anticipate this 
problem and leads him toward a robust critique of death that sets his lyric voice in very close 
proximity to the naïve rustic voices ventriloquized in his ballads. And, if the exhaustively 
funereal Excursion affirmed Wordsworth’s reputation as a poet of death, here too a problem 
emerges. It lies in the relationship between the deathly theorizing of the Wanderer, who insists 
upon a universal logic of consolation in faith alone, and the more various and more pliable 
ruminations of the Pastor, whose graveyard tales often escape the master narrative which they 
are ostensibly conjured to support. Wordsworth remains a poet of mourning, but this is a 
mourning that continually unsettles the very nature of the death it would grieve.   
The fourth chapter identifies a vision of death as a failed promise in William Blake’s 
Book of Thel. Blake’s later prophetic books develop a psychological critique of modern 
materialisms from hard empiricism to natural religion. All of these perspectives, Blake will 
argue, are at core devastated by a fear of death, which they can only consistently conceive as 
what he will call “Eternal Death”: perfect inexistence. Yet Thel identifies a different problem 
with death under natural religion. She finds herself in a world of seamless and aggressively 
happy pastoral reproduction. This happiness, she discovers, is predicated on utility: everyone and 
everything is valued insofar as, in the mechanistic discourse of natural theology, everyone is 
useful. However, Thel does not want to be used. She seeks instead to die, but discovers that the 
same organic economy she resists in life will consume her in the grave, decomposing and 
recirculating her remains. It turns out that death is not the end, but simply one node in the cycle 
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of material interchange. Thel can only resist absorption into her world’s natural and narrative 
economies by fleeing the frame of the text—and Blake’s corpus—never to reappear. 
Yet Thel also suggests a means of radicalizing incompleteness into a melancholic but 
potent reconstruction of identity. She likens herself to a series of bare existences—ephemeral, 
illusory, and useless: “Thel is like a watry bow,” a “parting cloud,” a “reflection in a glass,” 
“shadows in the water” (1.8-9). Though this apparently depressive spell has given even her most 
sympathetic readers pause, I find in Thel’s similes, which assert likeness rather than perfect 
correspondence, a fantastic and yet uncannily prescient sense of self, built through elective 
affinities with other incomplete, transient beings. The likenesses she imagines cannot be reduced 
to shared function or biological kinship, and instead highlight purposeless commonalities based 
in transience, illusion, and lack. Without teleological purpose, patched together out of ephemeral 
images, the self Thel images is formidably useless. It traces a limited existence that falls short of 
projecting an agential, substantial life, but while deathly, it will not resolve in death. This 
denaturing of the self counters the totalizing material-symbolic system of interlocking functions 
that governs her world.  
The late devotional poetry of Felicia Hemans is the subject of the fifth chapter, which 
draws especially on 1834’s Scenes and Hymns of Life, written in the year before her death. The 
1830s were a period of denominational flux: while the radical dissenting cultures of the 
revolutionary era were eventually absorbed into the mainstream of respectable Victorian 
nonconformity, this rearrangement was still very much in process when Hemans entered the field 
of devotional poetry. Like Wordsworth, Hemans plays on resonances between the ancient poetic 
trope of inspiration and the inspirited rhetorics of sectarian religious dissent, juxtaposing the 
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classed and classical with the vulgar and energetic. The problem was that Anglican practical 
piety did not make for good poetry. Inspiration and enthusiasm did, and were backed by a 
distinguished poetic heritage, but in religious contexts these rhetorics smacked of bathetic 
vulgarity and political radicalism. Genre choice proves decisive in this negotiation, as the affects 
and rhetorics of her first-person lyrics are more constrained than those of her dramatic poems, 
which shelter heterodox sentiments behind the veil of character.  
Hemans’s devotional lyrics declare their prophetic aspirations only to steadily attenuate 
their own desires. These poems arc toward inspired devotion, but fall instead into elegiac 
contemplation of a despiritualized age, ending in “holy quiet” rather than holy ardor, seeking 
relief from “self-accusing thought” rather than prophetic transcendence. As an ambivalent 
prophet, Hemans proves more anti-skeptical than positively Christian, exerting so much energy 
warding off doubt that there is precious little room left for belief. Dramatic verse, however, 
seems to loosen the denominational entanglements that knot her lyrics. By diffusing authorial 
sentiment through the multiple perspectives of dialogue, Hemans is able to risk depicting a range 
of religious impulses from enthusiasm to doubt and loss of faith. Crucially, the deathbed is the 
sole space where polite and prophetic rhetorics merge. Through the representation of the 
deathbed, Hemans finds her characters empowered to assert their proximity to the divine, or 
express their absolute despair. Scenes and Hymns of Life thus traces a special refuge from 
orthodoxy, accessed through the presence of death. In the following year, as her own death 
approached, Hemans’s lyrics began to assert the prophetic privilege of the dying—a privilege she 
had previously depicted, but heretofore declined to inhabit. 
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Keats, the subject of the sixth and final chapter, has become the byword for Romantic 
death. And yet in Endymion, his calling card in his short life, death seems impossible: its 
eponymous protagonist “dies,” over and over again, and yet cannot seem to find his end. 
Endymion’s Keats is not the poet of aestheticized morbidity that haunts many of the odes and 
sonnets, nor the poet of the Hyperion poems prepossessed by a yearning for an impossible 
immortality. Instead, Endymion evacuates death of its significance, rendering death at once 
inconclusive and meaningless—just another change of state in a world of continuous flux. The 
emptiness of death becomes a point of departure for a world bereft of teleology, procreation, and 
patrimony.  
Yet what critical potential could the escapism of Keats’s self-consciously juvenile poem 
possibly hold in reserve? I argue Keats’s fantasy of a world without teleology was a retort to the 
real-world discourse of poetic patrimony, in which the Wordsworth of the Excursion was 
patriarch and Keats, the suburban medical student, wasn’t poetic material (not, at least, until he 
was dead). But Keats’s reaction to the logic of poetic patrimony soon outstrips itself, as 
Endymion attacks the social teleologies of maturity and reproduction, as well as the narrative 
teleologies of progression and coherence. Indeed, both the attacks on and defenses of Endymion 
are animated by the same logic of poetic procreation and entailment that the poem vigorously 
rejects. In this respect, Endymion might be read as a preemptive critique of Keats’s own arch-
romantic legacy, organized, as it was, around the prolific significance of death. In the sense that 
it was absorbed into the mythology of his death, Endymion failed. Yet Endymion nonetheless 
opens onto a different Keats, one we are asked to read, perhaps impossibly, without the benefit 
and burden of his death.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEATER OF THE FINAL MOMENT 
 The story of death underwent a dramatic shift in the eighteenth century. In his influential 
account of the rise of sensibility, G. J. Barker-Benfield notes that death was formerly mediated 
by the tradition of contemptus mundi: this world is transient and insignificant by contrast with 
the boundless eternity that awaits. Loss and grief remind us to relinquish our earthly concerns, 
since all tends inexorably toward the grave. Barker-Benfield argues that the culture of sensibility 
turned this eschatological worldview upside down by foregrounding the present tense experience 
of loss, centered in an ambivalent combination of “pain and the relief of being alive” (223). As 
Mary Wollstonecraft wrote, 
The imagination renders even transient sensations permanent by fondly retracing them. I 
cannot, without a thrill of delight, recollect views I have seen, which are not to be 
forgotten, nor looks I have felt in every nerve, which I shall never more meet. The grave 
has closed over a dear friend, the friend of my youth. Still she is present with me, and I 
hear her soft voice warbling as I stray over the heath. (Letters from Sweden, Norway, and 
Denmark 61) 
 
The grief Wollstonecraft gauges is “so near akin to both pleasure and pain” (61). This admixture 
does not detach the mourner from her earthly bonds, but instead anchors her all the more firmly 
in the sensations of this world. Loss gives way to its own kind of permanence—not in eternity, 
but in the experience of the grieving subject, who can return to this wellspring of feeling at her 
leisure. Whenever elegiac transport carries her into the past, her return to the present is charged 
with the electric pathos of nostalgia, highlighting the vividness of life through the felt possibility
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of its end in the death of the other. Death is no longer a call to eternity, but rather a focalization 
of the psychological and affective dynamics of human sympathy.  
The novelty of Wollstonecraft’s reading lies in the way it explicitly theorizes the 
spectatorial dynamics of grief, intimating the outlines of an aesthetics of loss. Barker-Benfield 
identifies these logics as the unique contribution of the culture of sensibility, which find its apex 
and recapitulation in romanticism. In the broader historiography, this period is thought to 
transform death from an affair that was intimate and homely, yet suffused with the metaphysical 
drama of a yawning eternity. By the turn of the nineteenth century, both the earnest intimacy and 
the eschatology that lay behind it had supposedly disappeared, to be replaced by the spectatorial 
drama of bereavement and haunted by a deep discomfort with the actual process of dying in its 
bodily particulars.1 And yet, the late eighteenth century’s theatrical, elegiac visions of death are 
less distinct from their precursors than this historiography of sensibility suggests. In this chapter, 
I argue that death was never unworldly in the way that accounts of death like Barker-Benfield’s 
presuppose, and never became worldly in quite the way they assert. From the ars moriendi 
onward, the meaning and value of deathbed performance was explicitly theorized in the terms of 
spectatorship and affective transference. In the Restoration era, the outward expression of 
inwardly turned grace prescribed by the ars moriendi joined an expanding print culture to create 
a textual audience for deathbed performance. The cultures of sensibility and romanticism were 
late-breaking innovations in the theatrical history of death.  
Following some of the motifs that give shape to the encounter with death over the long 
eighteenth century, I measure both the changing terms of engagement with death and the 
                                                      
1 Ariés describes this transformation as a shift from “the death of the self,” preoccupied with the fate of 
the soul, to “the death of the other,” focused on the performance of mourning. 
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recurrent vision of death as a kind of performance. The corpus treated here reflects a persistent 
need to make sense of death, and to understand how to die, to control it and give it definitive 
meaning. Yet these discourses often recognize that death generates a surplus of significance, and 
thus that appeals to death are both potent and suspect. Death was not a neutral theological or 
philosophical problem, since, as these writings suggest, conceptions of death have living 
consequence. Whether directed at a heavenly afterlife or a worldly posterity, whether invoked to 
guarantee transcendental meaning or to proclaim the finitude of human endeavors, death was a 
site where competing cultural forces staked their claims. Though these debates complicated any 
specific interpretation of death, they collectively intensified its cultural power. The long purview 
of this account reflects the extended temporality of deathbed performance, whose shifting 
repertoire conserves and refashions old tropes into new narratives over the long eighteenth 
century. Across these discourses, the aura of universality that suffuses death seems to render all 
the wisdom of human history present and available for counsel. In the time of eternity, antiquity 
is not so distant, and modernity is not so recent. And yet death’s traditions are transformed when 
they are summoned into new cultural worlds. 
The Cult of the Final Moment 
In the period following Charles II’s restoration to the throne, the deathbed became a site 
of intense public fascination. Print culture provided the material infrastructure for this 
development: funeral sermons, death-centric biographies, and deathbed narratives offered a new 
kind of vicarious spectacle centered on the performance of death as represented in text. Though 
the literature of the ars moriendi had proven enormously popular since the fifteenth century, it 
was in during the Restoration that, especially for important persons, the act of dying began to 
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enjoy its own posterity. Yet this transformation relied upon a preexisting investment in the 
eschatological significance of the deathbed: “pray for us now and at the hour of our death.” The 
terms of this investment would prove decisive for the subsequent cultural history of death in 
England. Where Catholicism held that the vast majority of the dead wind up in purgatory, to be 
sped toward heaven by way of intercessory prayer, the Reformation annihilated purgatory in 
favor of immediate, eternal judgment upon death. As Richard Wunderli and Gerald Broce have 
demonstrated, one consequence was a new interpretation of the relationship between death and 
judgment: the notion that salvation (or damnation) depended upon the state of one’s soul at the 
moment of death (260). A range of Protestantisms already interpreted confidence in one’s 
salvation as itself a sign of salvation. Such confidence mattered most on the deathbed, which was 
understood to be life’s final trial. As the ars moriendi taught, the process of dying was a crucible 
of suffering beset with temptations. Displays of despair, anger, resentment, fearfulness, 
impatience, pride, or doubt all portended damnation. The cost of salvation was to be paid by 
graceful forbearance and tranquil resignation up to the moment of death.  
While Calvinism had conceived of grace as an act of God, it was also the goal of the 
proliferating spiritual exercises that sought to cultivate a right-thinking discipline of the soul. 
Grand sociological narratives from Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism to Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age have traced how this Protestant internalization of 
spiritual dicta generated the idea of the bounded, self-governing subject of secular society. 
However, the cult of the final moment challenged the general shift toward self-discipline by 
promising to upend a life’s spiritual trajectory at the conclusion. Whatever its total course, a life 
could be redeemed by a good death or destroyed by a bad one. And since it gathered all of life’s 
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eschatological stakes into its conclusion, the fixation on the moment of death undermined the 
devotional consistency and rigor at the core of so much Protestant teaching. Though there was no 
theological warrant for the saving power of a good death (Wunderli and Broce 261), the idea was 
nonetheless broadcast throughout the ars moriendi literature and persisted across the sectarian 
divisions that wracked the seventeenth century.2 Ars moriendi authorities Jeremy Taylor and 
William Perkins were Anglican clerics. Oliver Heywood was an arch-Puritan who painstakingly 
recorded every death he chanced to hear of, and Samuel Clarke, whose Lives of Sundry Eminent 
Persons in this Later Age (1683) relishes deathbed depictions above all, had been ejected from 
the Church of England. The deathbed’s utter importance, if not its precise doctrinal import, was a 
rare point of consensus.3 
In the early incarnations of the cult of the final moment, what was at stake was the soul of 
the dying. But as deathbed accounts proliferated, it became clear that deathbed performances 
could reverberate well beyond present company, affecting the souls of the living. This sense of 
publicity reached critical mass in the deathbed repentance of the notorious rake-courtier-poet 
John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, whose conversion and death was documented by Gilbert Burnet 
(1680). In the estimation of the Archbishop of Canterbury John Tillotson, Rochester’s 
conversion was “the greatest instance any age hath afforded” of repentance (Walker, “Rochester 
and the Issue of Deathbed Repentance” 22). Yet despite its influence in the cultural imaginary, 
                                                      
2 Wunderli and Broce note that the language of death literature was echoed in “innumerable” wills, 
suggesting the degree to which early modern England not only read but internalized the ars moriendi 
(264). The ars moriendi program was disseminated as a series of captioned woodcuts as early as 1450, 
which, alongside its prevalence in sermons, ensured a reach beyond the literate subset of the population.  
 
3 Allan Pritchard’s “The Last Days of Hobbes” describes a culture uniformly eager to “find the 
significance of the whole life in the manner of death” (181). 
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the theological value of deathbed repentance was hotly contested, since imminent death gave the 
convert little opportunity to perform works of atonement.4 Such conversions might seem 
opportunistic, even mercenary—conveniently delayed until the penitent was too infirm to 
practice his preferred vices. How, then, could so ardent a sinner as Rochester have any hope of 
salvation if he had no opportunity to make good on his repentance? Via Burnet, Rochester would 
answer: through posthumous works.  
In Burnet’s account, Rochester proves his contrition when he relays  
some messages, which very well became a dying penitent to some of his former friends, 
and a charge to publish any thing concerning him, that might be a mean to reclaim others; 
praying God, that as his life had done much hurt, so his death might do some good. (77) 
 
The funeral sermon delivered by Robert Parsons strikes the same note, highlighting 
“[Rochester’s] commands to me, to preach abroad, and to let all men know, (if they knew it not 
already) how severely God had disciplined him for his sins by his afflicting hand” (121).5 
Rochester speaks to a new temporality of Christian works, in which death is the ultimate work—
not simply a cessation but a kind of action, echoing long after its end and shaping the world it 
leaves behind. Because Rochester’s example lives beyond his life, he is able to posthumously 
continue his work for the salvation of others. Charles Taylor describes an early modern religious 
sensibility in which “the locus of death, as the place where one has given everything, is the place 
of maximum union with God; and therefore, paradoxically, the source of most abundant life” 
                                                      
4 Jeremy Taylor’s sermon “The Invalidity of a Late, or Death-bed Repentance” (1651) argues that 
repentance can only be achieved through the “habits” of devotion. Regret must be transmuted by works 
into true repentance, or it remains mere sorrow. 
 
5 Parson’s funeral sermon was frequently affixed to Burnet’s Life; the pairing had reached fourteen 
editions by 1730, and in the latter eighteenth century, Johnson’s Life of Rochester was attached as well. 
See Walker’s “Rochester and the Issue of Deathbed Repentance” 22-27.  
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(“Immanent Counter-Enlightenment” 395). The Rochester phenomenon literalizes this sense of 
abundant life in death by making death the source of his greatest worldly efficacy.  
The meeting of print culture and deathbed conversion had immediate consequences for 
the theological question of repentance. As the story of Rochester’s death spread, what was mere 
deathbed sorrow was retroactively transformed by Rochester’s posthumous work into true 
repentance. Deathbed repentance had gained its theological warrant. The textual echo of 
Rochester’s performance of death—his posthumous work—now enters into the balance of 
judgment. The weighing of works is deferred to the future, where the consequences of one’s 
actions will continue to reverberate long after death. Posthumous textual publicity on 
Rochester’s model reshaped the deathbed from a crucible of private salvation into an arena of 
public evangelism. The fate of the dying was bound up with the souls of the reading nation. 
Paradoxically, through its newfound potential as a vehicle for disseminating salvation, the 
deathbed became a more worldly affair. The state of one’s eternal soul was now linked to one’s 
afterlife on earth, through that burgeoning organ of earthly memory—print culture.6 
Final Moments, Devout and Polite 
In the standard trope of dying revelation, employed in Rochester’s case and throughout 
early modern depictions of death, the soul was supposed to become manifest in one’s final 
breath. (This figure has ancient Judaic roots, processed through a specifically Christian 
                                                      
6 This emergence of a worldly afterlife within evangelical discourse had a long posterity, and ultimately 
changed the constitution of heaven. Geoffrey Rowell’s Hell and the Victorians describes the 
consolidation within Victorian evangelism of “an immortality of self-realization, rather than an 
immortality of salvation” (15). Rowell’s comment speaks to a changing sense of the soul, defined less by 
its need for redemption from sin than by its self-consciously narrated becoming. But the shape of heaven 
itself is shifting, too: the afterlife is increasingly imagined as an extension of worldly life, focused on 
reunion with loved ones, continuing service and social progress, and intimacy with a familial God. See, 
for example, Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang’s Heaven: A History 228-275. 
  
25 
conception of the relationship between matter and spirit.) So Isaac Walton wrote that as George 
Herbert died he “breathed forth his divine soul, without any apparent disturbance,” while in 
Wordsworth’s Excursion we read that 
Mortality’s last exercise and proof  
Is undergone; the transit made that shows 
The very Soul, revealed as she departs. (5.667-669, discussed in chapter three)  
 
This motif had its pagan precedents; a maxim of Seneca’s, often cited in the eighteenth century, 
held that what is revealed at death is not the contents of an inner soul, but rather the truth of a 
life’s narrative: “What you have done in the past will be manifest only at the time when you 
draw your last breath” (Epistles 1:191). Seneca’s maxim was not simply narratological—it 
extended to the composition of the face, thought to resolve into its true character in death. The 
neoclassical interpretation of death thus had its material correlate in the death mask. Johann 
Kaspar Lavater, the father of physiognomy, wrote of the dead, “Their settled features are much 
more prominent than in the living, and the sleeping. What life makes fugitive, death arrests. 
What was indefinable is defined” (2:38-39).7 Though the neoclassical interpretation is closely 
related to the Christian trope of the departing soul, there is a telling distinction between these two 
models. In Wordsworth’s self-consciously retrospective Excursion, steeped in the ars moriendi 
tradition, the soul that discloses itself at death has the power to revise the passing life. So it was 
in Burnet’s account of Rochester’s deathbed: death revealed the true penitent inside the false 
rake. What Seneca’s maxim offers by contrast is not transformative revelation but narrative 
closure—the same logic that led the Athenian reformer Solon to declare, “Call no man happy 
until he is dead.” Estimations of virtue are merely provisional as long as one’s life (and works) 
                                                      
7 Lavater’s statement was cited as an inspiration by Laurence Hutton, the great nineteenth-century 
collector of death masks, whose collection is now held by the Princeton University Library. 
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remain incomplete. At death, judgment can begin in earnest.8 Seneca, Solon, and their 
eighteenth-century heirs are preoccupied with narrative consistency and uniformity. Death can 
verify life, but cannot redeem it. Meanwhile, the logic of deathbed conversion grants life’s 
conclusion a revisionary force. Each perspective, however, allows the performance of death to 
arbitrate the truth of life.  
The most important eighteenth-century proponent of the Senecan interpretation of death 
was Joseph Addison. Addison was a chief advocate of the pragmatic commercial class that 
would see its fortunes rise dramatically in Hanoverian England. His writing with Richard Steele 
in The Spectator helped rally business interests toward a tolerationist platform tuned to the 
emerging credit economy. We might expect a figure like Addison to view the seventeenth-
century preoccupation with the deathbed, with its tendency to epitomize life by the happenstance 
of death, as a reactionary superstition antithetical to an enlightened modernity. Instead, Addison 
updated and consolidated holy dying. His stated influences were classical and stoic rather than 
Puritan, and his Christianity was politely Anglican rather than prophetic. But while he 
                                                      
8 Vivasvan Soni’s Mourning Happiness uses Solon’s aphorism to explore the transformation of happiness 
from a narrative principle to an interiorized feeling. On Soni’s reading, Solon’s statement is a formal 
injunction to attend to the contingency of life and the importance of each moment in its minute 
particularity, because every moment contributes to the totality of a life. Only a narrative vantage of the 
whole can determine happiness, understood as “not a passive emotion, but the practice of living well,” 
and this is why one’s happiness cannot be judged prior to death (15). Solon’s model, which does not 
“search for meaning beyond the condition of finitude,” is “destroyed” by what Soni calls the trial 
narrative, which comes to predominate in the eighteenth-century, in which happiness as an ideal is first 
suspended by a series of narrative crises and then reconstituted on denarrativized emotional or affective 
grounds (28). By defining happiness in the terms of narrative totality, Soni’s Solonian reading makes 
death the very mechanism by which happiness becomes legible. By extension, the narrative drive to make 
death signify is only amplified, and the austerity of Solon’s interpretive model begins to look continuous 
with the theatricality of Joseph Addison’s, discussed below. 
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overhauled the cultural trappings of the deathbed, the practical result was strikingly similar to 
that of his generation’s disavowed sectarian forebears.9  
“The End of a Man’s Life,” Addison wrote, “is often compared to the winding up of a 
well-written Play, where the principal Persons still act in Character, whatever the Fate is which 
they undergo.” The performance of death discloses the truth of a great life, and that inner truth, 
paradoxically, can be affirmed only by continuous performance unto the end. Thus a “good 
Man” must maintain “Uniformity in his Actions, and preserve the Beauty of his Character to the 
last”—or be exposed as a fraud (Spectator no. 349). Addison’s lexicon (virtue, beauty, character) 
and his classical references place his model of dying on newly-cleared secular ground: no longer 
“holy dying” but simply the “good death.” This idiom was not irreligious, but sought to 
deemphasize its religious investments as a matter of taste, principle, and politics. This route had 
been unlocked, ironically, by Rochester’s death, which, in its evangelical appeal, ushered the 
deathbed into the arena of cultural politics. Addison’s innovation was to combine Seneca’s basic 
premise that death revealed life’s truth with an explicit formulation of what was only implicit in 
the Rochester affair: the controlling metaphor of the theatre. It is this metaphor that makes him a 
perfect representative of the moment of the Hanoverian succession. Fittingly, after he compared 
a good death to the conclusion of a well-written play, Addison composed a well-written play 
concluding with a good death in Cato (1712). However, in a stroke that would have been 
improbable thirty years prior, Cato’s good death was a heroic suicide in defiance of tyranny—an 
                                                      
9 The case of Alexander Pope follows a similar trajectory to the Anglican Addison from a Catholic 
perspective. Like Addison’s (and Hume’s), Pope’s death was a carefully orchestrated affair modeled 
above all on that of Socrates, and like Addison, the significance Pope attributed to the moment of death 
was “secular and public rather than religious, a pronouncement on the past rather than a prediction of the 
future” (Grundy 258, see also Brownell, “‘Like Socrates’: Pope’s Art of Dying”). 
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extravagance licensed by the pre-Christian source material.10 In Rochester’s moment, the 
theological value of a holy death was in dispute, but there was little doubt what such a death 
looked like. Now, the neoclassical vogue was altering death’s stylistic parameters, with 
ideological consequences. 
However, despite the neoclassical injection of pagan aesthetics, Addison’s emphasis on 
earthly posterity unfolded in the name of Christianity—just as Rochester had, in the name of 
evangelism, unwittingly helped to secularize the deathbed. Addison’s own death is a case in 
point. It took place in just the manner he had advocated in the pages of The Spectator. As Samuel 
Johnson tells the story, when Addison felt his end nearing he called for a young lord “of very 
irregular life, and perhaps of loose opinions,” and told him, “I have sent for you that you may see 
how a Christian can die” (165).11 In his serene Christian comfort, he outdid his own adulatory 
vision of the pagan Cato.  
Yet this Christianity was a polite, latitudinarian Anglicanism, relatively unbothered about 
doctrinal content. At stake was a more generalized sense of virtue: the dissolute young noble 
(who was in fact his stepson, the Earl of Warwick) is both beneficiary of and witness to 
Addison’s virtue. In Edward Young’s account, Addison’s words are aimed beyond their 
                                                      
10 Half a century later, Adam Smith recorded that Cato’s last soliloquy before committing suicide was 
recited and parodied as often as Hamlet’s “To be or not to be” soliloquy (Lectures 115). Cato’s suicidal 
rebellion against Caesar’s tyranny was, in Smith’s view, a sublime expression of “manly fortitude” 
(Theory of Moral Sentiments 58). 
 
11 In Edward Young’s account, Addison’s words are “See in what peace a Christian can die” (102). 
Young’s account also suggests how the neoclassical vogue reasserted gender distinctions that had been 
blurred in seventeenth-century deathbed treatments, which often gave prominent place to women. For 
example, we are told that Addison dismissed his physicians “after a long, and manly, but vain struggle 
with his distemper” (101). In 1857, Henry Havelock helped himself to Addison’s line on his own 
deathbed, enjoining his son to “see how a Christian can die” (Final Triumph 29). 
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immediate audience: “May distant ages not only hear, but feel, the reply!” (102). Young, though 
not present at the deathbed, becomes the vicar of Addison’s example, blazoning its pathos and 
virtue to the “distant ages” in a text that phenomenalizes its reading as hearing and feeling. 
Young insists that a glorious death like Addison’s is in fact “of no great consequence to the 
dying individual”; it is “granted chiefly, for the sake of the surviving world, which may profit by 
his pious example” (100). The question of the soul’s fate has begun to dissipate; posterity now 
lies at the fraught intersection of public morality and fame. 
Despite its pious punch line, Addison’s art of dying was earthly in its preoccupations, and 
the accounts of Young and Johnson only advance the worldliness implicit in Addison’s carefully 
orchestrated passing.12 The Spectator returns to the figure of the theatre almost compulsively, 
brazenly acknowledging the importance of reception—or more precisely, “Applause,” to the 
construction of the good death: “It is no Matter what Hour, what Day, what Month, or what Year 
we dye. The Applause of a good Actor is due to him at whatever Scene of the Play he makes his 
Exit” (Spectator no. 153; nos. 133, 289, 292, and 317 also treat the interpretation of death). It is a 
small step from this view to Young’s proto-romantic declaration, which replaces the figure of the 
theatre with the figure of a text: “His compositions are but a noble preface; the grand work is his 
death: That is a work which is read in heaven”—and, thanks to Young, on earth (104). Addison’s 
                                                      
12 Not everyone was convinced by Addison’s performance. Horace Walpole supposed that “he died of 
brandy—nothing makes a Christian die in peace like being maudlin” (1:406), and Lucy Aiken’s 1843 Life 
of Joseph Addison found the story implausibly theatrical. Peter Smithers, Addison’s twentieth-century 
biographer, accepts the deathbed account relayed by Johnson and Edward Young on the basis that the 
“whole of Addison’s life in its consistency pointed to such a studied ending” (448). The terms of 
Smither’s analysis are derived from Addison’s own contribution to the ars moriendi, which centered on 
“consistency” and “uniformity” unto the last; of Thomas More, Addison wrote in admiration, “[h]is death 
was of a piece with his life. There was nothing in it new, forced, or affected” (Spectator no. 349). 
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emphasis fell on posthumous life in this world, carried forth into futurity by a receptive public—
the kind of afterlife Johnson and Young grant Addison’s death by broadcasting it.  
Addison’s resonant example signals how death would change in meaning without losing 
significance over the eighteenth century. This point is crucial because, viewed at a certain 
distance, the transformations in question have encouraged historians to posit a decline in the 
culture of death—a thesis which maps neatly onto the conventional view of a seventeenth 
century of gloomy sectarian enthusiasms set against the clubbable commercial culture of the 
eighteenth century. The trajectories of funeral sermons and epitaphs can be adduced to support 
the conventional centurial thesis. Eighteenth-century sermons became steadily more circumspect 
in their accounts of the minutiae of dying, deemphasizing deathbed homilies and narratives of 
tested faith in favor of more general tributes to the courage and self-possession of the deceased 
(Houlbrooke 323). Maintenance of the moral order overtakes devotion to God for its own sake. 
Concomitantly, the motif of conversion was increasingly used to absolve known sinners—at 
least, those who were members of the post-1688 elite. White Kennett’s funeral sermon 
exonerating the notorious Duke of Devonshire in 1707 particularly offended the devout (see for 
example John Dunton’s rejoinder The Hazard of a Death-Bed-Repentance [1708]). But even 
before that inflection point, the funeral sermon was developing a reputation for sycophantic 
apologetics. A 1703 “Hymn to the Funeral Sermon” often attributed to Daniel Defoe begins, 
Thou Great Preserver of Men’s Fame,  
Arise and Vindicate thy Name, 
Some nearer diffinition give 
Between the Darlings and the Sons of Shame, 
Quickly thy sinking Pow’r repair, 
Shew us both who, and what they are,  
That build on thy Prerogative: 
Record the Wonder in each Honest Breast, 
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How Men of Infamy should rise, 
By Ladders to Ascend the Skys? (1-10) 
 
The hymn’s point of departure is the funeral sermon’s power to define posthumous reputation, 
effectively acting as a ladder to heaven in a figure that mixes earthly and eternal posterities. The 
sermon’s power is acknowledged in the first line only to be swiftly turned against itself, as the 
writer challenges the sermon to vindicate its own name by recalling how to distinguish between 
the virtuous and the vicious. It was clear to this writer that the evangelical force of Rochester’s 
conversion was now licensing aristocratic decadence, just as the skeptics of deathbed conversion 
had feared it would.  
 A related development was the publication of the order and ceremonies of prominent 
funerals, chiefly in the 1720s. In their most austere form, these would consist of an itemized 
catalog of the procession, “with an Exact LIST of the Names of All who are to assist at that 
Ceremony,” as the title page of the 1722 procession orders for the funeral of John, Duke of 
Marlborough reads. In other words, the publication worked to venerate the prominent and 
publicize new trends in funeral and mourning fashion: 
VIII. The Body under a Canopy, in an Open Chariot; a compleat Suit of Armour, Steel 
gilt, lying on the Coffin, Vizor clos’d; and at the Head Mr. Ridley, at the Feet Mr. 
Mitchell; A Horse of Honour, led by Captain Reed on Foot, in Soldiers Mourning, 
assisted by two Grooms. (5) 
 
Demonstrating rigorous attention to the performance and paraphernalia of mourning, these 
documents gesture toward a new emphasis on the spectacle of bereavement, at the expense of the 
final moment and its eschatological implications. 1722 also saw the republication of excerpts 
from Francis Sandford’s 1677 Genealogical History of the Kings of England detailing the first 
post-Restoration state funeral, given for George Monk, Duke of Albemarle, who had played an 
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instrumental role in restoring Charles II to the throne. The 1722 republication thus offered a 
nostalgic historical and anthropological vantage at a moment when funerary politics were being 
renegotiated in accordance with a new model of polite, commerce-friendly gentleman. It follows 
that the interest lies in the pageantry. There’s no deathbed narrative here: the Duke is seen out of 
this world by the third clause of its eleven-clause opening sentence. On, then, to the lavish 
description which is its true occasion: 
Upon the Bed was placed a Coffin covered with a fine Holland Sheet of eight Breadths, 
and eight Ells long; and over that, a Pall of black Velvet of eight Breadths, and eight 
Yards long, and thereupon the Effigies of the Duke in a Buff Coat, and over that 
compleat Azure Armour with gilt Nails, a Cravat about his Neck; his Ducal Coronet and 
Cap turned up with Ermine on his Head, invested in his Ducal Robe of Crimson Velvet, 
about his Neck a Collar of the Order and George; under the Head a Cushion of Crimson 
Velvet, with Fringe and Tassels of Gold; his Sword girt about him, and a great fringed 
Taffata Scarff, fringed with Gold, about his Waste; upon his Left Leg a Garter of blue 
Velvet; the Buckles and Letters of Gold, and a gilt Truncheon in his Right Hand. (5) 
 
After submerging the reader in its inventory, the account pivots into eleven pages of diagrams 
representing the marching formations of the procession. Albermarle’s service to the state 
threatens to recede into the litany of details, which could now generate a popular interest 
independent of their political aims and ends. We can observe in this short-lived genre the 
symptoms of a transformation in the art of dying, in two senses: first, toward a ceremonial 
formalism untethered from doctrinal or eschatological content, and second, from dying to 
bereavement—a phenomenon typically associated with Victorian Britain.  
While funerals were losing their evangelical force outside of the dissenting community, 
epitaphs were focusing on virtue and achievement, rather than the eschatological concerns of 
afterlife, resurrection, and reunion to come. These shifts allow Ralph Houlbrooke to conclude 
that “Appraisal of the [deceased] individual was increasingly concerned with the balance of the 
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life as a whole” (219). But while Houlbrooke’s induction helpfully draws out the worldly 
emphasis of the emerging eighteenth-century culture of death, this conclusion risks mistaking 
shifts in the function and representation of death for a diminution in its importance. By the same 
token, the emphasis on earthly posterity and virtue at the expense of heaven and the resurrection 
does not necessarily reflect a decline in religiosity. One of the architects of this shift was the 
devout Samuel Johnson, whose 1740 “An Essay on Epitaphs” declared, “The best Subject for 
EPITAPHS is private Virtue; Virtue exerted in the same Circumstances in which the Bulk of 
Mankind are placed, and which, therefore, may admit of many Imitators” (Gentleman’s 
Magazine 10:595). Indeed, when weighed against a seventeenth-century counterpart like Samuel 
Clarke’s Lives of Sundry Eminent Persons, Johnson’s Lives of the Most Eminent English Poets is 
remarkable for its relative lack of interest in its subjects’ ends, and for its refusal to moralize 
those ends. Instead, the deaths he records appear contingent and often grotesque in a manner that 
“levels the best with the unsatisfactory, extinguishes personality, and shifts the emphasis of the 
story away from distinctiveness onto common humanity” (Grundy 264); his admiring treatment 
of Addison’s death is in fact a notable exception. Skeptical of attempts to extract meaning from 
death, Johnson is a surprising precursor to the romantic-centered corpus of this study, which has 
been commonly understood to define itself in cultural and aesthetic opposition to Johnson’s 
influence. This suggests how, as a problem of representation, death cuts across the cultural and 
aesthetic boundaries that shape literary history: the question of how death signifies produces 
unexpected alliances and surprising divisions, registering at a deep cultural level the complex 
relationship between religion and the public sphere. While from the present Johnson’s 
demystifying approach to death may appear as an instance of the tectonic reorganizing process of 
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secularization, he in fact treated death as he did for religious reasons, just as Addison saw his 
worldly neoclassical death as distinctively Christian.  
The Obituary 
 The deep transformation in the culture of death finds another symptom in the decline of 
the published funeral sermon. This was one of the primary genres by which conversion 
phenomena like Rochester’s were disseminated in the latter seventeenth century. Just as life 
writing was dominated by accounts of death, so the funeral sermon was often less concerned 
with the life lived than the terms of its conclusion. This approach had a certain moral and 
theological coherence since, as exampled in Jeremy Taylor’s twin volumes The Rule and 
Exercises of Holy Living and The Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying, living and dying shared a 
program. Vigilant preparedness for death, acceptance of one’s fate, anticipation of salvation, and 
steady tranquility in the face of witnesses and mourners—this cluster of behaviors and affects 
guided both life and death. These terms and norms would mutate away from this aggressively 
eschatological vision over the first quarter of the eighteenth century, especially among the class 
of commercial and gentry interests that Addison was attempting to organize. With the mutation 
toward a benign, meliorist religiosity (especially in the elite corners of society) came the decline 
of the funeral sermon—a point only emphasized by the fact that such sermons remained popular 
among dissenters, which surely sped their decline among the Anglican gentry.13 And as 
Houlbrooke notes, staunchly radical dissenters felt that even the funeral sermons of their fellow 
nonconformists were falling under the pernicious influence of a mollifying politeness (325).   
                                                      
13 The remaining Anglican funeral sermons were shifting to a more practical and moralistic idiom with 
reduced doctrinal emphasis. Some funeral sermons came to have little to do with death, and even less 
with theology, as exampled by John Graile’s sermon on the death of Rev. William Helyet, titled Vigorous 
Longevity; or, A good old age, and the best way, both to Attain it; and to Improve it (1720). 
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However, if the eschatological content of Jeremy Taylor’s art of dying diminished over 
the eighteenth century, one of my central contentions is that the deep structure of holy dying 
persisted in apparently secularized and antithetical contexts. It has become a scholarly 
commonplace that, in Pat Jalland’s words, “the fervour of the ars moriendi tradition was in 
decline in the age of Enlightenment, to be rekindled by the Evangelical revival [of the nineteenth 
century]” (19). (And, indeed, Taylor’s book was in the bedrock of the nineteenth-century 
Evangelical imaginary as well as that of the High Church Tractarians, the conventions he 
codified “deeply rooted in the corporate memory of the faithful” [Wheeler 32; see also Jalland 
10].) But the ars moriendi, holy dying, and associated concepts and practices did not simply 
vanish into an eighteenth-century hiatus. Their impulses were channeled into new forms, in some 
cases producing decisive transformation, in others facilitating deep continuity under the veil of 
novelty. One such connection between apparently distinct or antithetical forms can be drawn 
between the fall of the funeral sermon and the rise of the obituary. The early obituary could be 
described as a secular phenomenon in the sense that the periodical was institutionally distinct 
from the church in a way that the funeral sermon was not.14 However, the obituary preserved the 
cultural energy of the theology of the final moment in a new discursive guise. If the obituary was 
often divested of crucible-of-faith narratives that now smacked of sectarianism, the manner of 
death remained the decisive narrative feature.  
                                                      
14 Jose Casanova’s Public Religions in the Modern World disaggregates the commonplace coupling of 
modernization and secularization into a series of distinct propositions that both analytically and in 
practice need not entail each other. From this perspective, the early periodical might be seen as a 
secularizing force in the sense that it represents the dispersion of cultural authority, but this version of the 
secular does not necessitate any decline in religious belief or practice.  
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Moreover, the rise of the obituary in no way signals a decline in religious belief or 
practice on the part of its readers. What it did register was a reorganization of cultural function 
and authority that opened new avenues for production, consumption, and monetization. 
Understood in these terms, we can recognize the development of a constellation of commercial 
practices that might be called the death industry, which would reach its apex in Victorian Britain. 
By transforming deaths into narratives packaged into a salable print object, both the published 
funeral sermon and the obituary advance the “work of mourning,” if we allow in Freud’s phrase 
an inflection of commodity fetishism (14:245). To begin to suggest the shape of the death 
industry’s give and take: where the grave plot and funeral services must be purchased on behalf 
of the deceased, the obituary gainfully employs the dead as news for distribution in the 
increasingly competitive periodical market. There is a self-sustaining circularity to these 
relationships. 
The obituary originated in The Gentleman’s Magazine, founded in 1731 by Edward Cave. 
As the first monthly digest, the Gentleman’s featured copious announcements of birth, marriage, 
promotion, death, and burial. Most of these entries went unadorned beyond name and residence. 
Some, like that of the Mrs. Reed who opened this study, gave a brief account of the 
circumstances of death, with scarce mention of the deceased’s life. It is worth noting that this 
approach is the inverse of the contemporary British obituary. James Fergusson, obituaries editor 
of The Independent from 1986-2007, has argued in print and practice that obituaries should be 
understood as “documentaries of lives, not deaths”: the reason such documentaries wait for death 
is that death closes life—Seneca’s logic again—thereby presenting a unified whole for biography 
to work upon. Under this directive, the circumstances of death are treated at decorous distance.  
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But such decorum would have been foreign to eighteenth-century Britain, for which 
death did not merely end life. It was life’s story. Indeed, the early obituary was nothing more 
than an account of death. The model of obituary as biography did not emerge until John Nichols 
assumed the editorship of the Gentleman’s in 1778, transforming the obituary into a descendent 
of John Aubrey’s Brief Lives (1669-96) tuned to the imperatives and interests of coffeehouse 
culture—with a special focus on the emerging category of “news.” Deaths could partake of news 
when they were especially odd, especially apt, or especially ripe for allegorizing. Funeral 
sermons and biographies sought to edify and make holy, while periodicals cultivated news by 
prioritizing novelty and curiosity. Their sensationalism was rarely mitigated by religious 
commitments. Thus, a Gentleman’s entry for December 26, 1736 records the death of one 
Craven Kinnerfley, Esq., 
late High Sheriff for Staffordshire, of a Shot in his Thigh from a Gun which the Keeper 
of his Park having laid down, was discharg’d by a Greyhound running over it. His Thigh 
was cut off, and his Groom’s Arm, which was Shot thro’ by the same Bullet, but he is 
recover’d. (6:55) 
 
If not for the improbable grotesquerie of his end, it seems unlikely that Esquire Kinnerfley would 
have made the Gentleman’s pages. 
 The sensationalized narrative of Kinnerfley’s death might represent one stray filament of 
the unraveling ars moriendi, which lost its specific ideological aims but retained its affective 
force as it unspooled into the modish world reflected in the coffee house periodical. This is not 
simply a matter of trading in devotion for lurid fixation, since that exchange would assume that 
the two forms of investment are distinct, rather than interrelated. In fact, the lurid, the morbid, 
and the holy were not antithetical categories under holy dying, but rather interdependent aspects 
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of a culture of death formidable in its reach and persuasive power.15 As death narratives were 
embedded in new formats and genres for a mutating consumer base, the mandate to proselytize 
fell away, reapportioning affective and sentimental emphases and thereby opening new 
orientations toward death and new ways of dying. We can understand Kinnerfley’s obituary, 
then, as a symptom of the process by which the print culture of death was decoupled into discrete 
elements. The shocking—and its polite, gentlemanly cousin, the curious—had value even where 
(or because) shorn of its salvific aim. 
Philosophical Death 
Print culture facilitated what Robert G. Walker has called “the era of public death” 
(“Public Death” 22), transforming death into a testing ground for moral philosophy, an extension 
of and demonstration of the care of the self, and, not least, an evangelizing technology. As dying 
became a kind of argument, it migrated from Rochester’s evangelizing example to ascendant 
sensational media like novels and periodicals, and to the political stage. As debates within 
Christianity became debates about the necessity of Christianity, the program of holy dying was 
increasingly appropriated to polemical ends by skeptical enlightenment philosophers, who 
rechristened the practice “philosophical death.” While the philosophers often claimed the death 
of Socrates as their model, the self-conscious publicity of their deaths owed as much to 
                                                      
15 Early eighteenth-century publications often traced an arc from the sensational to the edifying, in which 
the latter justified the inclusion of the former. These instances often emphasize the sensational selling 
point while subordinating the improving material. Consider, for example, the narrative relayed in the long 
title of one 1710 publication printed by the notorious Edmund Curll: The Case of John Atherton, Bishop 
of Waterford in Ireland; Who Was Convicted of the Sin of Uncleanness with a COW, and other 
Creatures; for which he was Hang’d at Dublin, December the 5th, 1640. With A full Account of his 
Behaviour after his Condemnation, and the Letters he sent to his Wife and two Daughter the Night before 
his Execution. To which is added The Sermon Preach’d at his Funeral, in St John’s Church, Dublin; with 
some farther Account of his Life. The moral may be clear by the end, but it’s less certain how many were 
still reading at that point.  
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Rochester. Philosophical death was no less theatrical than holy death, and relied upon the same 
dispositions and affects, namely resignation and consolation. This continuity is clear in the 
painting that recapitulated a long-running philosophical obsession with the death of Socrates, 
Jacques Louis David’s La Mort de Socrate (1787). David’s canvas features the philosopher 
serenely pointing upward as he accepts the cup of hemlock, surrounded by distraught disciples. 
His followers give expression to the grief that he disregards: buttressed by their performances of 
loss, Socrates can ignore them, tranquilly awaiting his abundant recompense. In exchange, his 
example assures his disciples that when the time comes, they too may die like philosophers.16 
Indeed, some troublesome skeptics wondered whether Christ himself had died such a good death, 
accusing his father of forsaking him and all that. Surely, they hinted, Socrates wore it better. 
At stake was the longstanding claim that only faith—and the promise of the hereafter that 
lay behind it—could ease the terrors of death. Religion was essential to one’s eternal fate, but it 
was also a pragmatic psychological necessity in this world. A common argument held that there 
were no true atheists, only parlor speculators who denied God in good health but would run back 
to him as soon as the prospect of death arose. Skeptical arguments had to be uttered with dying 
breaths to achieve any practical authority. The philosophers were complicit in this framing, since 
they too had a stake in death. Baron d’Holbach argued that state ministers had long used the 
afterlife as a tool to manipulate their subjects, promising compensation for injustices suffered 
and regulating conduct under threat of damnation. He insisted that there is nothing mysterious or 
sublime about death—it is an intelligible biological transformation, and as such, “if [man] were 
                                                      
16 Socrates was equally a model for the bereaved: upon the death of his wife, Henry Fielding asked 
himself, “How would Socrates have acted on this Occasion?” (Thomas, Henry Fielding 223). I discuss the 
eighteenth-century inheritance of Socrates’s example at length in chapter two.  
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to form a true idea of it, he would cease then on to fear it” (Nature and Her Laws 1:207). Yet any 
“true idea” of death is occluded by the nexus of church and state power, a nexus sustained by the 
fear of death: “All human institutions, all our opinions, conspire to augment our fears and to 
render our ideas of death more terrible and more revolting” (1:209).17 These arguments were not 
enough by themselves, however. Skeptics needed to offer a practical alternative to Christian 
consolation to answer the existential demands of mortality. The strategy here was to decouple the 
bodily rhetorics of the good death from their Christian superstructure—demonstrating that 
serenity, consolation, and resignation did not depend upon devotion. The greatest British theorist 
and practitioner of the enlightened death was David Hume, who claimed, via James Boswell, that 
“he was no more uneasy to think he should not be after his life, than that he had not been before 
he began to exist” (Life of Johnson 1:362). This was the wager of the philosophical death: to die 
well without God.  
Skeptics like Hume performed their own versions of holy dying with heightened 
discipline and vigor, as I discuss in the second chapter. Hume’s death concluded a lineage of 
sectarian deathbed controversy that dates back to the death of Martin Luther, and received a 
grotesque coda in the death of Thomas Paine (on Luther see Laqueur 187-189; on Paine see 
Walker, “Public Death” 21-23). Pamphlet wars over the circumstances of death followed the 
passing of great sectarians, freethinkers, skeptics, and atheists—and sometimes began while they 
were still breathing. The belief systems these figures represented were profoundly shaped by 
debates over their deaths (see Israel 295-301). Spinoza, for example, was transformed by his 
                                                      
17 A visitor to d’Holbach’s salon reported that the Baron’s atheism was in fact rooted in the experience of 
death: “I was told that the baron’s System and his passion in sustaining his views originally came from 
having seen his first wife die and the thought of an eternity of horrors and torments for her. This sorely 
moved his heart and marked a new era for him” (Christianity Unveiled lvi). 
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followers’ deathbed narratives into a simulacrum of Christ, “approach[ing] death in a serene, 
indomitable spirit…almost as if elated to sacrifice himself for those who had scorned and 
persecuted him” (Israel 296). His opponents meanwhile saw only vanity, pride, and self-
deception in the dying philosopher’s refusal to the accept God. Death had become infidel 
propaganda. As Hannah More argued, “the boastful accounts we sometimes hear of the firm and 
heroic deathbeds of popular but irreligious characters” were fabrications designed solely to 
eclipse eternity (2:159). 
 The furor surrounding Spinoza’s death set the template for the very public afterlife of 
David Hume. Faced with his own end, Hume sought to prove that religious belief was not only 
unnecessary but antithetical to a tranquil death. He saw death as a means to advance his larger 
contention: Christianity was a hindrance (at best) to the development of a polite, commercial 
society. Hume’s skeptical, probabilistic epistemology was revolutionary, and his naturalistic 
genealogy of morals was radical, but each concluded with a conservative reaffirmation of the 
status quo, based not in innate or divine truth but rather in habit and convention.18 Similarly, 
                                                      
18 Especially in his political writing, Hume often sounds positively Burkean:  
It is not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may 
be rejected, if we can discover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may 
safely be made, even though the success be doubtful. An established government has an infinite 
advantage, by that very circumstance of its being established; the bulk of mankind being 
governed by authority, not reason, and never attributing authority to any thing that has not the 
recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try experiments merely upon 
the credit of supposed argument and philosophy, can never be the part of a wise magistrate, who 
will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and though he may attempt some 
improvements for the public good, yet will he adjust his innovations, as much as possible, to the 
ancient fabric, and preserve entire the chief pillars and supports of the constitution. (“The Idea of 
a Perfect Commonwealth,” Essays 512-513) 
And he consistently disavowed “patriotism” (which he associated with oppositional factionalism) and 
“liberty”: 
The frenzy of liberty has taken possession of us, and is throwing everything into confusion. How 
happy do I esteem it, that in all my writings I have always kept a proper distance from that 
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Hume’s death was his most forceful rhetorical performance of the virtues of a secular worldview 
because it replaced the specific ideational contents of the good death but maintained and 
perfected its formal structure. While figures like d’Holbach and Hume managed to break up the 
Christian monopoly on deathbed consolation, their tactics of demystification relied upon a 
redoubled investment in the myth-making function of death. Accordingly, death’s signifying 
power was further amplified by philosophical attempts to renegotiate the politics of the afterlife. 
An irony here is that while he perfected the good death, in his youth Hume’s all-
encompassing skepticism led him even to doubt death, which makes him an early ancestor in the 
genealogy traced in the following chapters. However, taken collectively, enlightenment 
skepticism worked to consolidate rather than oppose the ideology of death by transforming the 
deathbed into a privileged stage for political theatre. Rochester’s death had inaugurated a new 
kind of evangelical politics of death, and Hume turned evangelical death against itself. Christian 
apologists responded with a pyrrhic effort to dissolve the argumentative force of public death, 
and by the early nineteenth century, the deathbed was no longer viewed as an arena for Christian 
polemic. But while Robert Walker claims that this period saw the end of public death, I argue 
that it simply changed forms—freed from immediate and obvious theological consequence into a 
more nebulous cultural realm, and ultimately, into narratological and aesthetic territory. Keats’s 
death remains the signal example of this phenomenon. His friends anticipated the capacious 
poetic value of his death well before it happened; it was diligently recorded by his companion 
Joseph Severn as it unfolded; and it was memorialized and monumentalized by his circle after 
                                                      
tempting extreme, and have maintained a due regard to the magistracy and established 
government…. (Letters 2:191-192) 
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the fact. J. H. Reynolds offered an apt vision of the peculiarly social transcendence to which his 
friend would graduate in the afterlife of “fame”:  
The dead have become blended with, and spiritualized in, their poetry;—and they are no 
longer mortal men. They have passed into fame, and we can only hear their names 
echoing about the air-clad world, day after day, and for ever. (Selected Prose 232) 
 
While death became a stage for the ambitions of rationalists and skeptics, even those who 
believed they were living in a new dawn of Reason found a limit in death. William Godwin, 
despite his belief in human perfectibility, acknowledged that the dead “have an empire” over the 
mind that cannot be overcome. His proposals on the subject of death have a surprisingly Burkean 
inflection, including a plan for an “Atlas of those who Have Lived, for the Use of Men Hereafter 
to be Born” that would document the burial sites of “the illustrious Dead of all ages.” The arch-
utilitarian Jeremy Bentham—who had his body dissected and preserved so that his corpse could 
continue to preside at University College London—admitted as his death neared that the “subject 
of ghosts has been among the torments of my life” (10:18). Nor, in the case of death, was there 
any clear opposition between Christianity and enlightened materialism. John and Charles 
Wesley, founders of Methodism, drew parallels between Newton’s gravity and ghosts: both were 
unseen and inexplicable forces that nonetheless acted in this world (Laqueur 77). The rise of 
worldly posterity I have described is itself a rather spectral phenomenon, birthed in the 
performative space where lives (and deaths) enjoy an afterlife of circulation in text.   
 Samuel Johnson was one of the few eighteenth-century figures to downplay the 
significance of deathbed performance. But while he did not foreground it in his Lives of the 
Poets, he was not personally unconcerned with death. In fact, he was famously terrified of dying, 
and admitted to feeling that “the whole of life is but keeping away the thoughts of [death]” 
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(Boswell, Life of Johnson 320). The enigma of death haunted him, portending “an entrance into a 
state not simply which [‘man’] knows not, but which perhaps he has not faculties to know,” and 
he equally feared the judgment it heralded, “the final sentence, and unalterable allotment” 
(Works 4:47). Still, Johnson did his best to find his terror salutary, recapitulating the language of 
the previous century’s ars moriendi heritage even as he rejected the notion that there could be 
any suitable or fitting death: “Nothing confers so much ability to resist the temptations that 
perpetually surround us, as an habitual consideration of the shortness of life” (Works 2:470). 
James Boswell was endlessly anxious that Johnson would fail to die as well as Hume the infidel, 
thus proving Hume’s point that piety (and the fear of judgment that lay behind it) was inimical to 
the good death. Boswell pestered Johnson on this score to the point of harassment—needlessly 
and counterproductively, since Johnson, one of the century’s great melancholics, was more than 
capable of sustaining his own fear and anxiety.  
But Johnson was equally capable of transmuting fear and anxiety into theological 
argument: as far as he was concerned, fear was a surer sign of piety than complacent serenity, 
which could only betray an overweening confidence in the sinner’s grace. He was deeply 
skeptical of deathbed theater, Hume’s performance included, which Johnson viewed as 
obnoxious, deceitful vanity. As he lamented, “[s]carce any man dies in publick, but with 
apparent resolution; from the desire of praise which never quits us” (Boswell, Letters and 
Journals 3:154). Better to face God in terror than blithely turn away. But Johnson’s campaign 
against the good death was a lonely one, and it was read symptomatically by his contemporaries. 
Joseph Towers’s early biography of Johnson offers a characteristic view: 
It is related by Mr. Boswell, that Dr. Johnson once said, that “he believed hardly any man 
died without affectation.” When he made this declaration, he seems to have been 
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influenced by his own habitual dread of death, which was certainly beyond what men 
ordinarily experience. There can be no reasonable doubt, but that men of great and noble 
minds have often died, even on public scaffolds, and especially in causes of the justice of 
which they were fully persuaded, with firmness, and even with chearfulness, without 
affectation. It is dishonorable to human nature, and injurious to some of the most 
illustrious characters that ever existed, to suppose otherwise. (3:415-416) 
 
From this perspective, the good death represents a uniquely human capacity to transcend the 
vicissitudes of biology. It expresses our capacity for will, resolve, and reason. To doubt it is to 
“dishonor” human nature. Despite his unparalleled influence, Johnson could not disturb the 
century’s regime of what Lawrence Lipking has aptly termed “competitive dying,” which only 
speaks to the phenomenon’s ubiquity and power (296).  
Death the Leveler  
I have noted that Johnson believed epitaphs should deal in “private virtue”—the sort 
applicable to “the Bulk of Mankind,” as opposed to the modes of virtue specific to heroic action 
in public life. Here Johnson was not alone, but while in principle anyone could die well, in fact 
the art of dying applied some rather stringent means-testing. If examples of good deaths could be 
drawn from all walks, there was no doubt that the Addisonian play of life concluding in the good 
death was written for the gentleman.19 By default, almost everyone died in obscurity, as Samuel 
Pepys had observed in his diary: “even to die well, the prise of it is not considerable in the world, 
                                                      
19 Addison’s neo-stoic approach to death was in fact more gender-restrictive than the Puritan model it 
sought to replace. Longstanding tradition held that the perils of childbirth necessitated preparation for 
death, and for the women who survived it, labor was understood as kind of trial run at dying. Women 
were thus thought to have a special intimacy with death before the fact. For example, the long title of 
William Perkins’s Salve for a Sicke Man (1595) specifies that the text “may serve for spirituall instruction 
to 1. Mariners when they goe to sea. 2. Souldiers when they goe to battell. 3. Women when they travell of 
child.” Moreover, insofar as they could not speak in church, the deathbed allowed women to offer 
declarations of faith with profound authority in a semi-public venue. These speeches were frequently 
recorded, as when Oliver Heywood documented the “strange extacy” in which his “modest” wife 
Elizabeth fervently urged continuing faith in God before her death of consumption (1:66-68). 
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compared to the many in the world that know not nor make anything of it” (4:338-339). This is 
because dying well was not simply a spiritual matter: it required an audience, with all the 
material resources entailed therein. The familiar iconography of the thronged bedchamber was a 
privilege of the gentry and the wealthier of the middle sort, since the lower orders did not have a 
household of servants and unoccupied relations to see them through to the end.  
Moreover, as many recognized, the manner of one’s death was decided primarily by 
one’s social station and the nature of the affliction, rather than the innate poise or determination 
of the sufferer. Graceful self-possession was the exception, since, as Houlbrooke writes, 
“[l]ethargy, delirium, excruciating pain, and sudden death made countless thousands of people 
incapable of anything resembling a model deathbed performance” (218). Pat Jalland has argued 
that actual examples of the good death, which “demanded an unusual mixture of prolonged but 
painless illness, fortunate family circumstances, and virtuous life,” were extremely rare (11). 
Indeed, the sages of the ars moriendi made sure to qualify their prescriptions in order to account 
for the instability of terminal illness. William Perkins encouraged his readers to be willing to 
discount the “rauings and blasphemings,” “frenzies,” and “vnseemly motions and gestures” of 
the dying as “the effects of diseases” (26, 168), while Henry Montagu, Earl of Manchester 
cautioned that  
Raving, and other strange passions, are many times rather the effect of the disease, rather 
than moving from the minde. For upon Deaths approaches, choler fuming to the braine 
will cause distempers in the most patient soule. In these cases the fairest and truest 
judgement to be made, is, that sins of sicknesse, occasioned by violence of disease in a 
patient man, are but sins of infirmity, and not to be taken as ill signes or presages. (100) 
 
Lastly, Jeremy Taylor enjoined,  
make no judgment concerning the dying person by his dying quietly or violently, with 
comfort or without, with great fears or cheerful confidence, with sense or without, like a 
  
47 
lamb or like a lion, with convulsions or semblances of great pain, or like an expiring and 
spent candle: for these happen to all men, without rule, without any known reason, but 
according as God pleases to dispense the grace or the punishment for reasons only known 
to Himself. (4:435-436)  
 
But in such moments of nuance, these writers were paddling against a powerful cultural current 
that they themselves had helped to generate. The discursive force of holy dying easily 
overpowered the genre’s subtler reflections on its own limits. 
One antidote to the good death was the death-the-leveler trope, which had a classical 
pedigree via Diogenes and Lucretius (and some warrant in Socrates), as well as powerful 
scriptural corroborations. This figure became a site of debate—and rhetorical play—over the 
politics of the afterlife. Thomas Gray offered its best-known eighteenth-century formulation in 
his tribute to the anonymous “mute inglorious Miltons” of a country hamlet, the “Elegy Written 
in a Country Churchyard,” which cautions against overvaluing worldly distinction: 
The boasts of heraldry, the pomp of power, 
And all that beauty, all that wealth e’er gave 
Awaits alike the inevitable hour. 
The paths of glory lead but to the grave. (33-36) 
 
Equally present was Hamlet’s pithier version: “your fat king and your lean beggar is but variable 
service—two dishes, but to one table. That’s the end” (4.3.23-25). Hamlet’s vastly influential 
engagements with death, from the “undiscovered country” to Yorick’s skull, tend to drive toward 
the shared existential burden of human mortality. But if kings and beggars meet in finitude, this 
invocation of shared fate softens—perhaps even licenses—the brutal disparity between the 
opulence of kings and the indigence of beggars. The destination may be the same, yet causes of 
death were thoroughly classed: beggars did not die of gout, and kings did not die of exposure. 
Though it seems to challenge the hubris of worldly power, the death-the-leveler trope can thus 
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function as a textbook form of mystification, in John Berger’s sense of a “process of explaining 
away what might otherwise be evident” (Ways of Seeing 15-16). It assured readers that what 
looks like lordly privilege is a mere hallucination—just one of the phantasms we encounter in 
our brief, delusive time on earth.  
These dynamics course through Anna Lætitia Barbauld’s “To the Poor” (1795), which 
tries to unbind the afterlife from its repressive worldly functions:   
But when thou feel’st the great deliverer nigh,  
 And thy freed spirit mounting seeks the sky, 
 Let no vain fears thy parting hour molest, 
 No whispered terrors shake thy quiet breast, 
 Think not their threats can work thy future woe, 
 Nor deem the Lord above, like Lords below. 
 Safe in the bosom of that love repose 
 By whom the sun gives light, the ocean flows, 
 Prepare to meet a father undismayed, 
 Nor fear the God whom priests and kings have made. (13-22) 
 
Cleaving the Lord above from Lords below, Barbauld seeks to disarm the church-and-crown 
appeal to divine judgment as a mechanism for social control. The poem did not see publication 
until 1825, the year of Barbauld’s death, and its 1790s radicalism felt uncomfortably prescient 
amid the bank panic of 1825 and the rising social pressure that would eventually wring a reform 
bill out of parliament. In a typical response, Henry Colburn’s Literary Gazette worried that “Mrs. 
Barbauld’s fiery democracy sometimes carried her almost the length of profanation” (24:611). 
But Barbauld knows the limits of her prophetic voice, which can offer only an alternative 
promise of future peace that has no traction in the very world of all of us. And that promise can 
come only after she urges resigned forbearance: “Bear, bear thy wrongs, fulfil thy destined hour, 
/ Bend thy meek neck beneath the foot of power!” (11-12). What remains is a desperate hope 
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displaced entirely onto the hereafter, a hope that must also bear the weight of retrospectively 
redeeming the present.  
Perhaps the most striking interrogation of death as leveler comes in Blake’s “Little Black 
Boy.” Born into slavery, the boy receives a consolatory lesson from his mother meant to help 
him endure his existence: the mark of subjugation that is “black bodies” will be transcended in 
heaven, where race will disappear. 
And we are put on earth a little space, 
That we may learn to bear the beams of love, 
And these black bodies and this sun-burnt face 
Is but a cloud, and like a shady grove. 
 
For when our souls have learn’d the heat to bear 
The cloud will vanish we shall hear his voice. (13-18) 
 
The boy misunderstands and universalizes her lesson, projecting a similar marking onto the 
white boy he serves. Both, he imagines, must transcend shade in death, in an astonishing 
denaturalization of whiteness:  
 And thus I say to little English boy. 
 When I from black and he from white cloud free 
 And round the tent of God like lambs we joy: 
  
Ill shade him from the heat till he can bear, 
To lean in joy upon our fathers knee. (22-26) 
 
His vision of the afterlife, however, is an afterlife of service, a heavenly facsimile of the slave 
economy that casts doubt on the promise of Christian transcendence. Yet if heaven remains a 
slave state, there’s a powerful current of transvaluation here, in which the white boy’s need for 
“shade” becomes a kind of weakness that must be overcome, an obstacle to God’s love. What 
emerges is a remarkably dense exploration of what the idea of the afterlife can and cannot offer, 
and to whom, in the way of transcendence.  
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 Byron’s Don Juan takes up this problem in rather different tone, reworking Hamlet’s we-
are-all-food-for-worms figure in a running skeptical engagement with the Prince of Denmark’s 
well-ventilated musings. As Byron’s narrator jests, even the “sublimest of mankind” are 
ultimately  
    Consigned  
  To those sad hungry jacobins the worms, 
Who on the very loftiest kings have dined (6.13) 
 
To its opponents, the French revolution was a catastrophically “unnatural” event (Burke returns 
again and again to this charge), but Byron turns this notion on its head, wryly intimating a 
Jacobinical order of nature down to the very soil. For if the order of nature is radically 
egalitarian, how natural is the human hierarchy of kings and beggars, and the residual legacy of 
divine right from which the constitutional monarchy draws its authority? But this is far from Don 
Juan’s last word on the subject; four cantos later Byron will absorb the leveling work of the 
worms into the prerogative of a traditional image of kingly Death:  
  And Death, the sovereign's sovereign, though the great 
       Gracchus of all mortality, who levels 
     With his Agrarian laws the high estate 
       Of him who feasts, and fights, and roars, and revels, 
     To one small grass-grown patch (which must await 
       Corruption for its crop) with the poor devils 
     Who never had a foot of land till now,— 
     Death’s a reformer, all men must allow. (10.25) 
 
Yes, death curtails high estates into burial plots, but only because death is a tyrant, demanding 
universal submission to its power. We are all serfs in the fiefdom of death. From the sovereign’s 
sovereign to the Jacobinical worms, Don Juan’s construals of death suggest that contemplation 
of death is less an object of high philosophy than a parlor game of fine analogizing.  
  
51 
Yet Byron is not always at play in Don Juan. In the preface to cantos six, seven, and 
eight, he addresses his refusal to suppress his posthumous attacks on Foreign Secretary Lord 
Castlereagh, who was loathed by radicals for his violent repression of Ireland and role in the 
restoration of the European monarchies after Napoleon’s defeat: 
In the course of these cantos, a stanza or two will be found relative to the late Marquis of 
Londonderry, but written some time before his decease. Had that person’s oligarchy died 
with him, they would have been suppressed; as it is, I am aware of nothing in the manner 
of his death or of his life to prevent the free expression of the opinions of all whom his 
whole existence was consumed in endeavouring to enslave. That he was an amiable man 
in private life, may or may not be true; but with this the public have nothing to do; and as 
to lamenting his death, it will be time enough when Ireland has ceased to mourn for his 
birth. (Major Works 589) 
 
Byron distinguishes between the temporalities of public and private life: insofar as public works 
generate a legacy that outlives the deceased, the public person remains subject to “free 
expression” even after death. Whatever his private graces, Castlereagh must be measured by the 
aggregate of his worldly consequence. This is the long ramification of the logic engineered by 
Gilbert Burnet in his account of the Earl of Rochester’s conversion, which extended life and 
works beyond death to account for the deferred temporality of print culture. Rochester’s death 
made it possible to conceive of the cultural posterity of dying as a kind of redemptive work. 
Castlereagh, after all, committed suicide, and his death was fashioned in the Tory press as a 
sentimental sacrifice in the idiom of romantic death.20 As he was honored with a state funeral, 
Byron railed: 
                                                      
20 The conservative New Times wrote,  
He laboured for thirty years in the service of the country. In this service he ruined a robust 
constitution, broke a lofty spirit, destroyed a first-rate understanding, and met an untimely death, 
without adding a shilling to his patrimonial fortune. What the country gained from him may never 
be calculated—what he gained from the country was lunacy, and a martyr’s grave. (Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh 1:88) 
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Of the manner of his death little need be said, except that if a poor radical, such as 
Waddington or Watson, had cut his throat, he would have been buried in a cross-road, 
with the usual appurtenances of the stake and mallet. But the Minister was an elegant 
Lunatic—a sentimental Suicide—he merely cut the ‘carotid artery’ (blessings on their 
learning) and lo! the Pageant, and the Abbey! and ‘the Syllables of Dolour yelled forth’ 
by the Newspapers—and the harangue of the Coroner in an eulogy over the bleeding 
body of the deceased—(an Anthony worthy of such a Caesar)—and the nauseous and 
atrocious cant of a degraded Crew of Conspirators against all that is sincere and 
honourable. (589-590) 
 
The machinery of poetic death, mantled in “learning,” licenses a profound revision of 
Castlereagh’s end. His fine manners are expressed in the medical precision of his suicide; his 
sacrifice wraps him the burial shroud of sentimentality and crowns him the “Werther of Politics” 
(590). The vogue of poetic suicide first flowered in the wake of the archetypal garret poet, 
Thomas Chatterton. Goethe wrote his Werther into the marginalized middle sort, and Werther’s 
downfall begins in earnest when he is humiliated by the aristocratic set of Fräulein von B.21 Yet 
now, Byron sensed, the idyllic cultural afterlife promised by poetic suicide was being seized as 
justification by the Caesarian tyranny of the counterrevolutionary state.  
Within Don Juan’s verse, Byron remains deeply skeptical of the romance of death—a 
romance his own Byronic heroes had helped to spawn. But he won’t let go of the subject, 
returning again and again to muse on what provokes and resists musing, blowing and popping 
the bubble of death: 
You know, or don't know, that great Bacon saith, 
       ‘Fling up a straw, ’t will show the way the wind blows;’ 
     And such a straw, borne on by human breath, 
       Is poesy, according as the mind glows; 
     A paper kite which flies ’twixt life and death, 
       A shadow which the onward soul behind throws: 
     And mine’s a bubble, not blown up for praise, 
     But just to play with, as an infant plays. (14.8) 
                                                      
21 As Georg Lukács declared, “Werther’s tragedy is the tragedy of bourgeois humanism” (45). 
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Suggesting a directive for a self-consciously directionless poem, this stanza fancies the play of 
poetry as a shuttling through a string of metaphors—a kite, a shadow, a bubble. Though it 
reflects the depths of the soul and navigates perilously “’twixt life and death,” poetry is, in truth, 
an ephemeral toy. Death floats in and out of the play space of the poem, where, like everything 
else, it proves at once absorbing and meaningless.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
DAVID HUME’S SECOND DEATH 
 In April of 1776, some five months before his death, David Hume left his home in 
Edinburgh for the waters of Bath. He was traveling at the behest of Adam Ferguson and Andrew 
Stuart, fellow Edinburgh luminaries who hoped he might recover from the digestive ailment that 
had withered away his famously corpulent frame. When his doctor Joseph Black objected to the 
journey, Hume quipped, “Have you no reason against it, but an apprehension that it may make 
me die sooner? – that is no reason at all” (Early Responses to Hume 9:278).1 To Ferguson and 
Stuart, whose insistence on the trip to Bath he held “answerable for shortening his life one week 
a-piece,” he cited the “good authority” of Xenophon: “suppose a man is dying, nobody has a 
right to kill him” (ibid.). Hume was determined to die jesting.  
This “ease,” “gaiety,” and “cheer” was not simply a reflection of the dying philosopher’s 
temperament (ERH 9:291, 300, 278). It was his last argument, an unmistakable polemic directed 
at the conventions governing the art of dying in the latter eighteenth century. It was rooted in a 
naturalistic interpretation of death as a simple biological cessation, stripped of sublimity, 
mystery, and transcendence. When his cousin John Home begged him to leave off the subject, 
Home reports, “he did so; but seemed surprised at my uneasiness, which he said was very 
nonsensical” (ERH 9:280). For the skeptic, the currents of morbid solemnity surrounding the 
deathbed reeked of superstition. Beyond its attempts to rethink the criteria of the good death,                                                       
1 James Fieser’s Early Responses to Hume is hereafter abbreviated to ERH. 
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Hume’s polemical death aimed to undermine the repertoire of belief and practice that gave dying 
its fundamental logic: Christianity itself.  
This project depended on the theatrical power of Hume’s dying performance. That is to 
say, it traded in one variety of credulity in order to dispel (what Hume saw as) another. The 
performance consisted simply in Hume continuing to be himself—refusing to allow the process 
of dying to influence the remainder of his life. He spent the last few months of his life 
entertaining, visiting, and editing his works. We know this because it is extremely well 
documented in the correspondence of the period. Samuel Jackson Pratt wrote that “for some 
weeks before his death, his situation became the universal topick of conversation and enquiry,” 
noting that “the most minute circumstances respecting his exit” were considered matters of 
public interest (ERH 9:310, 305). Interest in Hume’s exit was not limited to Edinburgh; updates 
on his condition traveled quickly to London and beyond. Among his friends, such reports were 
not simply news. They were recorded with an eye toward posterity, in the understanding that 
Hume’s remaining time on earth would be scrupulously analyzed and judged as evidence in the 
public trial of religious skepticism, as a persuasion, worldview, and way of life. Throughout the 
eighteenth century there was immense interest in the deaths of the famous and the notorious—
wherein the approach to death was scrutinized for edification, for salacious intrigue, or, in most 
cases, for some inextricable combination of both. Death was the ultimate testing ground of 
theological and moral theory, and moreover, for all varieties of Christianity, it was the portal to 
eternal life. Hume and his contemporaries understood that the stakes would be significantly 
higher in his own case, since he was making a case for the existential viability of confronting 
extinction, in a death that portended no future. They planned accordingly.  
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Collaborative Dying 
 First and foremost, these concerns entailed that Hume must die as he had lived. Hume, 
like most of the infamous skeptics of his era, drew on the classical tradition as a kind of counter-
scripture to the Bible. As such, he wholeheartedly embraced the neoclassical credo of the 
maintenance of character unto death—what Addison termed “uniformity”—on the assumption 
that one’s true character was revealed by the confrontation with death (see chapter one). In its 
structure and aim, this ideal was wholly at odds with the logic of deathbed conversion so 
influential in the latter seventeenth century; it was nonetheless adopted by mainstream Anglicans 
like Addison who took their religion pragmatically as a buttress to social norms. In this line of 
thought, unless he died avowing his positions, Hume’s rivals and opponents were free to dismiss 
the entire edifice of his thought. If his philosophy and his character could be sustained in death, 
on the other hand, then they must be taken as the unassailable truth of who and what David 
Hume was. The preacher William Agutter captured this sense of death as the testamental seal of 
a life’s ethos when he noted how skeptics “are anxious to affix the dignifying stamp of their 
death to the avowed principles of their lives” (7).  
But it was not sufficient that Hume continue to profess “infidelity”—or what we might 
more accurately call skepticism, since, though he was frequently accused of atheism, he 
remained at philosophical odds with the genuine atheists he had met in Paris. The viability of 
skepticism was not simply a matter of belief or unbelief. Hume had to show that his worldview 
could facilitate a good death, at the same time that he subtly renegotiated the criteria of that 
concept. The aim was to show that the demystifying naturalism of the Scottish Enlightenment 
was better suited to the behavioral norms of polite gentility than even the most polite and 
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privileged forms of Anglicanism. What Hume’s death sought, then, was to map specific 
dispositions and behavioral orientations onto an epistemological outlook. It worked to 
demonstrate—quite counterintuitively in 1776—that skepticism was more congenial than 
religion to the cultivation of a mannered and moral life. 
 In this context, “levity” was calculated to disrupt the solemnity of holy dying, which 
often and easily shaded into terror. As an opponent writing in The Christian’s Magazine 
recognized, 
If [death] were nothing more than a separation from all that we love in this world; the 
dissolution of our bodies; and the termination of our present mode of existence; there 
would be sufficient reason for approaching it with tender and solemn reflection. But 
when we add those anticipations of which very few, if any, can wholly divest themselves; 
that scene of “untried being,” which lies before us; and especially that eternity which the 
Christian revelation unfolds, death becomes an object of unutterable moment; and every 
sober thought of it bears upon the heart with a weight of solicitude which it is not in the 
power of unaided reason to remove. (1:419) 
 
While it might be admitted that Christian revelation supplies a particular and “unutterable” 
gravity to death, this writer goes on to insist that the mere possibility of life after death is reason 
enough to dismiss the “light and ludicrous speculations” of skeptics as signs of “the insanity of 
wickedness” (ibid.). Disputing this characterization would require precise maneuvering. The 
skeptic had to show that death was theologically and existentially nothing—James Boswell 
reports Hume declaring that the idea of annihilation made him “not the least” uneasy, “no more 
than the thought that he had not been,” referencing Lucretius (ERH 9:287). At the same time, 
such a demonstration had to tacitly admit that socially, in this world, death was everything. 
While logically compatible, these two notions would be difficult to hold together in practice. 
Hume’s performance had to recognize the argumentative import of his death at the same time 
that it denied its metaphysical freight. This is why levity comes to define Hume’s disposition 
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toward death. Levity could acknowledge death and disarm it in the same breath. By strenuously 
making light of death, and by ensuring that he was recorded doing so, Hume could leverage the 
political potency of death as public spectacle while subverting the solemnity and dread that were 
expected to attend it.  
 I have highlighted the recording and reporting of Hume’s death, from John Home’s 
comprehensive description of the trip to Bath referenced above to the epistolary flurry that 
followed every visit to Hume’s home, because I view his death as the collaborative performance 
of the Edinburgh literati. It was a closing statement delivered by the circle that found its center in 
Hume. The aim of this performance was not to categorically overturn the Christian art of dying 
as practiced by the polite classes, but rather to show how a naturalistic and skeptical worldview 
could offer a surer foundation for the performance of the good death than even the most refined 
forms of Christian belief. This new model of death had to recognize and emulate the way the 
Christian good death “structured the grieving process within a coherent framework” for both the 
dying and the bereaved (Jalland 12), to ensure that this skeptical alternative would fulfill the 
same social functions. To this end, Hume’s death retained the general structure of holy dying but 
reapportioned its ideological contents and affective balance.  
The controversy that followed Hume’s polemical death transformed the ideological 
significance of dying: the good death was no longer the special prerogative of the faithful. 
Subsequently, the unified standard of the good death fragmented into holy deaths and “happy 
deaths”—to use the term of disapprobation Hannah More employs in Practical Piety (1811).2                                                       
2 More is well known as a counterrevolutionary and Evangelical figure, less so as an aficionado of 
deathbed scenes: “I know of nothing so interesting...as the closing scenes of a champion of 
righteousness.” She was no less interested in the deaths of infidels; Robin Furneaux writes that “she 
positively wallowed in the delicious agonies of the death-bed” (347). 
  
59 
Hume’s death thus consolidated a shift in the art of dying that began in the early eighteenth 
century with the introduction of classical (especially Stoic) influences, which had coexisted, 
sometimes uneasily, with devotional conventions working in the service of evangelism. After 
Hume, the evangelical potential of deathbed performance was thrown into dispute. But this shift 
did not lead to diminished interest in death and dying—only a destabilization of death’s 
theological ramifications.  
But Hume’s performance of death also clarifies the nature of his own philosophical 
transformation, from the sublimely obscure radical skeptic of the Treatise of Human Nature to 
the polite ease of the man of letters.3 Hume’s death distills this transformation because it relied 
upon a consolidated sense of identity, of persistence and “constancy” over time. Hume died well 
insofar as he remained absolutely himself—that is, he continued to perform his sociable public 
character—up until the moment he was no longer able to speak. This identity was authenticated 
and purified by the trials of dying: it confirmed the philosopher as a true skeptic. It is a deep and 
telling irony that Hume came to make his unwaveringly authentic identity the crux of his closing 
argument, because self-identity was the precise focus of the young philosopher’s most searching 
and scathing critique. 
Socrates the Humean 
Hume died on Monday, August 26th, 1776, likely of colon cancer. He departed in “a 
happy composure of mind,” without voicing “the smallest expression of impatience” and “free 
from… feelings of distress,” as Black wrote in a letter to Adam Smith. Of Hume’s death, 
                                                      
3 Jon Mee’s Conversable Worlds: Literature, Contention, and Community 1762 to 1830 places Hume at 
the center of the installment of “conversation” as an ideal and practice governing conduct, but also traces 
how Hume’s commitment to candid rational inquiry could threaten decorum (57-67).  
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“nothing,” the doctor insisted, “could have made it better” (Letters 2:449). It was not enough for 
Hume—“the Great Infidel,” as frenemy Boswell christened him—to die at ease. Hume’s death 
had to be unsurpassably tranquil. It had to go beyond the century’s great performances of 
Christian consolation, to sever any necessary bond between faith and forbearance, and to reveal 
the terror of eternal judgment as nothing more than a relic of enthusiastic delusion. For many of 
Hume’s critics viewed him as a kind of parlor skeptic, more interested in provocation than 
edification, with no true attachment to the views he fancifully professed. This was a view he 
himself did little to dispel: an early nineteenth-century commentator could look back 
nostalgically at the “infidels” of Hume’s era who, unlike the Jacobins and Painites of the 
revolutionary era, had the good sense to “addres[s] themselves solely to the more polished 
classes of the community”—those who knew well enough to treat skepticism as a kind of 
intellectual game.4 In the world of the salon and the rarified, genteel public sphere, convictions 
and propositions could be traded like currency. Hume was admittedly vain and iconoclastic, even 
confessing to a love of “literary fame” (Mossner 615, “My Own Life” §21). Surely, some critics 
supposed, he did not believe his disbelief.  
Death would test all such vain conceits. As Isaac Disraeli wrote, “When a great man 
leaves some memorial of his days, his deathbed sanctions the truth, and the grave consecrates the 
motive” (Miscellanies 102). These dynamics ensured that Hume’s departure from the world 
                                                      
4 This reading of Hume’s intentions was commonplace. A 1778 publication titled A Philosophical and 
Religious Dialogue in the Shades has a repentant “Hume” lament from hell,  
My free and paradoxical thoughts were not intended for the ordinary tribe of mankind, but for 
men of ingenuity and reflection, who are capable of judging for themselves. I well knew that the 
vulgar were not to be regulated by the principles of pure theism or philosophy. I did not mean to 
abolish those pious arts and ideas, which are found so useful and salutary in managing that class 
of men, I was only desirous to reduce them nearer the standard of probability, reason and truth. 
(ERH 10:86) 
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would be carefully observed and interpreted, shaping his legacy, eternal judgment 
notwithstanding. Hume’s opponents were hopeful. Surely the approach of death would dispel his 
affectations, such that 
all the subtlety of a skepticism, avowed in the vigour of gay and glowing youth; and of 
arguments to support them, written when the pulse was full, among the ardours of 
science, and for the sake of singularity, would, upon the bed of a lingering distemper, all 
fly off, as the prospect of dissolution became apparent, and leave their author in the 
agonies of terror-struck repentance, or in the horrors of overwhelming despair. (ERH 
10:12) 
 
The afterlife of Hume’s skeptical empiricism lay in the balance of his death. It was not enough 
for philosophy to prove theoretically persuasive. It would have to prove itself livable, which was 
in the era of “competitive dying” as it was for Montaigne: to philosophize meant learning how to 
die.  
It was in this context that the Edinburgh professor of chemistry William Cullen could 
derive not just relief but positive “satisfaction” in comportment of his dying friend. Reflecting a 
few weeks after the fact—“now that the curtain has dropped,” as he put it—Cullen declared 
Hume “truly an example ‘des grands hommes qui sont morts en plaisantant’ [of great men who 
died in jest]” (Letters 2:449). The reference is to the book by André-Francois Deslandes 
translated as Reflections on the Deaths of Free-Thinkers (London, 1713), and it distills Cullen’s 
underlying contention: Hume died in good spirits because he was an unbeliever, not in spite of 
the fact. His death was “truly agreeable, to me,” Cullen explains, “who have been so often 
shocked with the horrors of the superstitious on such occasions” (ibid.). Hell was the crux of the 
matter. Skeptics and rationalist dissenters were wondering how a just God could damn vast sums 
of souls to eternal torment. Why was it, moreover, that the morally rigorous seemed to suffer 
most from the anxiety of judgment? Samuel Johnson’s fear of damnation was legend: he averred, 
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“as I cannot be sure that I have fulfilled the conditions on which salvation is granted, I am afraid 
I may be one of those who shall be damned.” When his interlocutor asked what he meant by 
damned, he shocked his company by responding, “Sent to Hell, Sir, and punished everlastingly” 
(Boswell, Life of Johnson 2:554-555). By the mid nineteenth century, this concept of hell as 
eternal punishment was increasingly difficult to reconcile with emerging understandings of 
proportionate justice that shaped benevolent, mainstream Christianities. Hell, by contrast, 
seemed downright medieval, modeled on the spectacular punishments meted out by the tyrants of 
yore, and ill-suited to a polite, reforming society.5  
But in 1776, if Johnson’s outlook seemed grim and overbearing, it was nonetheless far 
closer to the theological center of lettered opinion than Hume’s. Hume and his peers understood 
that his death had the potential to shift this center, and it is partly for this reason that his last days 
were focused on worldly matters, rather than what might lay beyond. As Rousseau wrote in La 
Nouvelle Heloise, “The preparation of death, is a good life; I know of no other” (4:203). If death 
was to be understood not as a metaphysical transformation, but rather as the decommissioning of 
biological machinery, it required no particular spiritual preparation beyond the maintenance of 
character in what Hume called “common life.” Cullen devotes special attention to this emphasis 
on “common life”: “It is perhaps from trifles that we can best distinguish the tranquillity and 
cheerfulness of the philosopher, at a time when the most part of mankind are under disquiet, 
anxiety, and sometimes even horror” (ERH 9:292-293). Hume is placed at the vanguard of an 
enlightened elite distinguished by tranquility and cheer. Cullen refers here to the last words of 
                                                      
5 Where hell persisted, it was conceptualized more abstractly as separation from God (Jalland, “Victorian 
Death and its Decline” 235-237, and see more generally Rowell, Hell and the Victorians and Wheeler, 
Death and the Future Life in Victorian Literature and Theology). 
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Socrates, which the philosopher used to make good on his debt of a cock to Asclepius. This 
attention to common life represents a surer sign “of the tranquillity of Socrates, than his 
Discourse on Immortality” (ERH 9:293). Cullen’s preference for the suit of the cock over the 
state of the soul suggests an important distinction. Socrates could be a problematic reference for 
skeptics, since in the Phaedo he makes clear that the reason he does not fear death is that he is 
certain he will survive it in some form. In doctrinal terms, Socrates lands closer to the bishops 
than to Hume, especially if we consider Hume’s posthumously published essay “Of the 
Immortality of the Soul,” in which he denies the very sense of life beyond death Socrates had 
expounded. Thus what is “philosophical” in Socrates’s approach to death, according to Cullen, is 
not his theoretical position with respect to immortality, but rather his disposition as a dying man. 
He spent his last moments immersed in the discrete particulars of this world, not the next. It is 
here, in his tranquility, and in the maintenance of common life even at life’s end, that Socrates 
becomes a Humean.6 
A “perfectly wise and virtuous man” 
Cullen’s letter is dated September 17, 1776. Eight weeks later, Adam Smith brought out 
the definitive statement on Hume’s life and death in the form of a letter to Hume’s publisher 
William Strahan. Smith had proposed the letter to Hume during his last days as a supplement to 
                                                      
6 Donald Siebert has recently gone beyond Cullen and Smith to suggest that Hume’s death may actually 
compare favorably to that of Socrates. Siebert finds it ultimately irrelevant whether Hume truly felt the 
sense of serenity he performed: even if Hume was faking it, the fact that he “could create such a picture, 
or text, of what good death is—indeed of his own death—is itself a tribute to human dignity and worth” 
(Mortality’s Muse 67). What we find here, in this modern view of death as a test of human dignity, is a 
refurbished Addisonian perspective where performance goes to the very nature of truth. If a character can 
be performed unto death, then the mask fits. What this perspective leaves out is the sense of Hume’s death 
as a collective project, buttressed by an extensive network of support and parceled out across a great 
variety of reports and responses throughout the Edinburgh literary culture. 
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Hume’s brief autobiographical piece “My Own Life.” We know that both John Home and 
Strahan himself reviewed drafts of the letter, and while it is written from Smith’s perspective, its 
portrait of Hume’s last days draws on anecdotes that must have been reported to him, featuring 
members of the Edinburgh circle including Colonel James Edmonstoune, Alexander Dundas, and 
the aforementioned Joseph Black. Accounts like Cullen’s might be seen as preliminary drafts of 
Smith’s letter insofar as the latter elaborates some of the earlier documents’ claims and 
analogies, and quotes other accounts in part or in full. 
Hume’s “My Own Life” and Smith’s “Letter to William Strahan” were first published 
together as a pamphlet, with the understanding that they would preface future editions of Hume’s 
works. Smith had made the case to Hume that an account of the philosopher’s death could serve 
as both advertisement and testament to the value of his writings: “You have in a declining state 
of health, under an exhausting disease, for more than two years together now looked at the 
approach of death with a steady cheerfulness such as very few men have been able to maintain 
for a few hours, tho’ otherwise in the most perfect Health” (Correspondence 206). The wisdom 
expressed in Hume’s art of dying would retroactively authenticate the wisdom of his works.  
Smith’s letter is shadowed by the model of Christian death from which it departs, in the 
way that texts can generate significance through negation by departing from the horizon of 
expectations invoked by genre. The rhetorical aim was tacit but transparent: “The dullest 
observer cannot but perceive his design to compare Mr. Hume dying an infidel, with a Christian 
dying in the faith of Jesus” (Mason 3:369). Indeed, Smith’s manuscript contains an inflammatory 
comparison between Hume’s “real resignation to the necessary course of things” and the 
“Whining Christian…with pretended resignation to the will of God”—this, needless to say, went 
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unpublished (Correspondence 203). In case anyone might miss the point, Smith reiterates no less 
than five times that Hume died cheerfully. He shows us Hume’s friends repeatedly entertaining 
hope of his recovery, which Hume in each case playfully but firmly extinguishes. Hume is 
quoted here and elsewhere insisting, “I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any, could 
wish, and as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire” (ERH 9:297). The recurrence 
of this bon mot in the archive suggests that it had become a kind of mantra, and yet Smith 
appears eager to temper any air of flippancy:  
though Mr. Hume always talked of his approaching dissolution with great cheerfulness, 
he never affected to make any parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the 
subject [of his death] but when the conversation naturally led to it, and never dwelt longer 
upon it than the course of the conversation happened to require. (ERH 9:298)  
 
If Hume was perfectly comfortable discussing his death, if he appears to enjoy it even, he was by 
no means preoccupied with dying, nor did he gratuitously unsettle any of his less enlightened 
company.  
Having nuanced his image of Hume’s temperament to his satisfaction, Smith proceeds to 
his central anecdote, which is staged as a counter-devotional scene. We find that Hume has taken 
Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead for his deathbed reading in place of the Bible, trading Christian 
sublimity for pagan satire. But if in the structure of the deathbed scene Lucian plays the role of 
counter-scripture, Hume of course does not “believe” his Lucian. It is not revelation; he reads the 
Dialogues as an entertaining fiction that offers the desired ambiance for his coming journey 
across the river Styx. The implication here is that the Bible, too, is such a fiction, read in such a 
context to psychologically prepare for death’s approach. However, Smith intimates that while 
Lucian generates a sociable levity, the Bible generates antisocial affects of awe and terror. Hume 
imagines himself before Charon, not quite ready to board the ferry to the underworld, and yet  
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“I could not well imagine,” said he, “what excuse I could make to Charon in order to 
obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do, 
and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better situation than 
that in which I am now likely to leave them; I, therefore, have all reason to die 
contented.” (ERH 9:297-298) 
 
The ethical responsibility of the dying is wholly oriented toward the bereaved. Preparation for 
death is a social and economic endeavor; with these responsibilities met (and with such ease), 
Hume is free to jest, and to die. He goes on to invent “several jocular excuses, which he 
supposed he might make to Charon” in order to delay his passage: 
“Upon further consideration,” he said, “I thought I might say to him, ‘Good Charon, I 
have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time, that I may see 
how the Public receives the alterations.’ But Charon would answer, ‘When you have seen 
the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such 
excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat.’” (ERH 9.298) 
 
This jest is an apt emblem: Hume’s bid to continue living relies on his need to continue narrating 
himself. The picture of interminable revision becomes particularly acute when we consider that 
Hume himself saw his entire philosophical career as the distillation and re-presentation of the 
book he published before he was thirty, the Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). Robin Valenza 
notes how this episode discloses the “intersection and interchangeability” of self and story (139): 
we might say that Hume embeds the rewriting of his corpus within the carefully composed 
narrative of his death—a narrative which would in turn compete with the counter-narratives of 
his opponents.7 
                                                      
7 Valenza argues that Hume understood consciousness and literary narrative as isomorphic processes, and 
organized not only his autobiographical writing but also his philosophical writing according to narrative 
development: “Hume sought patterns for his own literary narrative in the endlessly self-revising cognitive 
processes of the human mind itself, and, in turn, found in written narration a model for explaining 
everyday mental habits” (137-138). By consolidating bodily memory into a mental narrative that 
organizes our sensations, we provide coherence and unity to our recollected experience. Where Valenza 
attributes this narratological consciousness to Hume’s sense of autobiography and philosophy, it applies 
nowhere more consequentially than in his approach to his own death.  
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Since revision will never end, it can be no grounds for delay. Hume thus tries another 
tack: 
“‘If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfal of some 
of the prevailing systems of superstition.’ But Charon would then lose all temper and 
decency. ‘You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you 
fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy 
loitering rogue.’” 
 
If the epithet “superstition” was commonly reserved for Catholics and vulgar enthusiasts, Hume 
was notorious for his arguments dissolving polite, reasonable Christian into its superstitious 
others. He had closed his trenchant attack on Christian revelation in “Of Miracles” with the 
withering assertion that the only miracle is religious faith itself: the “Christian Religion” 
even at this Day cannot be believ’d by any reasonable Person without [a miracle]. Mere 
reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is mov’d by Faith to 
assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the 
principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most 
contrary to custom and experience. (Philosophical Essays 203) 
 
As long as it insists upon the resurrection, the arch-miracle that “subverts” all understanding, 
even the most rational Christianity slides into crude superstition. Given Hume’s history, there 
was no mistaking what was intended by “superstition,” as George Horne, President of Magdalen 
College, declared in a thunderous rejoinder: “We all know, Sir, what the word SUPERSTITION 
denotes, in Mr. HUME’s vocabulary, and against what Religion his shafts are levelled, under that 
name” (ERH 9:390).8 Blithe paganism and mockery of death were galling enough. But this 
smugly enlightened attack on Christianity was beyond the pale, and ran afoul of even the 
                                                      
 
8 All pretenses are dropped in Cullen’s version of the anecdote, which gives the full phrase “Christian 
superstition”—though the word “Christian” was omitted from John Thomson’s transcription of the letter 
in his 1832 biography of Cullen (ERH 9:292, see also Mossner 601). Smith’s manuscript is even more 
offensive: Hume pleads with Charon to “have a little patience only till I have the pleasure of seeing the 
churches shut up, and the Clergy sent about their business” (Correspondence 163).  
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sympathetic London Review: “We do not indeed much approve an apparent levity here … 
[which] on so serious an occasion seems unbecoming and frivolous” (ERH 9:273).  
If this were not enough, Smith closed his encomium with an extravagant tribute that 
proclaimed Hume “as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as 
perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit” (ERH 9:300). This line was widely recognized 
as an echo of Plato’s epitaph for Socrates in the Phaedo—Socrates, who was, “we may fairly 
say, of all those whom we knew in our time, the bravest and also the wisest and the most upright 
man” (98, §118a). Cullen’s direct reference to Socrates has become a thinly veiled allusion, 
striving to canonize Hume as a secular saint. In the most generous reading, Smith has uncoupled 
wisdom and virtue from any necessary relationship to religion; alternatively, if these ideals were 
most fully realized in Hume, then Smith could be taken to suggest that irreligion enabled wisdom 
and virtue, or was inherently wise and virtuous. It was incendiary: James Fieser records thirty 
separate attacks on Smith’s letter (ERH 9:295). Ten years later, Smith recounted,  
A single, and as I thought, a very harmless Sheet of paper which I happened to write 
concerning the death of our late friend, Mr. Hume, brought upon me ten times more 
abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole commercial system of 
Great Britain [i.e. The Wealth of Nations]. (Adam Smith as Student and Professor 283).9 
 
                                                      
 
9 Whether coy or naïve, Smith was wise enough to keep his distance from Hume’s posthumous 
publications, the Essays on Suicide and on the Immortality of the Soul (1777) and the Dialogues on 
Natural Religion (1779). Hume left his nephew in charge of their publication in Smith’s stead. Their 
appearance nonetheless made matters harder for him. The Essays—a defense of the right to suicide and a 
refutation of the immortality of the soul—were so toxic that the editor of the 1783 edition felt obliged to 
include “Remarks, Intended as an Antidote to the Poison Contained in These Performances,” as the title 
page indicated. In other words, Hume turned out to be exactly who everyone thought he was. Hannah 
More’s Practical Piety (1811) used these publications to undermine Smith’s depiction of Hume, pressing 
the apparent incoherence of a Hobbesian materialist’s appeal to virtue, that “rich embalming of so noble a 
compound of ‘matter and motion’” (ERH 10:173). 
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A more temperate respondent granted Hume his manners and learning but wondered how Adam 
Smith could possibly “think any man ‘perfectly wise,’ who is not wise unto salvation” (ERH 
9:383, original emphasis). Others, like Horne, were apoplectic:  
Is it right in you, Sir, to hold up to our view, as “perfectly wise and virtuous,” the 
character and conduct of one who seems to have been possessed with an incurable 
antipathy to all that is called RELIGION; and who strained every nerve to explode, 
suppress, and extirpate the spirit of it among men, that it’s very name, if he could effect 
it, might no more be had in remembrance? Are we, do you imagine, to be reconciled to a 
character of this sort, and fall in love with it, because it’s owner was good company, and 
knew how to manage his cards? Low as the age is fallen, I will venture to hope, it has 
grace enough yet left, to resent such usage as this. (ERH 9:390) 
 
Horne’s characterization of Hume’s attitude toward religion is hyperbolic, but his anger targets 
the very real displacement of grave and exalted Christian virtue by sociable politesse. The 
naturalistic theories of morality that emerged from the Scottish Enlightenment took social 
stability, a pleasure and pain calculus, and the expedition of commerce as their main criteria. 
Virtue needed no recourse to the timeless or transcendent; appeals to these latter were in practice 
more likely to upset civil norms than to uphold them, which is why Hume could view such 
appeals as inextricable from the dangers of vulgar superstition.  
Competitive Dying 
 We are now in a position to identify the specific contours of Hume’s performance of 
death. Politeness as a social and economic value system came into ascendancy through a careful 
rapprochement with Anglicanism. The achievement of figures like Joseph Addison was to make 
this bond seem natural: to make politeness look like religion, religion look polite, and to make 
the dissenters who rejected the connection between the two appear deviant. Hume’s performance 
of death sought to finish the project of politeness by rescuing it from this rapprochement, and to 
sacralize its freshly secularized norms by commandeering the tropes and framing of the Christian 
  
70 
death ritual. Opponents understood what was at stake here, arguing that the fundamental 
concepts of holy dying became incoherent when expropriated out of the religious framework: “In 
the mouth of a Christian, ‘composure,’ ‘cheerfulness,’ ‘complacency,’ ‘resignation,’ ‘happiness,’ 
in death, have an exquisite meaning. But what meaning can they have in the mouth of one, the 
very best of whose expectations is the extinction of his being?” (Mason 380). Such arguments 
recognized that the prized affects and dispositions of holy dying were not universal properties, 
but rather emerged out of specific correspondence with the belief system they expressed and 
affirmed. While the devout saw Hume’s secularized performance of holy dying as a grotesque 
parody, in historical perspective it is remarkable how the structure of the Great Infidel’s death 
remained pervasively Christian.  
Though Smith’s interpretation of Hume’s character was contested and his motivation 
impugned, the event undeniably muddied the significance of the Christian good death. To be 
clear, there is no evidence that Hume’s death led to greater unbelief in any direct sense; Pat 
Jalland has shown that the ideal of the good death persisted into the late Victorian era in 
normatively Christian terms.10 What Hume’s death did do was challenge the widespread 
assumption that Christian faith was essential to the good death, and more generally, it unsettled 
the grounds of death’s interpretation. In this respect, the sheer variability of romantic-era 
                                                      
10 T. H. Huxley spoke to the continuing marginalization of skepticism and agnosticism—the term Huxley 
coined—in 1893, lamenting, 
I go into society, and except among two or three of my scientific colleagues I find myself alone 
on these subjects, and as hopelessly at variance with the majority of my fellow-men as they 
would be with their neighbours if they were set down among the Ashantees. I don’t like this state 
of things for myself—least of all do I see how it will work out for my children. (Life and Letters 
1:258) 
What separates Hume from this late Victorian sense of alienation is his attempt to link skepticism and 
sociability. Unlike the pugilistic Huxley, Hume thought that unbelief could contribute to a detached, 
disinterested worldview conducive to polite conversation and culture.  
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representations of death, especially in contrast to the carefully maintained standards of the 
eighteenth century, owe an indirect debt to Hume’s example. Some of Hume’s opponents were 
ready to simply dismiss the significance of the controversy, but this would entail surrendering 
the Christian monopoly on dying, and with it, one of the central practical rationales for belief. 
Despite his cordial relationship with Adam Smith, Edmund Burke found Smith’s letter to Strahan 
mere propaganda, written “for the credit of their church, and the members of no church use more 
art for its credit.” As for Hume’s death itself, “here was a man at a great age, who had been 
preparing all along to die without showing fear, does it, and rout is made about it. Men in general 
die easily” (Boswell in Extremes 270). This line of argument might win out, but only at great 
cost. If Hume’s death meant nothing, if it was that simple to die easily, then death was just 
another social performance, without any unique revelatory power.  
Samuel Johnson was equally skeptical of the skeptic, but took a slightly different angle. 
Pestered by James Boswell for comment, he declared, “[Hume] lied. He had a vanity in being 
thought easy” (Life 3:153).11 It was one thing to die publicly with “apparent resolution,” fueled 
by “that desire of praise which never quits a man”—especially an admittedly vain one. But how, 
Johnson asked, “is the dread of death to be supported in solitude?” (Boswell in Extremes 155). 
Like Burke’s, this strategy risked pyrrhic victory. By rendering solitude the true test of death, 
                                                      
11 This approach to Hume’s death remained popular well into the nineteenth century. Thomas Dick’s 1833 
On the Improvement of Society synthesized several lines of argument in its attack on Hume’s death—
questioning the jocular tone of the Charon anecdote, the authenticity of Smith’s letter, the plausibility of 
Hume’s views on the afterlife, and the sincerity of Hume’s performance itself:  
It is, indeed, altogether unnatural for a man who set so high a value upon his literary reputation, 
and certainly very unsuitable to the momentous occasion, to indulge in such childish pleasantries, 
as Hume is represented to have done, at the moment when he considered himself as just about to 
be launched into non-existence; and, therefore, we have some reason to suspect, that his apparent 
tranquillity was partly the effect of vanity and affectation. (336) 
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Johnson erected a firewall between death’s truth and public discourse. If a death entered into 
publicity, then it was marred by vanity and thereby falsified. Death was only meaningful insofar 
as it was sealed away from representation and dissemination. (We might want to ask Johnson, is 
it really easier to die serenely in the face of public pressure, with one’s legacy at stake, than to 
die serenely in private?)  
Boswell’s writings on the affair are perhaps most revealing of the particular threat 
Hume’s virtuous death posed to a mainstream Christian conscience. Having missed church one 
Sunday, Boswell decided to pay the philosopher a visit and see how he was dying. It soon 
became clear that Hume “persisted in disbelieving” and appeared undaunted by his coming 
“annihilation.” As they rallied over doctrine, Boswell found himself equally engrossed and 
repulsed, embarrassed by his own “good humour and levity” at so grave a moment and lured by 
the temptations of Hume’s reasoning into a temporary crisis of faith. The encounter left him 
“with impressions which disturbed me for some time” (ERH 9:288). This account comes from 
Boswell’s private journal, unpublished until 1931. His public treatment of the visit in the London 
Magazine was quite different:  
I myself visited a celebrated infidel when he was dying, and when I tried to raise the 
pleasing hope of a future state, he said, “You never see it but through the medium of 
Tartarus, or Phlegethon, or Hell.” I concluded that he must in his early years have had the 
idea of Religion so associated with that of misery, that he was instigated to exert himself 
against it as an enemy, without ever having candidly examined if it might not be a friend. 
A friend he would have found it. But vanity, as a fascinating mistress, seized upon his 
fondness, and never quitted her dominion over him. (“On Religion,” March 1782, No. 54) 
 
The currents of persuasion have reversed polarity. In Boswell’s private account, his queasy 
doubts induce “a sort of wild, strange, hurrying recollection,” a phantasmagoria of memories 
punctuated by visions of his “excellent pious mother” and the “noble” Dr. Johnson: “I was like a 
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man in sudden danger eagerly seeking his defensive arms” (ERH 9:287). In the public version, 
Boswell instead psychologizes Hume, as speculation about Hume’s childhood associations 
replaces Boswell’s confrontation with his own past. Hume has become “fond” instead of resolute 
and self-contained. And it is Hume, not Boswell, who is seduced—by the “fascinating mistress” 
vanity, who exercises her “dominion” over him.12 These seduction games have a uniquely 
Boswellian inflection, but they also convey the peculiar illegibility of the infidel’s virtuous 
death.  
The upshot is that by attempting to dismiss Hume’s death, Burke and Johnson were also 
dismissing deeply naturalized conceptions of death’s significance that, for someone like Boswell, 
had become wholly intuitive. Hume’s death could not be argued away, and many like Boswell 
could not simply ignore it. But even if the Burke-Johnson route proved persuasive, it threatened 
to take the devotional legacy of holy dying down with it. Christians might lose by winning. 
Sophisticated thinkers could still recover theological value from the process of dying, but it 
would require a good deal of subtlety, and subtlety was anathema to the very argumentative 
power of the Christian good death. The prospect of death had been a clear, substantial, and                                                       
12 In the Life of Samuel Johnson Boswell turns this trope around again, puffing himself in front of 
Johnson and the Rev. William Adams by insisting that no quarter is due to “infidels” like Hume: 
If a man firmly believes that religion is an invaluable treasure, he will consider a writer who 
endeavours to deprive mankind of it as a robber; he will look upon him as odious, though the 
infidel might think himself in the right…. An abandoned profligate may think that it is not wrong 
to debauch my wife; but shall I, therefore, treat him with politeness? No, I will kick him down 
stairs, or run him through the body; that is, if I really love my wife, or have a true rational notion 
of honour. An Infidel then shall not be treated handsomely by a Christian, merely because he 
endeavours to rob with ingenuity. (ERH 10:158) 
The threat to Boswell’s personal faith is displaced onto the feminized abstraction of religion, which then 
becomes analogous to Boswell’s wife. The skeptical philosopher in turn becomes the seducer who would 
cuckold the knight of faith. Yet Boswell’s comments elsewhere record how his violent resolution seemed 
to weaken in Hume’s presence: “I always lived on good terms with Mr. Hume, though I have frankly told 
him, I was not clear that it was right in me to keep company with him. ‘But (said I) how much better are 
you than your books!’” (ERH 10:148). 
  
74 
practical rationale for Christian belief: choose the hope of salvation, or you’re stuck with 
annihilation at best and damnation at worst. Now, things had fallen into a muddle.  
This uncertainty in turn amplified the polemics as believers sought to recover stable 
ground for a distinctively Christian practice of dying. In the era of what Lipking has called 
“competitive dying” (296), theological rejoinders to Hume’s death naturally took the form of 
comparison, amounting to a genre in miniature that emerged in the 1780s. Hume would be paired 
with a devout counterpart in order to show that, however tranquil or fearless, a skeptic’s death 
would always prove inferior to the death of a believer. George Horne appealed to the death of the 
sixteenth-century theologian Richard Hooker (306); John Mitchell Mason looked to Samuel 
Finley; and William Agutter, in the most ambitious and refined of these arguments, sought to 
demonstrate, against all appearances, that Samuel Johnson had died better than David Hume.  
Agutter’s sermon On the Difference Between the Deaths of the Righteous and the Wicked 
(1800, based on a 1786 sermon) depends upon a profound revision of the terms of Christian 
death. He quickly admits, “It must be obvious to every reflecting mind, that Religion does not 
always triumph over the fears of death,” and likewise, the infidel “may enjoy an apparent peace, 
or display a real indifference, at the close of life” (4). In fact, this was not at all obvious prior to 
Hume. The names of Diderot, Rousseau, and Voltaire had become bywords for the bad death that 
inevitably awaited unbelievers, no matter how confidently they broadcast their convictions while 
in health. (Whether each of those figures had in fact died badly is beside the point, as counter-
enlightenment representations of their deaths carried the day.) Dying opened the soul to eternity, 
where truth would inevitably be revealed. Yet in light of Hume’s death, the notion that 
righteousness (and righteousness alone) would lead to a peaceful end “has been weakened 
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because overstrained” (ibid.). Instead, Agutter sets out not to guarantee the blessed death of the 
believer, but to undermine the ostensible virtue of the skeptic’s death. The argument is narrower 
and more precise, the position fundamentally defensive. According to Agutter, Hume’s death 
was not courageous. It reflected only a “stupid indifference” mistaken for “fortitude,” in the 
same way that we can walk blithely along the edge of a precipice in the dark if we do not know it 
is there (5-6). Ignorant recklessness is not bravery, nor virtue. Examples abound of hopeful, 
triumphant, or ecstatic deaths among “The patrons of idolatry and superstition, of enthusiasm 
and heresy, of rebellion, ambition, and assassination” (7). We do not mistake such delusions for 
grace. Conversely, fear—even terror—is an understandable and appropriate response to the 
prospect of entering the abyss beyond life. Fear acknowledges the existential gravity of death, 
which Hume’s superficial levity had denied. 
Agutter thus admits the full extent of Samuel Johnson’s anxiety and despair—his 
“morbid melancholy” and “horrible hypochondria,” well-documented in footnotes (17, citing 
Robert Anderson’s Life of Samuel Johnson)—but denies the implications that Hume’s advocates 
had drawn. According to Agutter, Johnson’s suffering was the fruit of his profound devotion, and 
his suffering thereby places him in the company of Christ crucified. This reasoning extends to 
the manner of death, which may, rather than expressing the sign of grace, appear the most 
onerous and terrible of trials: “As the righteous then are not distinguished by marks of earthly 
favour in their lives, it may be but consistent with the same comprehensive system of Divine 
Wisdom, that they should not be more distinguished in their deaths” (14). The process of dying is 
no prefiguration of the ascent to heaven nor, for that matter, the descent to hell. Reward awaits 
the believer only after death, and from this view, how one dies cannot be read as a preview of 
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eternal fate. Taken collectively, Agutter’s arguments disarm the threat posed by Hume’s death by 
throwing all moral and eschatological interpretation of the mode of death into doubt. “Rather 
than judging of others, and drawing doubtful conclusions from their latter ends,” he counsels, 
“our only business is with ourselves” (17). We are left with a sublime, mysterious vision of 
Christian death, aimed at fortifying the faithful. This vision saves death’s theological force, but it 
offers little to believers seeking hope and reassurance in the face of death, still less to those 
unconvinced of the virtues of suffering, and nothing at all to the skeptics Agutter is ostensibly 
trying to persuade.  
The Impartial Spectator and the Buffered Self 
Samuel Jackson Pratt may have overstated the case when he declared, “Never were the 
pillars of Orthodoxy so desperately shaken, as they are now, by [Hume’s death]” (ERH 10:11). 
But the collaborative performance of Hume’s death did tell a persuasive story about what kind of 
person Hume had been, with consequences for the theological and argumentative significance of 
death. The story of Hume’s death was, at core, that he had been consistent and uniform in his 
beliefs and his conduct—and implicitly, that he had been thereby more himself, and more 
authentic, than prominent Christian contemporaries like Johnson. From Hume’s “My Own Life” 
to Smith’s “Letter to William Strahan” to Pratt’s Apology for the Life and Writings of David 
Hume (1777), each representation of Hume’s life and death attested to his magnanimity and 
consistency of character. Hume’s opponents largely accepted the basic outlines of this story and 
focused the debate on its meaning and possible inferences; challenges to the facts were belated 
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and marginal.13 And indeed, this version of the story continues to appear in unqualified form in 
most contemporary treatments within and without academia.14  
Though he drew on the resignation and complacency of holy dying, Hume also appealed 
to neoclassical virtues to position his death as the antithesis of a conversion narrative, shunning 
the conventions of guilt and repentance, of faith surviving the crucible of doubt, in favor of a 
placid “constancy.” He was, Pratt argued, a “uniform Philosopher” who “died in the practice of 
his precepts, which he laid down in the earliest periods of a speculative life…. [E]very touch 
corresponds, corroborates, and confirms those which precede it” (ibid.). Hume’s tranquil 
consistency was tuned to counter the common picture of the volatile unbeliever that Burke would                                                       
13 A rumor emerged in the early nineteenth century that Hume’s entire performance was a sham—that he 
was, in fact, seized by mortal terror and barely succeeded in putting on a brave face for his guests. It was 
first printed in Benjamin Silliman’s 1810 travel journal, and the Quarterly Review then picked up 
Silliman’s anecdote, “related upon the authority of a gentleman old enough to have known the fact, and 
respectable enough to be entitled to full belief” (ERH 9:317). Hume’s nephew Baron David Hume 
demanded a retraction, to which the Quarterly diffidently acquiesced: it had never claimed the story was 
true, since it was run merely as an unverified rumor. But it reemerged in the Christian Observer in 1831, 
with expanded detail. The story had a “respectable looking woman” enter a stagecoach in which a group 
of gentlemen were discussing deathbed consolation. The example of Hume, an “acknowledged infidel” 
who died peaceably, inevitably arose. Here the woman spoke up: she wished she could assent to this story 
of easeful death, but she had in fact been his housekeeper and attendant, and while it was true that he was 
“jocular and playful” with his friends, in truth he was terrified. She is reported to have described his 
violent trembling and “mental agitations,” his intense fear of the dark, his refusal to be left alone, and 
“involuntary breathings of remorse” (ERH 9:324). This story recurs in Robert Haldane’s The Evidence 
and Authority of Divine Revelation (1834) and in his relative Alexander Haldane’s Memoirs of Robert 
Haldane (1852). These later retellings go further: Hume is said to have “observed on one occasion to the 
person who attended him, that he had been in search of light all his life, but that now he was in greater 
darkness than ever” (ERH 9:326). Adam Smith, too, gets drawn in: Hume supposedly promised Smith 
that in the afterlife they would meet in a shady run of meadows behind George Square near Hume’s 
house. As a result, “no persuasion” could convince Smith to walk the meadows at night (ERH 9:330). 
Each of these accounts appeals circuitously, through several sets of mouths and ears, to one or other 
unnamed “gentleman” said to be present in the stagecoach. It is perhaps a heavy load for a single carriage 
ride to bear. My aim is not to adjudicate between Smith’s and Silliman’s accounts, but rather to 
understand how they disclose the cultural import of narrating Hume’s death. 
 
14 The primary narrative given by Smith is repeated in the Wikipedia and the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entries, as well as in Simon Critchley’s Book of Dead Philosophers and Stephen Miller’s 
Three Deaths and Enlightenment Thought: Hume, Johnson, Marat.  
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later put to such effective counterrevolutionary use: “Of all men, the most dangerous is a warm, 
hot-headed, zealous Atheist” (Collected Works 4:50).15 This insistence on Hume’s consistency 
extended to portrayals of his philosophy: I have noted how in My Own Life Hume presents his 
philosophical career as an extended rewriting of his first book, the 1739 Treatise of Human 
Nature. This is true in almost every respect—excepting the case of the self. While his uniquely 
undeviating character served as the lynchpin of his dying argument, Hume’s Treatise had 
prosecuted a rigorous critique of identity. This earlier argument denies the very possibility of a 
persisting selfhood over time. For Hume to live as a polite man of letters and die a model of 
principled uniformity, he had to abandon this early critique and the styles and affects of its 
philosophizing. In other words, the elder Hume used his death to rewrite the relationship between 
death and the self.  
 The neoclassical ideal of uniformity represents an important moment in the history of 
what Charles Taylor has called the “bounded” or “buffered self.” This model of the self posits a 
boundary between what is inside and outside the self, and locates the materials of emotional life 
within the self. Taylor views this concept as a desideratum of modernity, contrasted with 
premodern “porous” models that conceive the self as vulnerable to cosmic forces or spirits—
“person-like powers” that shape the core of emotional life from outside the self, and, in so doing, 
preempt any strong sense of boundary between inner and outer space (Secular Age 36). The 
modern bounded self is also buffered because its logics explain the vicissitudes of experience in 
ways that deemphasize their significance: feelings are a byproduct of the way we process (e.g.)                                                       
15 Though this caricature became especially influential during the revolutionary era, it was recognizable 
throughout the eighteenth century. As Ralph Heathcote suggested in 1767, “[t]he term Fanatic has usually 
been applied to the Religionist, when disordered, and not in his right mind: may it not, under the same 
circumstances, suit as well the Philosopher?” (ERH 9:158) 
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hormonal fluctuations, which have no spiritual or ontological meaning in themselves. Humoral 
psychology might seem similar to this modern perspective but actually differs in a crucial sense. 
Black bile does not cause melancholy, it is melancholy—the physiological avatar of a spiritual 
malady (36-38). By contrast, there is no ontologically necessary relationship between 
biochemistry and first-person experience. Contingency and accidence abound. The contingency 
of the relationship between cause and effect demotes modern feelings down the ontological 
ladder, and thereby provides a psychological buffer against them: “It’s just my body chemistry.” 
While this contemporary line of explanation was not available to eighteenth-century neoclassical 
culture, we can see that the Stoic cult of self-consistency aims at the same psychological and 
behavioral goal of buffering between the self and its circumstance. The buffered self thus opens 
the possibility of “taking a distance from, disengaging from everything outside the mind” (38).  
Though Taylor does not discuss it in this context, the whole design of Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759) is to produce a naturalistic explanation of the buffered self that 
nonetheless remains sensitive to the flux of emotional experience. It sets out to explain how we 
experience vicarious pleasure and pain, and by what mechanisms we reproduce (or fail to 
reproduce) the joy or suffering of others in ourselves. Smith’s term of art here is the “spectator,” 
invoking a theatrical metaphor that conceives the transmission of feeling as a matter of 
representation and mediation. Crucially, Smith insists it is not the feeling but the situation of the 
other that affects us as spectators, and so we are not subjected to the other’s feelings in any direct 
sense:  
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the 
manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in 
the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our 
ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, 
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carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations. (11, §1.1.1.2)16 
 
Locked into our own sensoriums, we can enter the position of the other only virtually, through an 
act of imagination: “the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by bringing the 
case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer” (13, §1.1.1.4). This 
explains why we can feel embarrassed for someone who evinces no embarrassment of their own, 
or feel pity for a madman, even though “the poor wretch… laughs and sings perhaps, and is 
altogether insensible to his own misery” (15, §1.1.1.11). Sympathy thus reinforces the 
boundaries of identity and the distance between self and other, as the spectator’s pity serves to 
emphasize the gap between his consciousness and that of the madman. The spectator exercises 
his (normatively his) volitional imagination to experience compassion for the other, but such 
compassion can only be derived from an acute awareness of the madman’s violation of 
behavioral norms. Smith’s theory thus admits a powerful prescriptive and normative dimension 
at the same time that it promotes expansive “fellow-feeling.” This dual functionality allows 
Smith to assert that sympathy is morally benevolent while ensuring that our capacity to identify 
with others does not confuse social norms or undermine social stability.  
 As a repertoire of sympathetic identifications develops, these instances aggregate upward 
into an imaginative construction of “society.” This generalized social sense in turn revolves 
downward into a newly detached perspective on personal conduct, as if one were simultaneously, 
yet distinctly, both first-person person performer and third-person spectator. As Michael 
McKeon explains, this imaginative projection of society buffers: it is “a means by which we 
                                                      
16 All citations of the Theory of Moral Sentiments are to Knud Haakonssen’s Cambridge University Press 
edition (2002). Page number is followed by book, part, section, and paragraph number. 
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refine or distance ourselves from our own sense impressions” (377). Smith calls this internal 
sense of oneself as seen from the view of society the “impartial spectator.” This figure is 
impartial not because it emanates from a Platonic moral ideal theorized a priori, but rather 
because it identifies an emergent center of morality and manners out of the lived experience of 
social and commercial modernity.17 We cultivate a virtual representation of society within 
ourselves, through which we continuously evaluate our conduct. Revealingly sliding into a 
disciplinary metaphor, Smith writes, “I divide myself, as it were, into two persons…I the 
examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is 
examined into and judged of” (131, §3.1.6). The trial motif hardens the structural opposition 
between self and other, as the “impartial spectator” transforms into an “awful and respectable 
judge” (169, §3.3.25). On trial, Smith’s self operates “under the constancy necessity” of 
controlling “not only his outward conduct and behaviour, but, as much as he can, even his 
inward sentiments and feelings” (169-170, §3.3.25). And he is judged not according to a 
transcendental moral law, but to the immanent law of society itself. Our ostensibly private 
interiority answers to our own virtual incarnation of the public. The imperative to self-uniformity 
opens directly onto disciplinary society.  
A “funeral oration of myself” 
 Once we internalize society in the form of the impartial spectator, we can modulate our 
own sympathetic fluctuations against the actuality of our experience. And once we learn to 
measure our own feelings and conduct against this virtual standard, we are no longer entirely                                                       
17 John Money writes of an increasing awareness especially among the commercial classes that, despite 
widespread belief in its providential ordering, civil society was “a human artifice,” predicated on “the 
collective imitation and communication of human example rather than on the obedient mimesis of 
transcendental order and divine ordinance” (“The Masonic Moment” 360). 
  
82 
dependent upon the sympathetic responses of others, since we have an internalized ideal other—
a “man in the breast”— to judge their judgments. Virtual society comes to stand in for, and can 
be counterposed against, actual society.  
These dynamics offer a revealing perspective on Hume’s depiction of himself in “My 
Own Life,” which was intended as an epigraph to his works and an epitaph to his life. It features 
“little more than the History of my Writings; as, indeed, almost all my life has been spent in 
literary pursuits and occupations” (Mossner 611, §1).18 Sublimating his self into his writing, 
Hume translates Smith’s model of sympathy into a theory of literary production and reception. 
Absorbed in learning, he is pictured as the attractor at the center of a series of external 
contingencies, none of which leave any lasting impression. In Hume’s telling, his “literary 
pursuits and occupations” are uniformly met with indifference and disapproval. And yet he 
remains unalterably himself, unaffected by external praise or censure, until by sheer persistence 
he has achieved renown. His literary career is defined by his decision to follow his conscience—
his impartial spectator19—over and against the whims of the public, which eventually comes to 
recognize his genius. His success is thus predicated on a sublime individuality that is not 
iconoclastic or antisocial, but rather appeals to a higher, more refined sociability latent in polite 
culture. Actual society ascends to its virtual potential by learning to appreciate Hume.  
Hume’s literary disappointments begin with the Treatise, which, he claims, “fell dead-
born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the 
                                                      
18 Citations of “My Own Life” refer to the appendix to Ernest Campbell Mossner’s The Life of David 
Hume (1980), given as page number followed by paragraph number. 
 
19 Hume anticipated Smith’s concept: “The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in society and 
conversation, makes us form some general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove 
of characters and manners" (Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 166). 
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zealots” (612, §6). This is a misleading claim, as Mary and David Norton have shown that the 
Treatise received a significant amount of attention for a work of its kind. By comparison, George 
Turnbull’s Principles of Moral Philosophy (1740) went unnoticed by the periodicals that 
reviewed Hume’s Treatise. The reviews Hume did receive were, however, uniformly negative.20 
This is to say that “My Own Life” sees Hume carefully modulating the narrative of his 
disappointments to fit the story of selfhood he needs to tell. It is important that the Treatise be 
ignored rather than rejected because, as he explains, he determined its failure “had proceeded 
more from the manner than the matter,” refining the “remote and abstruse” centrally by 
abandoning the critique of identity (612, §8; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 12). If 
the problem was not the content but the presentation, then the Treatise could be simply rewritten, 
and the subsequent writings are staged as nothing more: as he recounts, “I… cast the first part of 
[the Treatise] anew in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,” and soon after he refers 
to his “Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, which is another part of my treatise, that I 
cast anew” (612, §8-9).21 These publications are portrayed as repetitions of the same argument, 
newly attuned to a genteel reading audience but without compromising its interior constitution. 
                                                      
20 The most comprehensive bibliography of responses to the Treatise is in Fieser’s Early Responses to 
Hume (10:318-19). Fieser records six notices with editorial comment and six incredulous reviews. The 
first review in The History of the Works of the Learned is typical: it concludes that though the anonymous 
author of the Treatise “deals mightily in Egotisms, he is no less notable for Paradoxes,” assuming 
throughout “the Air of a Sphinx” (3:32, 18). 
 
21 The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding accordingly opens by distinguishing between “easy 
and obvious” philosophy intended to cultivate the manners and “accurate and abstruse” philosophy 
engaged in the business of what Kant will call critique. Speaking in the personified voice of “Nature,” 
Hume describes the obstacles to the pursuit of the latter: “Abstruse thought and profound researches I 
prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless 
uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall 
meet with, when communicated” (3-4). Hume’s aim is thus to translate the profound researches of the 
Treatise into an “easy style and manner” (3) 
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The point is that Hume has always been a fully realized self; what changes is simply the way he 
modulates the zone of contact between himself and the public.22  
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith uses the figure of attunement to describe 
sympathetic negotiations between spectator and performer. Drawing on the example of a man 
who has lost his son, Smith posits that the bereaved “longs for that relief which nothing can 
afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the spectators with his own.” He moves the 
spectators to reflect his grief (note that this is already a public scene) by “flatten[ing]” and 
“lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with him” 
(27, §1.1.4.7). The sufferer thus sympathizes with his spectators, recognizing and anticipating the 
gulf between their affective positions, and modulating his performance of grief so as not to 
overwhelm his onlookers (28, §1.1.4.8). Emotional performance is standardized—“tuned”—
through this process of reciprocal identification. Hume’s narrative of recasting the Treatise is a 
dilated and textualized version of this process. Accordingly, it emphasizes the immutable core of 
his thought alongside his rhetorical and generic turn to the mediating distance of polite letters, set 
against the cloister of arcane metaphysics.  
The text’s litany of disappointments serves to spotlight Hume’s placid temperament, and 
in this respect it advances his preparation for (public) death. Though his revisions of the Treatise 
into the Enquiries are said to initially fail, the author, “being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine 
temper,” continues in kind. Additional disappointments, he insists, “made little or no impression 
                                                      
22 A Weekly Magazine obituary suggests how successful this strategy was—at least in certain quarters. 
Hume is described as the “author of the History of England, essays moral and political, &c.” It continues: 
“It would be altogether superfluous to give a panegyric upon an author, whose character is so well 
established, and whose merit as a political writer is universally acknowledged” (original italics, ERH 
9:333).  
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on me,” and, “not being very irascible in my temper,” he reports having refrained from “all 
literary squabbles”—though he learns “by Dr. Warburtons railing, that the books were beginning 
to be esteemed in good company” (612, §9). This well-placed dart suggests some experience at 
squabbling, and in fact, Hume did not passively perdure through the controversies his writings 
occasioned, but was an avid controversialist and “hardy combatant,” as the sympathetic 
Analytical Review called him in 1795 (22:469). He lived under the ongoing threat of official 
church censure, he had been publicly denied a philosophy chair on two occasions,23 and he had 
engaged in a farcical and very public controversy with his erstwhile friend Rousseau.24 Privately, 
he was often neither disinterested nor sanguine, decrying that the English were “relapsing into 
the deepest Stupidity, Christianity and ignorance” (Letters 1:498). However, these aspects of 
Hume’s life are left out of the “History of my Writings,” presumably because they would 
undermine the sense of sublimely unperturbable detachment that makes for the text’s core 
argument. Hume must remain perfectly himself, but without seeming intransigent or defensive. 
Where history cannot balance these imperatives, it is omitted.                                                        
23 Hume continued to arouse appointment controversy from beyond the grave. In 1805, a candidate for the 
Chair of Mathematics at Edinburgh University named John Leslie came under attack for the offense of 
praising Hume’s theory of causality in a footnote. A pamphlet war between the clergy and Leslie’s 
supporters ensued, and Leslie’s supporters “won” by successfully refuting the notion that Hume’s theory 
of causality necessarily led to atheism. Nonetheless, it is astonishing that thirty years after his death, the 
mere mention of Hume in certain settings was sufficient to start a pamphlet war. On the Leslie 
appointment controversy, see Henry Cockburn’s Memorials of his Time (1856), as well as John G. Burke, 
“Kirk and Causality in Edinburgh, 1805,” J. B. Morrell, “The Leslie Affair: Careers, Kirk, and Politics in 
Edinburgh in 1805,” and Ian Duncan, Scott’s Shadow, 133-135. 
 
24 Hume had escorted Rousseau to England so that he might escape sedition charges, but Rousseau in his 
“infinitely resourceful paranoia” soon imagined that Hume was in league with his persecutors and 
publicly accused him (Critchley, Dead Philosophers 155). Even though most of those aware of the 
situation saw Rousseau as deeply unstable and delusional, Hume could not resist publishing a pamphlet 
defending his own conduct in the matter, damaging the reputations of both figures. Hume’s feud with 
James Beattie also goes unmentioned: Beattie’s vitriolic attacks on Hume were so widely praised that was 
awarded a £200 pension by King George III for championing the cause of Christianity.  
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Hume’s unwavering focus on his own narrative of resilience makes the causal links 
between the events of his life difficult to follow. In his own account, his History of England is 
initially even more obnoxious than his philosophical work, uniting “English, Scotch, and Irish, 
Whig and Tory, churchman and sectary, freethinker and religionist, patriot and courtier” in “one 
cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation” (613, §11). Despite the reaction to the 
History and the lackluster response to his new philosophical writing, which comes “unnoticed 
and unobserved into the world,” he somewhat inexplicably admits to becoming immensely 
successful, “not only independent, but opulent” (614, §17). It is altogether unclear how he 
becomes known as perhaps the preeminent historian of his age, but the deep implication seems to 
be that the public has slowly but steadily come to appreciate the value of what it previously 
ignored or despised.25 The portrayal of his terminal illness introduces another careful negotiation, 
this time between an insistence on his abiding happiness coupled with the Stoic art of dying’s 
emphasis on detachment. To the former end, he states that he has, “notwithstanding the great 
decline of my person, never suffered a moment’s abatement of my spirits; insomuch, that, were I 
to name a period of my life, which I should most choose to pass over again, I might be tempted 
to point to his later period.” But, despite his replete happiness, “it is difficult to be more detached 
from life than I am at present” (615, §20). This detachment rises into an astonishing self-epitaph 
in which Hume converts references to self into the past tense: 
To conclude historically with my own character. I am, or rather was (for that is the style I 
must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my 
sentiments); I was, I say, a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, 
social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and                                                       
25 Liz Stanley uses the causal obscurity of Hume’s account to connect it to his philosophical critique of 
causality, presenting life itself as a discontinuous series of happenings from which we can derive 
succession but not cause and effect: “events simply follow earlier events, with Hume writing no 
‘explanation’ of the how and why of these” (12). 
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of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, 
never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. (615, §21) 
 
This conversion from present to past tense transports the narrative from the time of writing to the 
time of reading. Hume the historical actor, the “character,” is committed to the past, while Hume 
the author speaks in the present whenever the text is read. The shift from present to past, author 
to character, offers the removed vantage of an impartial spectator, imbuing his assessment of his 
own character with a sense of objectivity. It is an emblem of perfect detachment, at the same that 
it “emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments.” In the terms of sympathy, this gesture sees 
Hume identifying with his audience—his judges in the future—whom he joins to evaluate Hume 
the historical personage. But by affecting to become a member of his audience, he also preempts 
their judgments with his own.  
Sympathy, Passion, Porousness 
Hume’s performance of death was modeled on Adam Smith’s theory of self and 
sympathy, which negotiates between self-consistency and detachment on one hand, and, on the 
other, a scrupulous anticipation of the thoughts, feelings, and responses of the audience. Smith’s 
theory is in fact a refinement of Hume’s own take on the relationship between identity and 
sympathy, developed in the early Treatise. However, there is good reason why the late Hume 
would come to present his dying self in Smithian rather than Humean terms. For Hume’s early 
thinking on identity and sympathy does away with the self altogether. Not to put too fine a point 
on it: Hume’s early writing had killed the self, and, in the same volume, Hume had rehearsed his 
own spectacular textual dissolution—a bad death that anticipates and inverts the virtuous self-
epitaph of “My Own Life.” The early argument about identity was so publicly noxious and 
personally distressing that he left off further philosophizing on the subject, even deflecting 
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criticism of the Treatise by noting that he had never claimed authorship of the anonymous book. 
This did not stop his critics from seizing on it as the definitive statement of his thought, and it 
loomed over his work beyond his death. I am proposing that Hume’s virtuous death in 1776 was 
an attempt to rewrite his own logic of identity—to counteract the death of selfhood he had 
already performed in text forty years prior.  
The relationship between sympathy and personal identity in the Treatise can be helpfully 
contrasted with Smith’s work. We recall that in Smith’s theory of sympathy, I do not directly 
experience the feelings of the other; instead, I experience what I would feel were I in their 
situation. Only after constructing an imaginative model of the situation of the other that is 
nonetheless centered on myself instead of the other do I experience “fellow-feeling.” This is 
effectively fellow-feeling for myself as myself, since Smith takes it as given that I have no 
access to the contents of the other’s interiority. And crucially, this imaginative reconstruction of 
the feelings of others must be willed by Smith’s spectator. The very terminology presumes a 
sealed, bounded subjectivity. 
Hume’s theory by contrast eliminates much of the mediation present in Smith’s model. 
According to Hume, 
The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations, nor can any one be 
actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in 
strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the 
affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements 
in every human creature. (1:368, §3.3.1.7)26 
 
                                                      
26 Citations of the Treatise of Human Nature refer to David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton’s 2007 
Clarendon edition. The volume and page number are followed by book, part, section, and paragraph 
number.  
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Invoking the Aeolian harp, Hume figures “the minds of all men” as sensitive matter vibrating in 
correspondence. Through sympathy, the affections of others touch us from the inside, effecting a 
kind of corporeal exchange at a distance. It is an anti-volitional model of mind in which the 
affections are the agents, “readily pass[ing]” between persons. Hume is moreover profoundly 
skeptical of the anthropocentric “imagination” at the core of Smith’s theory—a point 
underscored by the grammatical reduction of the “human” to a type of the “creature.” Where 
Smith privileges the situation of the other over the feelings they perform, Hume’s model of 
sympathy allows either the situation or the performance of feeling to do the work of 
transmission. Like Smith, Hume assumes that we are in principle epistemologically barred from 
the thoughts and feelings of the other.27 But even though “No passion of another discovers itself 
immediately to the mind” (ibid.), the preconscious linkage between internal feelings, outward 
expressions, and situations is so powerful that the epistemological problem of other minds has no 
practical consequence:  
When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind 
immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the 
passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive 
the causes of any emotion, my mind is convey’d to the effects, and is actuated with a like 
emotion. (ibid.) 
 
The bodily “external signs” of passion can lead us, by association, to the situation that produced 
it, or if we encounter a situation that should evoke passion, we “immediately” find the passion 
itself reconstructed within us. Any part is sufficient to reproduce the whole, as feelings translate 
                                                      
27 Nancy Yousef highlights the tension in Scottish Enlightenment moral philosophy between its deep 
sense of epistemological uncertainty and its absolute confidence in the benevolence and efficacy of the 
sympathetic communication of feeling. Smith’s approach is unique in its untroubled conjunction of “the 
fact of compassion alongside the fact that we cannot know what others feel” (31). The rhetoric of Hume’s 
Treatise is by contrast rife with anxiety on this front. 
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seamlessly into situations and situations into feelings. There’s no conscious judgment and no 
mediating imagination to be found. Where Smith’s sentimental subject is like a thermostat, 
adjusting the temperature of emotional performance upward or downward to meet the spectator, 
the seamlessness of affective exchange in Hume’s theory suggests an intensifying feedback loop: 
Where friendship appears in very signal instances, my heart catches the same passion, 
and is warm’d by those warm sentiments, that display themselves before me. Such 
agreeable movements must give me an affection to every one that excites them. This is 
the case with every thing that is agreeable in any person. (1:386, §3.3.3.5) 
 
Passions and hearts are the movers here, and affection is not given to others, but surrendered 
automatically.  
Described thusly, the Treatise could be seen as a high-water mark of moral benevolence 
in Enlightenment thought, projecting an altruistic world where sympathetic passions are 
“contagious” and universal, “produc[ing] correspondent movements in all human breasts” 
(1:386, §3.3.3.5). But the apparent optimism of human hearts beating in concert is undermined 
by the way the universal synchrony of the passions threatens individual identity. Aptly, the text 
that makes these arguments is as tonally volatile as the sympathetic world it imagines. I noted 
above that Charles Taylor has described various premodern visions of the self as porous, while 
suggesting that Enlightenment secularisms began to theorize what would eventually become an 
intuitive sense of the self as buffered. In a porous view of the self, “emotions which are in the 
very depths of human life exist in a space which takes us beyond ourselves, which is porous to 
some outside power, a person-like power” (Secular Age 36). Taylor’s examples of such person-
like outside powers include the evil spirits, Holy Ghost, Aphrodite, Fortune, the devil, and so 
forth. This historical schema would naturally position Hume’s theory of selfhood on the bounded 
and buffered axis of modernity, since it dispenses with the personification of unknown causes, 
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and even mocks those “children, poets, and the antient philosophers” who superstitiously 
“personify every thing” (Treatise 1:148, §1.4.3.11). But in fact, the Hume of the Treatise treats 
emotions themselves as “person-like powers” that constitute human interiority from a radically 
exterior position. One consequence, Adam Potkay notes, is that Hume’s “own prosopopoeia 
mirrors, however darkly, religion’s prosopopoeia, as passion replaces the God he would 
extirpate” (186-187). At the apex of Enlightenment reason, the buffered self involutes into 
radical porosity.  
The Humean self is porous to the point of its own extinction in several senses. First, 
Hume attests that the feelings of others strike him more forcefully than the feelings that seem to 
originate in him: 
A chearful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind; as an 
angry or sorrowful one throws a sudden damp upon me. Hatred, resentment, esteem, love, 
courage, mirth and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than 
from my own natural temper and disposition. (§2.1.11.4)  
 
Where My Own Life had staked its claim on the philosopher’s intrepid indifference to the 
passions of others, which allowed him to persist in his work despite continual rejection, in the 
Treatise passions only become real and vivid when performed by others. Hume feels passions 
“from communication” because he experiences a gap between the other’s performance of passion 
and his own “disposition.” Because this passional difference is what makes possible the 
experience of passions, passions should not be understood as positive entities unto themselves. 
Instead, they circulate in a differential economy. If in Smith’s thought the passions of others 
function to attune and self-regulate our own passions, for Hume the theatrical performance of 
passion is the very precondition for passion itself, since it is only through performance that 
passion can be communicated.  
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 The radicality of Hume’s vision of sympathy among the eighteenth-century moralists is 
evident here, with the result that, in Jacques Khalip’s terms, “the difference between external 
influence and inner integrity becomes murky, and notions like ‘self-identity’ and ‘otherness’ in 
Hume’s account appear unstable and approximate” (101). Given as much, Terry Eagleton 
wonders, “if my identity is caught up with yours, and yours with another’s, and so on in a 
perpetually spawning web of affiliations, how can I ever know that your approving glance is 
your glance, rather than the effect of an unreadable palimpsest of selves?” (75). And Miranda 
Burgess has provided an influential gloss of Hume’s version of sympathy as a “contagious form 
of affective migrancy,” “immediate, involuntary, and transpersonal” in contrast to Smith’s 
“imagined, volitional, and individual” model (298, 300). Sympathy here is not the product of 
interaction between pre-existent individuals, but rather the flow of sympathetic commerce and 
conversation out of which individuals are produced. Given this consensus view of Humean 
sympathy, and given his critique of personal identity (discussed below), on what grounds can 
Hume continue to distinguish between self and other at all? Further, how does Hume account for 
the way we intuitively experience feelings as belonging to us, given, as he readily admits, that 
the “impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us”? (1:206-7, §2.1.11.4).  
 He proposes that our intuitive impression of self is produced through reflexive passions—
feelings about ourselves, which produce selves as objects. First, when we admire an object or 
action, our admiration transfers by way of association to the object’s possessor or the action’s 
performer. Then, if we feel admiration for a possessor or performer that turns out to be our own 
self, we experience the reflexive passion of pride. (Pride’s contrary, humility, works the same 
way.) Pride and humility produce the self as the indirect object of admiration or shame; this is 
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how passion “turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and 
circumstances” (1:188, §2.1.5.6).28  
Consider the order of operations here. Pride is a derivation of admiration for others, 
reflected, in an exceptional case, back on ourselves. We identify others as responsible for their 
attributes and possessions, and only for that reason can we feel self-esteem. Hume thinks others 
supply us with an image of personhood that we can then attribute to ourselves, as a 
backformation. In Annette Baier’s words, “I must be to what is mine whatever I take you to be to 
what is yours, and what you take me to be to what is mine” (Progress of Sentiments 136). As our 
passions respond to objects and actions, they generate owner-operators. The movement of 
passion thus fixes others in place as subjects in possession of objects, and those subjects reflect 
back to us an intuitive impression of selfhood that we can attribute to ourselves. Once we have 
ourselves, then the passions we experience appear to belong to us.  
The ramification is that we do not have passions in any rigorous sense. We become 
temporary lodgings for passions that we mistake for our own possessions. It would be better to 
say they have us. This confusion is reflected in the grammar of feeling: we say my anger, my joy, 
my sadness, but in fact the feelings in question give rise to very possibility of a possessive self. It 
is for this reason that Hume defines identity as “sensitive” rather than “cogitative”: without the 
feelings, there is no self (1:123, §1.4.1.8). In order to reverse this commonsensical logic of 
possessive selfhood, Hume instead treats passions as conceptual and grammatical subjects (akin 
to Taylor’s “person-like powers”), and, by turn, treats the self as an object. This intervention 
                                                      
28 See Amélie O. Rorty’s “‘Pride Produces the Idea of Self’: Hume on Moral Agency,” as well as Annette 
Baier’s A Progress of Sentiments 130-134 and Pinch’s Strange Fits of Passion 21-24 for further 
discussion of the relationship between pride and the self.  
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occasions a profound rewriting of the grammar of the self. The nature of this rewriting will 
become clear in the context of the critique of personal identity.  
Of Personal Identity 
How did Hume come to question personal identity? Descartes had taken the self-evidence 
of his own existence as the irreducible foundation of knowledge, and Locke had located his self 
in the reflexivity of perception, “[i]t being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving 
that he does perceive” (Essay 302, §2.27.9). If our perceptions, minds, and bodies are always 
changing, why, Locke asks, do we experience ourselves as a constant “I”? Because the self is 
part of those changing perceptions, and thus we cannot help but be continually aware of it. Hume 
reverses Locke’s claim to argue that it is precisely because the impression of the self attends all 
of our experiences that we can never actually perceive it. The self appears as a subcomponent of 
experience: “I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
any thing but the perception” (Treatise 1:164, §1.4.6.3). Because our self is always in ideas and 
impressions, and because our ideas and impressions vary continuously, whatever “personal 
identity” is must be variable and inconsistent rather than “simple and individual” (1:399, §11). 
And because Hume can arrive at no “notion of any thing we call substance, either simple or 
compound” on which to ground the “I”, he determines that perceptions must “compose the mind, 
not belong to it” (1:414; §28). I do not have perceptions, I am perceptions. Yet even if the idea of 
the self cannot be separated from the mutability of perception, the idea of the self remains with 
us—as a fiction. Amid the teeming variability of experience, the idea of the self spackles 
together a semblance of continuity: “we feign the continu’d existence of the perceptions of our 
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senses … and run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance, to disguise the variation” 
(1:166, §1.4.6.6).  
Accordingly, the self is both more and less than it seems. The self is not autonomous 
from experience and does not transcend experience, so there is no singular thing that can be 
called the self. Perception itself is radically discontinuous, such that consistent identity must be 
projected out of continual difference in an unceasing performance of belief. The mind, Hume 
will write, is “kind of theatre” through which perceptions “pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle 
in an infinite variety of postures and situations” (1:165, §1.4.6.4). The remarkable thing about 
experience is that we intuitively believe in the constancy of the objects we perceive, even though 
the perceptions themselves are in continuous flux. This feature of experience demonstrates that 
we do not subject our perceptions to rigorous tests of reason, arbitrating whether each object we 
perceive has always appeared precisely as it does at this moment. Instead, we simply know 
things are real, which means they persist, self-identically, through time. This knowledge arises 
from a certain quality attached to certain perceptions that Hume calls “vividness,” which sustains 
the gaps between distinct perceptions to produce an apparently stable world we can believe in.  
As Jonathan Lamb writes, “the truth of a proposition or a feeling will be determined not in the 
application of the criterion, but in the degree of vividness with which it is felt” (86). This 
vividness—not reason, not the cogito—is the foundation of knowledge. What is original is not “I 
think” but rather the connective tissue that weaves together distinct perceptions into continuous 
experience. While Hume denies the self as continuous object, he asserts a radically formative 
consciousness, charged with shaping coherent experience out of discrete sensations.  
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This is the sense in which Humean consciousness exceeds the self: consciousness is an 
imaginative connective apparatus. Perceptions must be linked together so that from their relative 
similarity they give the impression of indicating self-identical objects in an apparently 
continuous world. The faculty of perceptual association that creates this sense of continuity is 
grammatical. Its principles are the grammar that organizes experience into coherence. As the 
fundament that undergirds the possibility of a thinking judging self-consciousness, the faculty of 
association renders experience far more imaginary than previous philosophers had imagined. At 
the same time, this grammar of perception shrinks the thinking judging “I” to an after-effect, 
inseparable from and thus dependent upon perception for its constitution. Interiority is 
exteriorized into a series of perceptions and feelings—in Hume’s notorious phrasing, the self is 
“nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (1:165, §1.4.6.4). In their 
absence, the self as we know it disappears: “Ourself, independent of the perception of every 
other object, is in reality nothing” (1:221, §2.2.2.18).  
Hume’s First End 
 Perception is organized by a grammar of association that produces the appearance of 
continuity. But under scrutiny, it is clear that perceptions vary continuously. And since we have 
access not to things but to perceptions, “[a]ll the nice and subtile questions concerning personal 
identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as 
philosophical difficulties” (1:171, §1.4.6.21). Just as perception is organized by an experiential 
grammar, so linguistic grammar produces its conceptual corollaries. Words reify perceptions into 
things. Sameness and difference are determined by the contingence of ordinary language. 
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Because “we have no just standard” for deciding when a transitioning entity is officially 
something new, “disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal,” 
subtended by “some fiction or imaginary principle of union” (1:175, §1.4.6.21). Ever-changing 
and yet still somehow intuitively persistent, the self is a paradigm case of this phenomenon. We 
experience continuous identity because the imagination feigns it, constructing the illusion of 
stability amid richly or chaotically variable experience. Such nuance is ill-used by language, 
whose conventions buttress this imaginative feigning. Nouns remain constant while their 
referents shift. This gap is especially precarious where referents are persons. I, you, she, we—
pronouns cannot capture the continually self-differing beings they mark. Perception thus 
proceeds according to a grammatical logic, and identity is one of the byproducts of this grammar.  
 Hume prosecutes this argument at the close of the first volume of the Treatise in a section 
titled “Of personal identity” (§1.4.6). He has already undermined belief in an external world or 
an immortal soul. Personal identity is the last vestige of superstition he will eradicate from what 
he imagines will be a truly modern philosophy—a science of human nature. At this moment of 
apparent triumph, however, the gravity of his own argumentation seems to precipitate a crisis. In 
the conclusion to his volume, he suddenly declares himself “forelorn,” bemoans his “weakness,” 
“doubt,” “ignorance,” and “wretched condition,” finds himself “inviron’d with the deepest 
darkness,” considers burning his books, entertains a “resolve to perish,” and imagines himself 
transformed into a “strange uncouth monster” (1:172-5, §1.4.7.1-10). These threats—literary, 
existential, and biological—are eventually dispelled by “nature herself,” leading Hume to a 
chastened skepticism haunted by unresolved doubts. The conclusion’s flagrant mixture of arch 
melodrama and lurid gothicism could not be further from the genial and cheerful tone of the 
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philosophical account that precedes it. Yet its elegiac treatment of self as object rather than 
subject, down to its very grammar, represents a philosophical experiment on par with the 
“funeral oration of myself” that closes “My Own Life” (Mossner 615, §21).   
 At the close of his critique of personal identity, Hume surveys the course of his argument 
in the first-person plural: “we” stand between the critique of causality, external world, soul, and 
self that precedes this moment, and the opening of the second book (1:171, §1.4.6.23). The 
author of this final paragraph is genial and inclusive, precise yet carefree, the Hume of “easy 
clarity” that John Richetti describes as “a modest observer careful to affirm a world of custom 
and habit even as he politely demolishes philosophical expectations” (184). This Hume explains 
that “[w]e…in our miscellaneous way of reasoning have been led into several topics” which will 
be found to elucidate what has come before, and “prepare the way for our following opinions” 
(1:171, §1.4.6.23). We’ve simply followed Hume following the natural course of his reasoning, 
which finds us conveniently stopped at a resting place between two volumes and two realms of 
inquiry.  
 Except book one does not end here. On the next page, a conclusion appears seemingly 
from beyond the text’s planned architecture, interrupting the path of argument that Hume has set 
out for the reader. The resting-place paragraph that closes “Of personal identity” now dilates into 
a multi-page monologue. The generic transformation is striking, as the skeptical reasoner 
becomes an intrepid explorer, suddenly overwhelmed by the scale of his voyage:  
Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly 
escap’d shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the 
same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of 
compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances…. (§1.4.7.1) 
 
This language shares more with the tumultuous test-of-faith narratives of Puritan life writing 
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than with the lettered neoclassicism Hume will come to champion.29 It is an enthusiastic idiom 
issued, as Hume himself will admit, from the disequilibrium of a “heated” “brain” (§1.4.7.8). 
And its confessional energies only escalate: 
My memory of past errors and perplexities, makes me diffident for the future. The 
wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my 
enquiries, encrease my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending or correcting 
these faculties, reduces me almost to despair, and makes me resolve to perish on the 
barren rock, on which I am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless 
ocean, which runs out into immensity. (§1.4.7.1) 
 
Where the Treatise to date has followed the “way of reasoning,” this conclusion’s author is led 
by an “inclination” which abruptly turns the course of his thought and the genre of his text. 
Drawing on the conventions and affects of religious melancholia, he’ll evaluate the practical 
significance of the epistemology he’s developed, namely by dramatizing the porousness he’s 
theorized.  
When Hume “considers,” “comprehends,” “suggests,” or “observes” in his philosophical 
voice, his verbs indicate a convergence between the authorial persona and the person composing 
the text. These verbs map the narrative present tense onto an image of verbalized thought, such 
that the narrative can stand in for the author’s thinking. The trope of the present tense generates 
the bond that allowed Montaigne to declare “myself am the matter of my book.” Thought and 
voice are phenomenalized in writing, such that when we read that “Hume” “considers” or 
“observes” we project a fusion of narrator and author. Hume regularly uses his philosophical 
narrative to reinforce this fusion of text and self by, for example, offering an image of his scene 
of composition to demonstrate how the faculties of association generate a consistent world out of                                                       
29 While Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding is the model for the Treatise as a whole, 
Adela Pinch marks the conclusion’s connection to spiritual autobiography, and Hume’s early critics 
(namely Thomas Reid and James Beattie) attacked it as grotesquely hybrid philosophical-gothic romance.   
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limited perceptions: 
I am here seated in my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the objects, that strike 
my senses, are contain’d in a few yards around me. My memory, indeed, informs me of 
the existence of many objects; but then this information extends not beyond their past 
existence, nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of 
their being. When therefore I am thus seated, and revolve over these thoughts, I hear on a 
sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who 
advances towards me. This gives occasion to many new reflexions and reasonings. First, I 
never have observ’d, that this noise cou’d proceed from any thing but the motion of a 
door; and therefore conclude, that the present phænomenon is a contradiction to all past 
experience, unless the door, which I remember on t’other side the chamber, be still in 
being. Again, I have always found, that a human body was possest of a quality, which I 
call gravity, and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must have done 
to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. 
But this is not all. I receive a letter, which upon opening it I perceive by the hand-writing 
and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two hundred leagues distant. 
’Tis evident I can never account for this phænomenon, conformable to my experience in 
other instances, without spreading out in my mind the whole sea and continent between 
us, and supposing the effects and continu’d existence of posts and ferries, according to 
my memory and observation. (§1.4.2.20) 
 
This passage wondrously transforms the substructures of the republic of letters—servantry, 
transportation, the post, the “hand-writing and subscription” that authenticates the letter, the 
entire world beyond the door—into variously spectral phenomena whose existences must be 
imagined by the philosopher seated before his fire. As Hume sits in his chamber musing the text 
into existence, he passes these material infrastructures through the looking-glass of alienated 
labor into a phantasmagoria of philosophical projection. The phantoms of the world outside the 
study are rendered in contrast to Hume himself, cogito-like in his chamber, anchoring reality. 
This fictional conjunction of author and narrator, composing his thoughts just before we 
read them, gives way to something different in the conclusion of the Treatise. The dramatic 
historical failure of this conclusion can be partly attributed to its refusal to replace the 
epistemological safeguard of the author/narrator bond with any new foundation. Instead, we 
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depart for the seas of romance. The narrative perch takes on an allegorical quality that breaks the 
immediacy of the image of the philosopher transforming his thoughts into the volume in your 
hand. His text still issues from his “present station,” but the figural setting is “the barren rock, on 
which I am at present” (§1.4.7.1). This image dispels the coherence that grounded the text in the 
bond between author and narrator, united in the same person, seated in his chair writing each 
thought just as it comes to mind. The present tense of the narrative is now divided from the 
presence of the writer. Dorrit Cohn calls this form of narrative rupture between the act of writing 
and the events it depicts the “fictional present tense” (96-108). We are in the fictional present 
tense whenever a present-tense narrator claims to perform an action that is logically incompatible 
with the act of writing, e.g. “I am sleeping.” When Hume asks us to picture him on a barren rock, 
we have entered a different order of fiction, introducing a gap between the act of writing and the 
narrative it relays.  
Self-consciously isolated, Hume no longer employs the inclusive “we” he has used to 
guide the reader through the topography of his thought. Instead, in the conclusion, he speaks for 
himself alone. Now reflexively authorial, he “finds” himself, but only through the effect of being 
“inclin’d,” locating his self through his inclination, through which he decides—or which decides 
for him—that he will stop and ponder. This whimsy is demonstrative: he is writing himself as a 
passional subject, which is to say, an object. Inclination pauses him. The caprice of this decision 
emphasizes the sense that it comes from outside, that it is not, in fact, a decision. In Hume’s 
philosophical romance, the self is formed and reformed by phenomena that can only be written 
as its possessions, and yet seem to possess it. Hume finds himself reduced to the moods and 
attitudes that correspond to the skepticism he’s discovered. His own meticulous argumentation 
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begins to exact a psychological cost, rearing up and romping violently through his mind. The 
form of the text follows the shape of his theoretical habitus. “Discover’d” by its own thoughts 
and “led” by its own passions, Hume’s syntactical displacement of “I” figures its metaphysical 
displacement from subject to object, and from object toward inexistence. He has followed the 
self to its philosophical death, and now this loss forebodes textual and psychological death. 
Hume’s “desponding reflections” reflect his “forelorn solitude”—forelorn, with its 
etymological bearing of disgrace and depravity, because as Hume argues the fiction of the self is 
only sustainable through the medium of sympathetic exchange (1:172, §1.4.7.2). To be forelorn 
is to be shut out of (if not God’s love) the immanent self-making economy of feeling. In isolation 
the passional rhythms of sympathy become deregulated, and the fictioning of the self unravels. In 
one sense, Hume’s theatre of sympathy favors continuous conversation over the trope of virtuous 
retirement. Here a revealing contrast with Addison emerges.30 Addison held that “those Retired 
Hours,” “destitute of Company and Conversation,” offered their own opportunity for virtue in 
“that Intercourse and Communication which every reasonable Creature ought to maintain with 
the great Author of his Being” (Spectator no. 93). Solitude does not suspend conversation, but 
rather redirects it toward the divine. (This was in fact an original, rather than derivative, usage: 
prior to the eighteenth century, “conversation” primarily signified religious communion or sexual 
intimacy.) Hume’s sense of solitude, unmitigated by prayer, was less optimistic. As he writes in 
the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), “Reduce a person to solitude … and he 
loses all enjoyment…because the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent                                                       
30 Though Hume deemed Addison’s essays mere “agreeable Triffling,” their form, and the mode of 
politeness they elaborate, proved enormously influential for Hume and for the culture of Edinburgh more 
generally (Letters 2:257; Phillipson 235, see also Dwyer 17 and Mee, Conversable Worlds 57-58 on the 
Addisonian inheritance of the Scottish Enlightenment). 
  
103 
movements in his fellow creatures” (43, §5.2.3). But the picture of solitude in the polite and 
refined Enquiry has nothing on the apocalyptic Treatise:  
I am first affrighted and confounded with that forelorn solitude, in which I am plac’d in 
my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who not being able to 
mingle and unite in society, has been expell’d all human commerce, and left utterly 
abandon’d and disconsolate. (1:172, §1.4.7.2) 
 
The grammatical passage from the subject, “I,” to the object, “myself,” is the deforming crucible, 
and monstrosity lies on the other side. If these shifters indicate merely verbal unities, the shifting 
shape of “I” and “myself” will depend upon the turn of the fancy. In solitude, the fancy deranges 
itself, and thus deforms the self. This is where he is “plac’d” and thereby contained in and 
determined by his philosophy. Undisciplined by the sympathies of others, the “chimeras” of 
metastasized reason run amok.  
“Human commerce” indicates not just human contact but polite conversation—the 
elegance and gallantry alien to this desexed and dehumanized “uncouth” being.31 “Uncouth” ties 
etymological resonances of “unknown” and “unusual” to the more familiar senses of “unfriendly, 
unkind, rough,” linking impolite vulgarity to alienation and deformation. It is in this sense that 
“to mingle” in society is also to “unite:” the presence of the other, sentimentalized and                                                       
31 In “Of Essay Writing,” Hume represents himself as “a kind of resident or ambassador from the 
dominions of learning to those of conversation” (Essays Moral, Political, and Literary 533-534). In this 
role, he proposes a trade agreement that will add substance to the realm of conversation and polite 
refinement to the domain of learning. Conversation is figured as international diplomacy, the nation is a 
commercial corporation, and the division of conversational labor recapitulates the “Balance of Trade.” 
But the central figure is gender. The “Fair Sex,” we learn, are “the Sovereigns of the Empire of 
Conversation,” and their resources are needed to soften and polish masculine learning, which otherwise 
tends toward the “totally barbarous” (534-535). While Hume presents himself as an intermediary to 
female company, the larger effect of the essay is to reify the gender distinctions it proposes to negotiate 
between. It is not simply that learned masculinity must be polished by the “manners” of “virtuous 
women,” but that conversation must in the first place produce the connection between masculinity and 
learning—(the “man of letters”)—as its other. I am suggesting that the language of Hume’s 
transformation “strange uncouth monster” suggests an exclusion from gendered commerce, not just 
isolation in the abstract.  
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naturalized in the “human breast” but implicitly classed as polite, conveys the “harmoniously 
organized feelings” (Mullan, Sentiment 7) that in turn produce self-recognition. Without 
commerce in feeling, self is revealed in its horrific mutability and becomes unrecognizable. By 
contrast, where the self perdures, it is through the commerce of sympathy. The Treatise offers a 
clarifying perspective on the detached, self-consciously posthumous narrative voice of “My Own 
Life,” which comes into being at the nexus of conversation. The bounded, autonomous self that 
text affects is a collaborative product emerging against its isolated, deformed other.  
Reading Hume as Romance 
Hume’s sophistry, Thomas Reid was certain, depended upon grammatical sleight of hand. 
Reid insists that “we find in all languages the same parts of speech, the distinction of nouns and 
verbs, the distinction of nouns into adjective and substantive, of verbs into active and passive” 
(ERH 3:289). This (specious) linguistic uniformity conforms to a universal and commonsensical 
understanding of human agency affirmed by ordinary language. But now Hume tells us that our 
actions are impressed upon us by feelings, that our very sense of self is an illusion engendered by 
passion. This gothic fantasy perversely rejects the plain truth of subject and object, reflected in 
every language, all “grounded upon common notions, which Mr HUME’s philosophy opposes, 
and endeavors to overturn” (ERH 3:290).32 Reid remains one of Hume’s most perceptive readers 
                                                      
32 Blacklock issued a similar complaint in more dire terms:  
If consistent with himself he must neither be active nor passive, neither conscious nor insensible, 
neither an existence nor a non-entity, neither a medium between any, nor a compound of all these 
opposite extremes; for, from every one of these situations, some principle, positive or negative, 
must arise; and absolute negation or affirmation are both equally and essentially destructive of his 
doctrines. (ERH 9:211) 
Hume theorizes activity and passivity, self and other, as reified fictions that emerge from a primordial 
perceptual flux. And his language resubmerges notions of activity and passivity into that primordial 
confusion.  
  
105 
because he recognizes how Hume manipulated grammar to undermine any commonsensical 
order of nature. This gesture also suggests its inverse: the order of nature relies upon grammar 
for its affirmation, which Hume himself recognized, and which is why Hume must be read at his 
word, grammatically.  
But if Reid refuses Hume’s grammatical inversions as violations of common sense, he 
winds up picturing science itself as a kind of romantic fantasy, where rational inquiry and natural 
philosophy “open to my mind grand and beautiful scenes, and contribute equally to my 
happiness and power” (ERH 3:162). Reading Hume, however, threatens to dispel these pleasures 
with a fantasy of a different order: 
But when I look within, and consider the mind itself, which makes me capable of all 
these prospects and enjoyments; if it is indeed what the Treatise of human nature makes 
it, I find I have been only in an inchanted castle, imposed upon by spectres and 
apparitions. I blush inwardly to think how I have been deluded; I am ashamed of my 
frame, and can hardly forbear expostulating with my destiny. (ibid.)  
 
Reid no longer finds himself atop his magisterial summit surveying Nature’s beauties below. 
Instead he is trapped in the “inchanted castle” of his mind, which now sympathetically resembles 
Hume’s mind—flush with gothic delusion and shame and distress.  
In “Of the Study of History,” Hume recounts a request from “a young beauty, for whom I 
had some passions, to send her some novels and romances for her amusement.” He instead sends 
her Plutarch’s Lives, “being resolved not to make use of poisoned arms against her” (Essays 
Moral, Political, and Literary 564). Because they deform truth and disorganize the passions, 
novels and romances are “poisoned arms” in a metaphor field of courtship-as-combat that 
suggests the friction between vestigial codes of courtesy and modern civil politeness.33 In Reid’s                                                       
33 Rebecca Tierney-Hynes’s Novel Minds: Philosophers and Romance Readers, 1680-1740 (2012) offers 
a signal treatment of this essay and the surrounding issues in a chapter titled “Hume: Reading Romance, 
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encounter with Hume’s text, it is Hume that plays the part of poisonous romancer, whose 
ostensibly hypermodern facade covers up his latent allegiance to the aims and affects of 
medieval sorcery. Like Boswell in his encounter with the dying Hume, Reid is poisoned by 
Hume’s skeptical fantasy and finds himself imitating Hume’s histrionics in the sentimental 
lexicon of shame and blushes, brought on by epistemological rather than sexual transgression.34 
Hume contaminates philosophy with romance, transforming the scholar into an image of the 
“tender and amorous Disposition” he projects onto susceptible female readers. And crucially, 
Hume poisons the reader by making an afflicted spectacle of himself, with which his readers are 
enjoined to sympathize. The monstrous deformation of the Treatise is a consequence of his                                                       
Writing the Self” (116-140). I am also gesturing toward Anna Bryson’s important From Courtesy to 
Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (1998). In “Of the Rise and Progress of 
the Arts and Sciences,” Hume offers an anthropological exposé of the gallant mock-deference that Burke 
would call “proud submission” and “dignified obedience” (Reflections 170), and that Hume himself 
espouses in “Of Essay Writing”: 
As nature has given man the superiority above woman, by endowing him with greater strength 
both of mind and body; it is his part to alleviate that superiority, as much as possible, by the 
generosity of his behaviour, and by a studied deference and complaisance for all her inclinations 
and opinions. Barbarous nations display this superiority, by reducing their females to the most 
abject slavery; by confining them, by beating them, by selling them, by killing them. But the male 
sex, among a polite people, discover their authority in a more generous, though not a less evident 
manner; by civility, by respect, by complaisance, and, in a word, by gallantry. (Essays Moral, 
Political, and Literary 133) 
 
34 Another early reader, one James Wodrow, commented on the resonance between Hume’s writing and 
romance: “One after having read such a book finds himself pleased and Entertained (much in the same 
way as by a modern romance) from the Propriety of the Language Harmony of the Periods & the Novelty 
& oddness of some of the thoughts” (Letter to Samuel Kendrick, 1752, ERH 9:8). Moreover, the 
trajectory of Hume’s arguments mirror the emotional tumult of romance reading, which Hume 
complained has “no Propriety in the Expression nor Nature in the Sentiment”: 
His Arguments & reasoning never or seldom produce any solid conviction, but leave the mind 
some way loose & more uncertain than when you began. He uses an argument to establish a point 
then he throws out some thing on the other side which overturns all he said & leaves you just as 
you were, then he sets it up; then down with it & at the end you don’t know what to think. (ibid. 
9:9) 
Hume’s text by way of Wodrow’s pen becomes a flurry of verbs and prepositions, sending the reader 
through a series of gyroscopic convolutions until we finally end up “just as [we] were,” only more 
nauseous. Convictions dissolve amidst a frolic of indulgent argumentation. 
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romantically flighty feminine susceptibility, which is at the core of his radically discontinuous 
vision of self. 
As philosopher and protagonist fold into each other, Hume’s effusions seem to do double 
duty, participating in the continuation of his argument at the same time that they advance the plot 
of his romance. “When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance”—is this a 
sentimental plea, or, given its distinct echo of his claim that “[o]urself, independent of the 
perception of every other object, is in reality nothing,” is it an attempt to epitomize the 
metaphysical evacuation of the self? (1:221, §2.2.2.18). As his plot grows bleaker, it seems to 
gain cogency as theoretical drama: “All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho’ 
such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported 
by the approbation of others” (1:172, §1.4.7.2). This meld of paranoid grandeur and self-erasure 
in turn becomes evidence for theory, representing precisely the dynamics of his own account of 
sympathy. Philosophy causes melancholy, which is assuaged by philosophy—but at the cost of 
generating new sources of melancholy. Hume finds his own critique of causality as a habitual 
projection especially depressing:  
how must we be disappointed, when we learn, that this connexion, this tie, or energy [the 
principle of causality] lies merely in ourselves, and is nothing but that determination of 
the mind, which is acquir’d by custom, and causes us to make a transition from an object 
to its usual attendant, and from the impression of one to the lively idea of the other? Such 
a discovery not only cuts off all hope of ever attaining satisfaction, but even prevents our 
very wishes; since it appears, that when we say we desire to know the ultimate and 
operating principle, as something, which resides in the external object, we either 
contradict ourselves, or talk without a meaning. (§1.4.7.5) 
 
Sounding like a classical Freudian melancholic, Hume internalizes the lost object (our intuitive 
sense of causality) into the self, which not only obstructs his grief but forces him to disavow the 
very possibility of its meaningful expression. This dejection sends him veering between radical 
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skepticism and naïve belief, “betwixt a false reason and none at all” (§1.4.7.7):   
Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition 
shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings 
surround me? And on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I 
am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable 
condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use 
of every member and faculty. (§1.4.7.8) 
 
Hume is now in the realm of spiritual despondency, a transparently infidel writer trading in the 
language of religious melancholy—the discourse on which Hume’s self-diagnosis of 
“philosophical melancholy and delirium” clearly tropes.35 His epistemic enclosure gives way to 
an image of bodily debilitation, as the materialist philosopher’s spiritual crisis is channeled into 
physical and cognitive impotence. This stasis, so complete it verges on inexistence, is suddenly 
disrupted not by some rational introspective resolution, but by the deus ex machina of “nature 
herself.” Nature relieves Hume’s “philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this 
bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all 
these chimeras” (1:175, §1.4.7.9). These fanciful chimeras are the spawn of “refin’d or elaborate 
reasoning,” a “bent of mind” that echoes the Frankenstein-esque disfigurement of his “strange 
uncouth monster.” Philosophical solitude powers a dysfunctional economy of sympathetic 
exchange “bent” inward, “confounded” in form and identity.36 Nature’s resolution to the drama 
is a passional or sensory intervention that simply dissolves Hume’s preoccupations. The 
underworld of “deepest darkness” into which Hume had descended suddenly vanishes. 
                                                      
35 Jeremy Schmidt draws a connection between eighteenth-century hypochondria and the older language 
of “afflicted conscience” prominent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, insofar as each indicated a 
kind of election: the afflicted evinced a unique “spiritual sensitivity to sin” while hypochondria was 
widely understood as a disease of sensibility and privilege (152-154).  
 
36 Compare to Addison: “the Mind never unbends itself so agreeably as in the Conversation of the well 
chosen Friend” (Spectator no. 93). 
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Sociability Regained 
And then nature shuttles Hume off to dinner, replacing his chimeras with “lively 
impressions”—in other words, more genial chimeras: “I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I 
converse, and am merry with my friends” (1:175, §1.4.7.9). This conversable turn is the only 
moment in the conclusion where Hume’s syntactic and semantic agency coincides. It marks the 
end of his textual breakdown, and fittingly, a sense of agency emerges through commerce with 
others. Momentarily freed from his reflexive nightmare, he entertains the idea of killing off the 
philosopher within him: “I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve 
never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy” 
(§1.4.7.10). But he knows that this readiness is a long way from realization, that it simply 
reflects “that splenetic humour, which governs me at present” (ibid.).  
Contemporaries had no idea how to read what was either a sophisticated demonstration of 
psychological theory or a catastrophically discrediting mental breakdown. The easiest response 
to this sentimental zigzagging was to declare it all a ruse. Certainly, it contaminated Hume’s 
science of human nature with a sickly strain of romantic drama, punctuated by intimations of 
suicide too palpable to be ignored yet too histrionic to be fully credited by early readers.37 
Reading this passage left George Horne irate:  
Now, Sir, if you will only give me leave to judge, before dinner, of Mr. HUME’S 
philosophy, as he judged of it after dinner, we shall have no farther dispute upon that                                                       
37 This tonal and generic confusion extends to the text’s reception. Hume’s first reviewer began by 
mocking his theatrics—(“What Heart now would not almost bleed? what Breast can forbear to 
sympathize with this brave Adventurer?”)—and recommended “very serious Reconsideration” to the 
anonymous author. However, at some point the sarcasm trails off, replaced by concerned avuncular 
encouragement. The writer closes incongruously by suggesting that history will view the Treatise “in the 
same Light as we view the JUVENILE Works of MILTON, or the first Manner of RAPHAEL” (ERH 
3:38-39). Unsure of how to read Hume’s despair, this review’s unstable mixture of condescension and 
admiration absorbs the inscrutabilities of Hume’s own text.  
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subject. I could indeed wish, if it were possible, to have a scheme of thought, which 
would bear contemplating, at any time of the day; because, otherwise, a person must be at 
the expence of maintaining a brace of these metaphysical Hobby-Horses, one to mount in 
the morning, and the other in the afternoon. (ERH 9:389)  
 
Indeed, Reid intoned, “it was only in solitude and retirement that he could yield any assent to his 
own philosophy” (ERH 3:169). If Hume was as depressed as his conclusion suggested, his 
friends “would have the charity never to leave him alone”—though Reid had never heard “him 
charged with doing anything…that argued such a degree of skepticism” (ibid.). Reid’s 
implication, reiterated by contemporaries, is that the suicidal currents in Hume’s text must be 
merely for show, since if he really felt the way he wrote, he’d be in Bedlam or dead, not hosting 
polite entertainment.38 If the Treatise wasn’t a suicide note, it must be parody—in any case, it 
certainly wasn’t philosophy. Reid thus inaugurated a long tradition of skepticism toward Hume’s 
conclusion, upheld by much recent scholarship.39 It is remarkable that Horne and Reid (among 
                                                      
38 On this implication in Reid, see Pinch 40. James Beattie (1770) levels a version of the same charge: “If 
a man were to speak and act in the evening, as if he believed himself to have become a different person 
since the morning, the whole world would pronounce him in a state of insanity” (ERH 3:207). Like Reid, 
Beattie affects uncertainty about whether Hume truly believes his “extraordinary paradox” (ERH 3:234). 
Hume must be joking, and yet doesn’t seem to be joking: “nothing could make me believe its author to 
have been in earnest, if I had not found him drawing inferences from it too serious to be jested with by 
any person who is not absolutely distracted” (ibid.). Thomas Blacklock (1771) takes up the same line, 
writing that Hume  
dashes one principle against another, till both seem annihilated; or (which has the same effect) till 
the intellects of his readers are so irrevocably confounded, that they cannot distinguish light from 
darkness, or truth from falshood. Is this situation of mind more adapted to rational life, or to 
Bedlam? (ERH 9:211)  
 
39 John Passmore regrets Hume’s “lapse into a stagey, melodramatic tone,” riddled with “inconsistencies 
of the most startling character” (133). For Donald Siebert, this Hume is perhaps “playfully theatrical” or 
perhaps has “lost his wits,” while M. A. Box refers to Hume’s “notorious histrionics” and “profound 
dithering,” and A. D. Nuttall finds Hume fallen into “a kind of schizophrenia” (Siebert, “Ardor” 181-182; 
Box 98, 104; Nuttall 105-106). In an ingenious reading, Adela Pinch argues that readers historical and 
contemporary have found Hume’s melodrama strained and exaggerated because “Hume’s understanding 
of the relationship between passions and persons, his emphasis on sympathy and the passage of feelings, 
makes the expression of one’s ‘own’ feelings a hard thing to render automatically” (43). Hume’s 
performance is incredible to the precise degree that he depicts himself beside himself—in fidelity to his 
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others) tried to debunk the carefully curated presentation of Hume’s death by recurring to the 
conclusion of the Treatise, published almost forty years prior. A rarely read “metaphysical 
choke-pear” (the term is William Hazlitt’s, used endearingly [17:113]), it nonetheless continued 
to shadow his public figure. Its vision of radical porosity at the limits of reason remained the 
most effective antidote to the persuasive force of Hume’s philosophical death. 
 As his death approached in 1776, it offered Hume the opportunity to reinvent the self, 
and to monumentalize that reinvention for posterity in the way that only death could. The writing 
that emerged out of his death strives to make coherent a life whose major work challenges the 
possibility of self-coherence. The very bad death Hume had theorized, figured, and threatened in 
his early work—a complete dissolution of all sense of persisting character—lingered in 
unresolved tension with the apotheosis of selfhood he achieved in his last days. We know that 
the dying Hume conferred with Smith, Home, Blair, Black, and the rest of the Edinburgh literati 
to determine how to present himself, and by extension, how to present the project of polite, 
skeptical, empirical naturalism that has come to be called the Scottish Enlightenment. The 
perfectly uniform picture of Hume’s character broadcast out of Edinburgh was in this sense a 
collaborative invention. In a more fundamental sense, Scottish sentimental theory understood the 
possibility of such a bounded self as an artifact of conversation. This vision of bounded selfhood, 
sustained by conversation and vindicated by his own death, offered Hume a chance to repair to 
permanence the sense of self that his own Treatise had decomposed into nothingness.   
                                                      
own conception of the relationship between the passions and the self. As his text treats his self both 
formally and argumentatively as the passive object of his feelings, his expressions of feeling become 
incoherent and unbelievable. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WORDSWORTH AT DEATH’S END 
William Wordsworth’s poetry has long been recognized for its sensitive engagements 
with death, dying, and bereavement. As Geoffrey Hartman wrote in 1964, Wordsworth’s poetry 
announces that “man stands in communion not only with the living but also with the dead” (321); 
Duncan Wu has more recently argued that “the force that exerted the most influence on his 
poetic life was grief” (Wordsworth: An Inner Life 309). Yet for a poet so closely identified with 
what Frances Ferguson called the “epitaphic mode” (155), Wordsworth offers no clear or 
consistent sense of what death is. Our accounts of death in Wordsworth—figuring death as 
writing, and writing as death,1 exploring death’s anthropological prehistory,2 or its role in the 
constitution of community3—foreground death’s effects upon the living. But death is not simply 
the motive force of Wordsworth’s poetry, the first cause of a poetics of effects. Death is also a 
problem in its own right, whose significance is everywhere qualified. I will argue that this poetry 
trains its critical intelligence on not just the psychology and sociology of mourning, but also the 
                                                      
1 In his seminal reading of Wordsworth’s Essays Upon Epitaphs, Paul de Man declares that death is “a 
displaced name for a linguistic predicament” (81). If language “is indeed not the thing itself but the 
representation” (80), then language encounters its fundamental crux in death, since here it is tasked with 
representing an absence. This vision of writing as a figure for death can then become romanticism’s 
specific remit, as in Mark Sandy’s Romanticism, Memory, and Mourning, where the “‘unnameable, 
shapeless, faceless’ figuration of Romanticism finds a haunting affinity with the ultimate ‘nothing’ that 
figures, and stands in for, the reality of death” (8).  
 
2 Alan Bewell’s Wordsworth and the Enlightenment sees Wordsworth’s poetry exploring how death takes 
shape as an idea, from the phenomenological encounter with the human corpse to the anthropological 
emergence of myth.  
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nature of death itself. This inquiry takes on a distinctive inflection in each of Wordsworth’s 
poetic modes: the folk anthropologist of the Lyrical Ballads, the lyric sonneteer of the new 
nineteenth century, and the endlessly grave obituarist of The Excursion. Wordsworth’s poetry 
begins by attempting to recruit death into social, spiritual, or rhetorical service, and ends in the 
realization that it has disrupted the ground it sought to build upon.  
In brief, I argue that Wordsworth is skeptical of death. This skepticism has been read as a 
symptom of troubled mourning: when Wordsworth questions death he is actually dramatizing 
grief, which includes the denial that seeks to divert mourning but ends up prolonging it. The core 
concern from this perspective is how persons orient themselves toward the inevitability of death, 
and how they live on in the face of loss. The tradition of rhetorical reading jettisons this 
psychological current but nonetheless finds Wordsworth’s poetics circling a representational 
impasse that is taken to figure and anticipate death. By contrast, this essay follows moments in 
Wordsworth’s poetry where death is constituted less by vacancy than by a transformed sense of 
presence. This Wordsworth is beset by an anxiety that death will not deliver the permanence and 
transcendence it promises.  
 
                                                      
3 In Bearing the Dead: The British Culture of Mourning from Enlightenment to Victoria, Esther Schor 
develops a sense of Wordsworthian mourning “as a force that constitutes communities and makes it 
possible to conceptualize history,” extending well beyond privative personal grief (4). Schor’s 
Wordsworth negotiates between competing theories of the relationship between mourning and morals, 
from an elegiac emphasis on the redemptive potential of traumatic loss to, by 1814’s The Excursion, a 
view of moral sensibility as grounded in “a tranquility immanent within nature” (149). Kurt Fosso’s 
Buried Communities: Wordsworth and the Bonds of Mourning follows an early commitment to the 
community-forming power of “interminably indebted grief,” such that “it is not community that leads to a 
connection with the dead so much as it is the dead, and more specifically the relationship of the living 
with them, that leads to community” (23, 7). For Fosso, The Excursion marks Wordsworth’s departure 
from a community of interminable mourning, toward a new insistence on consolation, sacralized by 
“cultural tradition and institutionalism” (215).  
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Phenomenologies of Death: “We are Seven” and “Lucy Gray” 
In “My First Acquaintance with Poets,” William Hazlitt recalls the young Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s disappointment that his collaborator Wordsworth “was not prone enough to believe 
in the traditional superstitions of [the Lake District]” (The Liberal 2:39). By the Lyrical Ballads, 
Wordsworth had figured out how to turn this belief gap between enlightened Cambridge poet and 
local rustics into a dramatic poetry of encounter between incommensurate worldviews. His 
disenchanted poet persona wanders about the Lake District like an amateur anthropologist: he is 
inoculated from the superstitions he encounters by education and privilege, yet some 
combination of frisson and nostalgia finds him captivated by what he cannot believe. The 
subjects he meets on the road act as vicars, granting mediated contact with a world of 
enchantment the poet has surrendered as the price of his sophistication. The unstable mixture of 
admiration and condescension that pervades these poems is a byproduct of this trade in credulity. 
And the most pervasive credulity of “common life” (783) in the Lyrical Ballads is the belief in 
persistence after death—not in what the narrator of “There was a boy” will call “that uncertain 
heaven,” but rather in the form of an immanent, material, ongoing life (24). This poetry tarries 
with the idea that the dead do not transcend or disappear—do not even die—but simply change.  
Doubting death was not merely superstitious—it was deeply heterodox, and so had to be 
staged vicariously. In orthodox Anglican theology, death was absolute and irreversible, ensuring 
that Christ’s Resurrection expressed a truly divine power of redemption. This mortal absolutism 
is disturbed by the rustic epistemologies Wordsworth encounters on the roads and in the villages 
of the Lake District, where the nearer one gets to “primitive” belief, the less reliable the 
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boundary between life and death becomes. The absolute distinction between life and death, so 
intuitive to the educated poet, comes to look like a cultural artifact. 
 Ground zero for the conflict between reasonable Anglican orthodoxy and rustic 
heterodox superstition is “We are Seven,” an impromptu debate between a Wordsworthian 
narrator and as near an incarnation of nature as might be found in Herefordshire: “She had a 
rustic, woodland air, / And she was wildly clad” (9-10). The picture is more forest sprite than 
eight-year-old girl; we are in the vague and evocative realm of projection. Asked about her 
siblings, 
She answered, “Seven are we, 
“And two of us at Conway dwell,  
“And two are gone to sea. 
 
“Two of us in the church-yard lie, 
“My sister and my brother, 
“And in the church-yard cottage, I 
“Dwell near them with my mother.” (18-24) 
 
On the contrary, the narrator responds, “If two are in the church-yard laid, / “Then ye are only 
five” (34-35). When the girl insists that she can count, this mathematical argument quickly 
becomes a metaphysical argument: she argues that her dead siblings still exist, or more precisely, 
still fall under the copula that holds existence together—are. She turns out to be on good 
psychological and phenomenological ground. Her siblings at Conway and at sea are gone. What 
part do they play in her life? How do we know that they are still alive? Even if they are, will she 
ever see them again? If these unavailables nonetheless “are,” then surely her dead siblings, with 
whom she spends every day, must also count:  
“Their graves are green, they may be seen,” 
The little Maid replied, 
“Twelve steps or more from my mother’s door, 
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“And they are side by side. (37-40)  
 
Graves and grass offer conflicting readings of death. The graves signal absence, and their 
epitaphs, if they are marked, would relegate the entombed to the past tense. Though these grave 
signs of cultural authority proclaim the absolute distinction between life and death, the girl surely 
cannot read them. Yet the grass, nourished by the bodies of the dead, marks the ongoing worldly 
presence of her siblings. This text of nature openly declares their continuing vitality, with all of 
the rhetorical force that nature possesses.  
Like the grass on the unweeded graves, the girl’s beliefs have sprung up in the midst of 
the churchyard cottage where she lives—infertile ground for heterodoxy, the narrator might have 
hoped. But her conviction is really too primitive and spontaneous to register as doxa of any kind. 
It’s closer to uncultivated belief: nature, in other words. And nature, in the shape of an untutored 
and “wildly clad” “woodland” child, proves astonishingly resistant to the logic of the institution 
that houses her.4 She is, then, a living sign of institutional decay, of Anglican theology’s 
estrangement from the natural grounds of belief. Paul Fry has argued that Wordsworth’s poetry 
at its core seeks “to make the primitive an object of phenomenological reflection” (What We Are 
66). The primitivist vision of “We are Seven” is akin to that offered by the early twentieth-
century archaeologist V. Gordon Childe, who, working in an enlightenment lineage that runs 
back to Vico and Rousseau, insisted that we should not “imagine early hominids elaborating an 
                                                      
4 Mainstream Anglican theology was broadly allied to “nature” insofar as it depended upon the argument 
from design, which held that God’s existence could be proven from the observation of nature. Given 
paradigmatic form in the “watchmaker” argument of William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802), the 
argument from design was less a theological system than a “set of intellectual and emotional habits” 
working to synthesize polite religion and empiricism, as Colin Jager has argued (Book of God 11). “We 
are Seven” by contrast worries that closer to nature is further from theology. Theology begins to look 
unnatural. 
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eschatology and then acting on it.” The experience of death “found expression in no abstract 
judgments, but in passionate acts. The acts were the ideas, not expressions of them” (13). This 
schema suggests the way Wordsworth’s narrator understands the girl’s round circuit to and from 
the graves—as the embodied, impassioned conception of her buried siblings’ living persistence. 
Theologies and eschatologies are sophistications of this primordial phenomenology. “We are 
Seven” worries that a phenomenology of the primitive offers no basis for an Anglican Christian 
conception of death, and instead threatens to dissolve death altogether. 
This is how the sophisticated narrator finds himself callously badgering an eight-year-
old: “But they are dead; those two are dead! / Their spirits are in heaven!” (65-66). His senseless 
protest reflects his dawning awareness that natural experience cannot yield or even comprehend 
a metaphysical distinction between life and death: “Twas throwing words away” (67). Nature 
will not commit this wild child’s siblings to the afterlife, and it offers no basis for any heaven, no 
matter how uncertain. The death nature offers is not absence but deeply rooted presence. The 
dead remain right where they are, grounded, in the present tense. 
Ted Underwood has highlighted the uniquely material bearing of the ghosts that haunt 
many strands of romantic-period writing. James Macpherson’s Ossian poems are a key 
forerunner of this development, depicting a world in which antiquity’s own prehistory lingers in 
the naturalized, materialized form of “ghosts [that] fly on clouds and ride on winds” (Fingal 24). 
What Ossian offered was a way of imagining immortality through material transmission, where 
the words and deeds of poets and heroes would be preserved in the elements of nature. 
Underwood cleverly describes the cultural investment in such heterodox visions of the afterlife 
as a form of insurance: believers might hedge their bets on Christian eternity, given that “it is not 
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uncommon for human beings to hold several conflicting ideas about the afterlife” (241). This is 
why Macpherson, a devout Christian, could write with untroubled enthusiasm of ancient Celtic 
religion. Wordsworth, however, has a marvelous penchant for locating his own psychic 
contradictions and gently inflaming them to the point of quiet combustion. Wordsworth’s 
anthropological poems trade in just this kind of Ossianic, material presence of the dead to depict 
a contemporary antiquity—distanced from cultural modernity and thereby, in the enlightenment 
schema, temporally “backward.” But that backwardness is also, curiously, from the future. The 
deep threat that haunts “We are Seven” is the eclipse of transcendent Christianity, which might 
be reduced to a brief historical interval sandwiched between a primordial materialist prehistory 
and an emerging materialist modernity. The elfin adversary of “We are Seven,” a living fossil, is 
both a primitive anachronism and a sign of the times. 
“We are Seven” performs the tension between Oxbridge reasonability and natural 
superstition in psychological and phenomenological terms, throwing nature in the face of an 
ostensibly naturalistic Anglican theology. This poem finds a sequel of sorts in “Lucy Gray,” 
which explores the transformation of the wild child’s natural psychology into communal 
superstition. One powerful narrative of modernity, vividly incarnate in poems like The Prelude, 
concerns the internalization of the supernatural. As Terry Castle has argued, when an emerging 
rationalism sought to explain away supernatural experience as an artifact of the human mind, it 
wound up “displac[ing] [the spirit world] into the realm of psychology.” “By relocating the 
world of ghosts in the closed space of the imagination,” Castle writes, “one ended up 
supernaturalising the mind itself” (161). The “invention of the uncanny,” exemplified by the 
gothic, emerges as a “toxic side effect” of the forced migration of ghosts and specters to the inner 
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world of the mind (8). “We are Seven” and “Lucy Gray” are, in different senses, faux-relics of a 
world yet to be touched by this interiorization of the supernatural. “Lucy Gray” is what happens 
when the lone heroine of “We are Seven” survives childhood to be integrated into the local 
community: we move from the simple assertion of continuing vitality of the dead (“Their graves 
are green”) to the more elaborate vehicle of undead perdurance that is myth, which is the product 
of collective ingenuity.5 Haunting remains an externalized social phenomenon—a participatory 
event. In both poems, the survivors will not allow the dead to disappear to heaven: 
Oft I had heard of Lucy Gray, 
And, when I cross’d the Wild, 
I chanc’d to see at break of day 
The solitary Child. 
 
No Mate, no comrade Lucy knew; 
She dwelt on a wide Moor, 
The sweetest Thing that ever grew 
Beside a human door! 
 
You yet may spy the Fawn at play, 
The Hare upon the Green; 
But the sweet face of Lucy Gray 
Will never more be seen. (1-12) 
 
These opening stanzas do the narrative work of framing and the conceptual work of containing 
the poem’s narrative core, which is the quotidian story of the girl’s disappearance. This frame is 
communal second-order reading, laboring to give meaning to Lucy’s death. Lucy, we are told, is 
solitary and wild. Set in parallel with fawn and hare, she is a Rousseauvian child of nature that 
grew not in but “Beside a human door!”  
                                                      
5 Alan Bewell has argued that through the “interpolative layers” of mythopoesis contained within the 
poem’s narrative, we discover “how a commonplace event, which can be explained without reference to 
supernatural intervention, has been taken up and revised over the course of its history by an interpretive 
community” (205).  
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 Yet when we turn to the narrative of Lucy’s disappearance, the fabula archeologically 
prior to the mythical framing, it quickly becomes clear that the frame doesn’t fit. Indeed, as 
Pamela Woof suggests, the precise, earthy narrative details of the central story “seem to belong 
to a different poem”: “The particularity of fact might be thought to confer a believable reality on 
to the more mythic component of the poem, but the two aspects do not sit perfectly well 
together” (30). I propose that this mismatch is exactly the point: “Lucy Gray” reveals the gap 
between the source narrative and its interpretive frame, illuminating how disappearance becomes 
myth. As the central stanzas plainly explain, Lucy is in fact no wild child and no solitary. She is 
a farm girl with a mother and a father, and she participates in the domestic economy of rural life. 
At her father’s behest, she travels to town with a lantern to guide her mother’s evening return, 
gets lost along the way, and disappears. After her parents search fruitlessly through the night, 
 And now they homeward turn’d, and cry’d, 
“In Heaven we all shall meet!” 
When in the snow the Mother spied 
The print of Lucy’s feet. (41-44) 
 
At the moment that Lucy’s parents are ready to entrust her to God, they receive an indexical sign 
of her presence on earth. The providential machinery is in place, but it doesn’t lead to heaven. 
They follow her footprints to the middle of a bridge where the trail disappears, and the poem 
reverts back to the mythic voice: 
 Yet some maintain that to this day 
 She is a living Child,  
 That you may see sweet Lucy Gray 
 Upon the lonesome Wild. 
 
 O’er rough and smooth she trips along, 
 And never looks behind; 
 And sings a solitary song 
 That whistles in the wind. (57-64) 
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This closing frame begins by perfectly inverting the rhyme sequence of the first stanza, as if to 
insist on the tale’s immaculate closure within the mythical apparatus. In the poem’s first stanza, 
the narrator had claimed he himself “chanc’d to see” Lucy, yet by the third insists she “[w]ill 
never more be seen.” Her haunting is at once verified and committed to the past. Yet in the 
conclusion, she once again becomes a “living Child”—at least, so “some maintain.” In this 
equivocal gesture, the poem joins the compelling formal closure of the myth to its semantic 
openness as a living legend. Life and death become entangled at the nexus of first-person 
reportage and communal storytelling.  
So while the poem is narrated in the first person, the speaker is only a node in the 
dissemination of myth, even as he revises and renews the myth by inserting himself into it. The 
proper author is the village. It is the village that keeps Lucy alive and translucently, evasively, in 
presence. But in order to achieve indefinite life, she must join the heroine of “We are Seven” and 
become the text of nature. And like that heroine, the community is effectively denying the 
transcendental afterlife in favor of immanent life, however spectral. Lucy will not be committed 
to the deathly alteriority of heaven. However, this is not—or not only—a generalized 
melancholia that cannot bear to confront death. It is equally a phenomenology of the afterlife, 
tracking how the dead are rebirthed and nurtured in their passage through the cultural imaginary. 
But Wordsworth does not simply dramatize the emergence of legend. By expanding the 
title to “Lucy Gray, or Solitude” in the 1815 edition, he adds a final stage to the process of 
abstraction, transforming Lucy into an emblem of fashionable contemplation. The subtitle thus 
heightens the tension between the quotidian story of Lucy’s disappearance and her ascension into 
the afterlife of discourse. “Solitude” works to “spiritualise” Lucy Gray, which is the term 
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Wordsworth used to describe his aim in the poem to Isabella Fenwick. And as he admits in the 
Fenwick note, he first heard the story from Dorothy—“The body however was found in the 
canal” (Lyrical Ballads 385). But this spiritualization doesn’t abstract Lucy Gray to a 
transcendent heaven—it abstracts her out of her class: “solitude” is a variation on pastoral 
retreat, the privilege of a voguish melancholic subjectivity. It is not dying alone in a snowstorm. 
While the myth of Lucy as a “living Child” is produced and consumed by the rustic village, the 
parallel myth of Lucy as “Solitude” circulates from polite author to polite reader.  
From the psychology of “We are Seven” to the anthropology of “Lucy Gray,” 
Wordsworth depicts a natural history of the afterlife that forsakes heavenly transcendence for 
immanent, still-vital existence. If, as Hazlitt’s Coleridge lamented, Wordsworth could not 
partake of this belief world, we can now identify what so fascinated him about the broken rural 
communities of the Lyrical Ballads. Wordsworth himself could not deny death’s irrevocable 
transcendence. But he could project onto the marginalized milieu of these poems a sense of 
death’s limits—or more precisely, a deeply heterodox sense that nature does not believe in death.  
Lyric Beyond Death: “These chairs they have no words to utter” 
Wordsworth may allow his rustics to subvert the “world of death” (Peter Bell 338; The 
Prelude [1850] 4.249; cf. “A Universe of death,” Paradise Lost 2.622), but we have grown 
accustomed to reading his lyrics as testaments to death’s absolute terminus. This is especially 
true of Excursion-era sonnets like “Surprized by joy.” In the tradition of Milton’s “Methought I 
saw my late espoused saint,” the speaker of “Surprized by joy” momentarily forgets his 
bereavement, and, upon remembering, is forced to relive the loss: 
Surprized by joy—impatient as the Wind 
I turned to share the transport—Oh! with whom 
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But thee, long buried in the silent Tomb, 
That spot which no vicissitude can find? 
Love, faithful love, recalled thee to my mind— 
But how could I forget thee? Through what power, 
Even for the least division of an hour, 
Have I been so beguiled as to be blind 
To my most grievous loss!—That thought’s return 
Was the worst pang that sorrow ever bore, 
Save one, one only, when I stood forlorn, 
Knowing my heart’s best treasure was no more; 
That neither present time, nor years unborn 
Could to my sight that heavenly face restore. (Major Works 334) 
 
There’s no space to entertain folk thanatologies amidst this suffocating grief. She—
Wordsworth’s daughter Catherine, dead at age three—is gone, and the only escape from death’s 
permanence is forgetting. The myth of Orpheus and Eurydice is internalized: memory recalls her 
from the underworld, but as the speaker instinctively turns to lay eyes on her, she has already 
vanished. Her loss returns with a self-incriminating vengeance once it is recalled. This fleeting 
relief from death is worse than futile: it ensures that death must be relived, and damns the living 
for forgetting the dead. Her “heavenly face” conveys not just her beauty but also her 
transcendent alterity in death. She is immutably severed from life, surviving only in the memory 
that must kill her again every time it forgets her loss.  
 “Surprized by joy” showcases the epitaphic mode that tends to become a synecdoche for 
all of Wordsworth’s writing, even for romanticism as such—a lyric tarrying with an ultimately 
withheld sense of presence. Mary Jacobus’s Romantic Things offers a shining example of 
Wordsworth read from this angle. For Jacobus, Wordsworthian lyric becomes a nexus of thought 
and thing, as the poetic apprehension of things generates a surplus of sense out of their very 
resistance to thought. In this lyric excess of sense, Jacobus sees a transvalution of the limits of 
representation: language neither adequately represents nor categorically alienates but mediates, 
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as a thing between things. One virtue of this perspective is its profound generosity toward the 
nonhuman and the inanimate. In the lyric time Jacobus theorizes, these categories do not come 
predefined. It is the work of the poem to reconstruct relations between thoughts and things, such 
that ontology emerges through the movement of verse. Yet there is one significant exception to 
this rule that Jacobus’s reading shares with de Man’s otherwise skeptical protocols, one 
phenomenon that both critics posit prior to the work of verse: death. Death is the organizing 
abyss around which Wordsworth’s lyric gravitates, and his epitaphic mode registers the 
movement of all beings toward death. As Jacobus writes, “both human and nonorganic life end 
in the grave, muted and stilled”: “Even breathing becomes breathing toward death, just as the gift 
of a poem becomes a form of conversing with the dead” (3). However, the very ubiquity of death 
Jacobus identifies in Wordsworth’s poetics threatens to negate death’s meaning, opening, by a 
slight turn of the screw, onto a world beyond death. “Death” as human mortality slides into 
“death” as perpetual change. This perpetual orientation toward death forestalls any arrival. 
Jacobus’s Wordsworth generates a world in which death is at once everywhere and nowhere.  
Paul Fry’s Wordsworth and the Poetry of What We Are similarly depends upon and yet 
undermines death. Fry is interested in a strand of Wordsworthian poetics that reveals the “ontic, 
unsemantic self-identity of things,” which the poet “constantly touched upon yet shied away 
from, masked at various times in more acceptable—but less original—pantheist, quietist, and 
idealist registers” (7). From this perspective, Wordsworth’s most original insight lies in a tacit 
but ever-present sense of poetry as the disclosure of the sheer being of all things. Hazlitt 
recognized that Wordsworth’s muse “proceeds on a principle of equality, and strives to reduce 
all things to the same standard,” yet for Fry this “levelling” impulse is primarily ontological, 
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rather than political (thus the fortuitousness of Hazlitt’s “all things” [11:87]). Subtending the 
vision of mind as lord and master, the Wordsworthian lyric discloses existence in its inhuman, 
indifferent, unmeaning core:  
The disclosure of things as things, not as entities in a vertical chain of being ranged from 
inanimate to animate to reflective to celestial but as these varied entities in their 
inanimate or suspended moment: that is the sole function of the Wordsworthian 
imagination. (139) 
 
However, this inanimate moment undergirding all existence, which comes fleetingly into focus 
through lyric evocation, cannot be allowed to remain in “pre-significant” unmeaning. As for 
Jacobus, it is the idea of death that roots existence, and Fry too draws on Heidegger’s existential 
analysis of being-toward-death: “‘Nature’ really is a being toward one’s own death, one’s 
existence in a universe of death” (140). The shared condition of all bare unmeaning existence lies 
in its impending end.   
Yet there’s a slippage here between the monist equality of all things stressed by Fry and 
the more specific Heideggerian notion of a human horizon defined by “being toward one’s own 
death.” This is Hamlet’s tragic sense (often cited by Wordsworth [e.g. Lyrical Ballads 753]) that 
what distinguishes “man” from “beast” is the burden of “looking before and after”—living in 
“ecstatic” temporality, in Heidegger’s language (Hamlet 4.4.37). From the phenomenological 
perspective, it is not death’s ubiquity, but rather awareness of death’s ubiquity, that establishes 
finitude as the mode of human consciousness. Heideggerian being-toward-death is the rarefied 
mode of reflective consciousness that recalls and anticipates, standing outside the present 
moment. Such futural projection, such awareness of death, is for Heidegger exclusive to 
humanity; it is what allows him to claim that humans “die” continuously until the moment of 
their actual demise (Being and Time 290-296). Death, then, is less an empirical event than the 
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horizon that gives consciousness its peculiarly tragic flavor. But Fry’s Wordsworth, in his 
ontologically-egalitarian monism, radically diminishes the value of temporal consciousness. 
High reflection is submerged back into low undifferentiated being. The Heideggerian armature, 
constantly endeavoring to define the unique sense in which “Man” inhabits time, is in fact 
entirely incompatible with the leveling thrust of Fry’s reading, which denies any particular 
privilege to consciousness—even to life, just as Fry finds Wordsworth deviating from the monist 
core of his own insight. 
Consider the Hamlet soliloquy cherished by Wordsworth:  
What is a man, 
If his chief good and market of his time 
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more. 
Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking before and after, gave us not 
That capability and god-like reason 
To fust in us unused. (4.4.33-39) 
 
The temporal ecstasy of human consciousness is useless and impotent, or worse, it is a curse. 
Knowledge, however painful a spur, cannot produce action. And “large discourse”—the 
abstractive capacity that allows the human to step out of the present—cannot in practice 
distinguish man from “bestial oblivion.” However experientially enriching or harrowing, 
temporal ecstasy and “god-like reason” are destined “To fust in us unused.” Insofar as 
Wordsworth tends toward this radically austere view, knowledge is out of the question. 
Everything perishes. It does not grant us any ontological privilege to know as much.  
These readings take Wordsworth brilliantly beyond the impasse of representation to the 
creation of sense (Jacobus) and to the meaningless core of existence (Fry), in the process 
rediscovering Wordsworth’s epitaphic mode and with it, the preeminence of death. But this death 
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is a transcendental condition of all existence, rather than a transcendent repository of the 
deceased. Under this dispensation, death’s domain is stretched so severely that it loses all 
signifying force. By radicalizing a humanist vision of death to encompass the universe of things, 
these readings actually wind up disclosing death’s insignificance. Take Jacobus’s reading of the 
1802 lyric “These chairs they have no words to utter”:  
These chairs they have no words to utter, 
No fire is in the grate to stir or flutter, 
The ceiling and floor are mute as a stone, 
My chamber is hushed and still, 
And I am alone, 
Happy and alone. 
 
Oh! who would be afraid of life, 
The passion the sorrow and the strife, 
When he may be 
Sheltered so easily? 
May lie in peace on his bed, 
Happy as they who are dead. (Major Works 255) 
 
For Jacobus, the “impenetrability” of the chairs, “neither figurative nor metaphorical but 
hardened and resistant to (being) thought,” tests the value of thought itself as it encounters an 
“insensibility” that “inhabits life as its other” (122, 117). The chairs “become placeholders for 
things that resist being thought yet, through their resistance, provoke it”: they are measured into 
meaningfulness precisely insofar as they withhold meaning. This process of measuring thought’s 
value against that which is thoughtless places the lyric, though “ostensibly life-affirming,” within 
the framework of Wordsworth’s epitaphic mode (122). Writing takes place against insensibility, 
and insensibility elides into death.  
I see “These chairs” responding to Coleridge’s “Frost at Midnight,” with its evocative 
and uncanny calm that “vexes meditation”—facilitated by Coleridge’s “dim sympathies” with 
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the film “fluttering” on the grate of the poet’s fireplace. Wordsworth’s poem obstructs all of 
Coleridge’s animism, offering a direct retort to his sympathetic imagination: “No fire is in the 
grate to stir or flutter.” There is no catalyst here for the kind of imaginative journeying that 
shapes what M. H. Abrams called the greater romantic lyric. There are only prosaic chairs, 
unworthy of even the barest description. In the second stanza, however, Wordsworth’s speaker 
finds the place where he and the resistant chairs will meet: in the insensibility of death. The very 
stillness of the scene takes on a subtle terror, as the speaker realizes that a life of pure peace 
extrapolated from this silent moment—a life without “the passion the sorrow and the strife”—
verges dangerously on death. It may even be a form of death, a catatonic tranquility that renders 
him “Happy as they who are dead.” This last line, a variation on Solon’s injunction to “call no 
man happy until he is dead,” injects vivifying anxiety into the midst of total serenity. The poem’s 
perfect happiness is indistinguishable from perfect insensibility: without the vexation that spurs 
and disturbs thought, existence dissolves into absolute relief. Facing the prospect of such 
absolute relief, the speaker recognizes that he would become dead.  
Freud defined the death drive as the allure of “inorganic stability,” a desire tasked with 
“lead[ing] organic life back to the inanimate state” (“Masochism” 163, Ego 40). The poem’s 
second stanza recognizes that its desire for perfect peace closely resembles a desire for death. 
But death is less an absence than an insensitive form of bare existence, devoid of all vibrancy. 
These chairs are simply, indifferently there. The sense of just being there suggests an inanimate, 
senseless presence that remains beyond the limits of thinking life. Where Jacobus sees an 
“ostensibly life-affirming” lyric shadowed by the grave, I see a quiet, almost silent reimagining 
of death. 
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  “Surprized by joy” and “These chairs they have no words to utter” represent two distinct 
modes of the Wordsworthian lyric. “Surprized by joy” registers the effects of transcendent loss 
as the speaker’s bereavement escapes from and returns to memory: this is a poem of certain 
death, death that can be suspended only by Lethean delusion. This elegiac model has provided 
the basis for critical reconstructions of the aims and assumptions of the Wordsworthian lyric. By 
contrast, “These chairs” tests a vision of death as senseless existence rather than absence, a mode 
of being where chairs and poets meet. In the Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth played up his troubled 
distance from the death-skeptical superstitions of the Lake District, yet poems like “These 
chairs” see him closing that distance in lyric terms. In “Memorial Verses: April 1850,” Matthew 
Arnold laurelled Wordsworth an English “Orpheus” for reviving “spirits that had long been 
dead” (38, 55)—a perceptive gloss of poems like “Surprized by joy,” which depicts the Orphic 
journey to the underworld as a psychological event. “These chairs” is an Orphic poem in a 
different sense, attuned to the mythological poet’s other career as the lyrist who sings inanimate 
nature to life. However, in Wordsworth’s revision of this other Orphic myth, the lyrist instead 
sings himself into inanimate insensibility. This underside of the Wordsworthian lyric finds a 
space of senseless existence between—or perhaps beyond—life and death. 
Necropolitics in The Excursion 
If there is an authentically epitaphic Wordsworth, we might expect to find him in 1814’s 
The Excursion, which, as Geoffrey Hartman protested, deteriorates “into a massive communion 
with the dead” (296). This is where Edmund Burke’s influence emerges in its most direct form, 
provoking William Hazlitt to charge Wordsworth with “apostasy” for forsaking the revolutionary 
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ideals that guided his best-known poetry in favor of crown-and-church conservatism.6 The 
explicit aim of The Excursion is to establish a means of living with death—the deaths of loved 
ones, and one’s own future death. It insists upon a providential acceptance of death, and is at 
times ruthless in its demand that grief be overcome. As Wordsworth puts it in his first “Essay 
Upon Epitaphs” (attached to The Excursion as a note), monuments to the dead must be freed 
from “that weakness and anguish of sorrow which is in nature transitory,” rejecting “transports 
of mind” and “quick turns of conflicting passion”—the same dramatic techniques that so 
distinguished his early poetry (Prose Works 2:59-60).   
One register of the shift from 1793 to 1814 lies in Wordsworth’s sense of the political 
nature of the bond between the living and the dead. Where in 1793 he had found something 
grotesque in Burke’s veneration of the dead, by 1814 he condensed his hopes for national 
reconciliation into a figure of corpse-cherishing.7 The Excursion’s Burkean necrocracy charts the 
reintegration of the traumatized individual psyche into the local and national community through 
Christian consolation. But if consolation is the high-level argument prosecuted by the poem, its 
local particulars remain discontinuous and conflicted. I will argue that Wordsworth himself 
recognized as much, evidenced by lifelong revisions that work to discipline The Excursion’s 
                                                      
6 Markers of this shift include Wordsworth’s renunciation of the French Revolution, hostility toward 
Napoleon, newfound devotion to King George III, return to the Anglican fold, and acceptance of a 
patronage position as distributor of stamps for Westmoreland. Robert Ryan has noted that because in his 
revolutionary period Wordsworth rejected the Christianity of his youth, Wordsworth’s return to the 
Church in fact represents his second apostasy, “repudiating an apostasy that more truly deserved the 
name” (83).  
 
7 In 1793 Wordsworth would leave off his long-held plan to enter the clergy (Ryan 83) and pen his 
furious “Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff,” which diagnosed Burke’s famous reverence for the dead as a 
diseased necrophilia. According to the young Wordsworth, Burke would have Britain “bound to cherish a 
corse at the bosom, when reason might call aloud that it should be entombed” (Prose Works 1:67). 
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churchyard tales to better accord with the poem’s stated aims. These revisions act as a running 
commentary on the tension between the theory and practice of consolation.  
The Excursion is about the Solitary, a bereaved and disillusioned radical who refuses to 
accept divine providence, and the two cooperating (and competing) priestly figures that attempt 
to save him. The Solitary is a figure of crisis, having failed to complete the work of mourning for 
his lost family and lost ideals in the wake of the French Revolution. His rehabilitation falls to the 
Wanderer, a nature’s-son-cum-sage who expounds a pitiless discourse of divine consolation: 
One adequate support 
For the calamities of mortal life 
Exists, one only;—an assured belief 
That the procession of our fate, howe’er 
Sad or disturbed, is ordered by a Being  
Of infinite benevolence and power, 
Whose everlasting purposes embrace 
All accidents, converting them to Good. (4.10-17) 
 
Raised in the Scottish church “with strictness scarcely known on English ground” (1.133) and 
sympathetic to the Covenanters, those “brave Progenitors, who rose / Against idolatry with 
warlike mind” (4.916-17), the Wanderer’s severity renders him a bit of an alien—framed to be 
admired, but not without reservation.8 Susan Wolfson suggests that the Wanderer’s dismissal of 
tears as “the weakness of humanity” is a “disquieting comment on what it means to achieve 
natural wisdom and to possess its comfort” (99). Sally Bushell links his “calm acceptance of 
others’ suffering” to his professional itinerancy: as a “Pedlar” (his name in early manuscript 
versions) who “loved to pace the public roads / And the wild paths” (1.417-18), the Wanderer 
moves in and out of his subjects’ lives, granting him “a literal ability to just ‘walk away’” (228-                                                      
8 A generation prior, Samuel Johnson had decried the rise of Presbyterianism in Scotland as “an 
epidemical enthusiasm, compounded of sullen scrupulousness and warlike ferocity,” a description which 
might double as a caricature of the Wanderer (Collected Works 9:6). 
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229). He can demand total submission to his providential view because he is curiously detached 
from the everyday fabric of domestic and social life (Bushell 164; Fry 151, 155).  
The Wanderer’s consolatory work is thus supplemented by the Pastor, who appears in 
Book V to minister on behalf of orthodoxy by way of concrete particulars—the “authentic 
epitaphs” of the dead in his own churchyard. The Pastor’s local histories are meant to 
complement the relentless universality of the Wanderer’s inspired theology, to balance the 
Wanderer’s airy truths with the gravity of the grave. Jane Stabler observes that “Graves yield up 
a number of life histories in The Excursion, but the lesson of each one is the same” (145). For 
Kurt Fosso the graveyard eulogies, set in parallel and tending toward the same place, “signify the 
surrender of [‘private, tenacious grief’] to tradition” (216). Yet though these life histories may be 
intended to convey the same lesson, in their very particularity they veer the poem off its 
universalizing narrative and away from the consecrated tradition toward which it drives.  
The Pastor’s most persuasive illustration of social rehabilitation ends in a deathly 
embrace. Among the deceased parishioners in the Pastor’s churchyard is a pair of unlikely 
friends: a Jacobite highland chieftain who fought at “Culloden’s fatal overthrow” (6.437), 
escaped into exile, and, upon return to Britain, found his way to the Pastor’s quiet “nook,” where 
he met a Hanoverian Whig who blew his estate in a losing campaign for a parliamentary seat and 
“slunk from the world” to this same hamlet (6.470). This pair, “flaming Jacobite / And sullen 
Hanoverian,” proceeded to argue their way to a friendship whose “very bickerings made them 
love it more” (6.474-475, 490). In this parable of national unity risen from the ashes of civil 
strife, partisan violence dissolves into sociable conversation. The solvent of strife is the 
churchyard itself, wherein,  
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One Spirit seldom failed to extend its sway 
Over both minds, when they awhile had marked 
The visible quiet of this holy ground 
And breathed its soothing air;—the Spirit of hope 
And saintly magnanimity; that, spurning  
The field of selfish difference and dispute, 
And every care which transitory things, 
Earth, and the kingdoms of earth, create, 
Doth, by a rapture of forgetfulness, 
Preclude forgiveness, from the praise debarred, 
Which else the Christian Virtue might have claimed. (6.496-506) 
 
Casting off “selfish difference and dispute” as transitory trifles silenced by the “Spirit of hope,” 
the odd couple decides to share a monument upon their own deaths. Its inscription reads, 
“Time flies, it is his melancholy task 
“To bring, and bear away, delusive hopes, 
“And re-produce the trouble he destroys. 
“But, while his blindness thus is occupied, 
“Discerning Mortal! do thou serve the will 
“Of Time’s eternal Master, and that peace, 
“Which the World wants, shall be for Thee confirmed.” (6.531-537)   
 
Civil strife diminishes to a mere artifact of the “blind” mutability of time, overcome by the 
eternal rest to which these partisans have graduated. Beyond mutable appearances lies God’s 
eternal mastery and the promise of providential resolution. The transformation of civil strife into 
national cohesion takes on this same providential inevitability.  
The skeptical Solitary will usually counter appeals to providence by appealing to his own 
metaphysics of radical contingency—“The sport of Nature, aided by blind Chance” (3.130). But 
gathered before the tomb of the pacified partisans, even the Solitary is moved by a sense of 
deeper coherence. His vision of nature seems to lose its flighty contingency and becomes a 
wellspring of eternal truth: he intones that the grave’s inscription  
Accords with Nature’s language;—the soft voice  
Of yon white torrent falling down the rocks  
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Speaks, less distinctly, to the same effect (6.539-542)  
 
From the “blended influence” (6.543) of this shared tomb emerges a vision of reconciliation 
modeled on nature, as time-bound historical traumas—civil war in 1745, global war in 1814—
are eroded by the timeless “soft voice” of mountain torrents.9 The bond of friendship, established 
through reverential conversation under the watchful eyes of the departed, ends in an embrace 
held for perpetuity in the grave. This epitaphic conversation is translated by death into “Nature’s 
language,” and in Nature’s language it returns from secular time back to eternity.  
The lesson is compelling, and the hard-hearted Solitary seems to acquiesce to this vision 
of consolation wrought from death. But as he absorbs the Pastor’s tale, he quietly radicalizes it, 
discerning a morbid subtext in which the only true solution to humanity’s lot of “dread strife” 
and “ruthless destiny” is death (6.570, 572). Elaborating on his theme, the Solitary contends that 
human life incarnates the myths of Prometheus, Tantalus, and Oedipus, “Fictions in form, but in 
their substance truths” (6.560). These pagan myths evoke a sense of providence without 
benevolence, a world of order that is nonetheless deeply hostile to logics of salvation and 
redemption. Humans sojourn on earth to suffer, “made desperate by ‘too quick a sense / Of 
constant infelicity’” (6.548-549)—a citation of Jeremy Taylor’s 1651 ars moriendi classic The 
Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying.10 But where the epitaph of Hanoverian and Jacobite folds 
                                                      
9 The Excursion’s “Summary of Contents” suggests how the episode is meant to transcend its 
particulars—the partisans are described simply as “two Men of opposite principles, who had encountered 
agitations in public life” (45). 
 
10 Wordsworth and Coleridge both deeply admired Taylor. Duncan Wu’s Wordsworth’s Reading, 1800-
1815 notes that Lady Beaumont relayed that both Wordsworth and Coleridge “highly approve the 
writings of Dr. Jeremiah Taylor, who had also the feelings of a Poet” (208). Hazlitt’s “My First 
Acquaintance with Poets” mentions Coleridge’s regard for Taylor’s “richness of style and imagery,” and 
in The Friend, Coleridge described the passage quoted here by the Solitary as “among the most sublime 
passages in English Literature” (The Liberal 2:44; The Friend 199).  
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historical difference into eternity, Taylor’s dire seventeenth-century orthodoxy strains against the 
ameliorating impulses of Anglicanism in 1814. In the passage the Solitary cites, Taylor reminds 
the “careless merry sinner” of the litany of torments under which humanity suffers, declaring, 
“we should be glad to be out of the noise and participation of so many evils. This is a place of 
sorrow and tears, of so great evils and a constant calamity: let us remove from hence, at least, in 
affections and preparation of mind” (38). This radical contemptus mundi is affectively and 
politically estranged from the Pastor’s polite Anglicanism, and he tries to guide the Solitary 
toward a more temperate conclusion: “these be terms,” he gently chides, “Which a divine 
philosophy rejects” (6.573-574).  
But the Solitary has understood the Pastor’s tale too well. If reconciliation can only arise 
from the grave, then the Pastor’s message hides a deeper morbidity than the Solitary’s own 
“bitter language of the heart” (3.462). The Excursion may, as Nicola Trott suggests, “figure an 
overriding wish to subdue mortality” (246), but moving beyond death into communal 
reconciliation seems to require an ever-deepening immersion in death. The Solitary’s 
Tayloresque despair expresses the inner logic of the Pastor’s Burkean vision of social 
reproduction through sepulchral reverence. First a means to an end, death becomes an end unto 
itself.  
Though not without its difficulties, the tale of the partisans offers the Pastor’s strongest 
case for consolation. The next episode is far more vexed, as the Pastor tries to stay on message 
but struggles against his source material. It tells the story of a formidable and melancholy 
woman, with “power of mind, and eloquent discourse,” who bears an uncanny resemblance to 
both Milton’s Satan and the Wordsworth of The Prelude (6.692). In youth, we are told, she split 
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her time between books and nature, estranged from her peers like an “imperial Thistle” amidst a 
vale of “humble Flowerets” (5.702-703). Her proud, regal sense of self-sufficiency carries a 
whiff of sulfur from the start: 
Even at that age, she ruled as sovereign Queen 
Among her Play-mates; else their simple sports 
Had wanted power to occupy a mind 
Held in subjection by a strong controul 
Of studious application, self-imposed. (6.707-711) 
 
The poem’s controlling aim is to deflate this satanic fantasy of subjection to oneself alone, and to 
replace it with the recognition of our subjection to the dead, and to the divinity with which they 
are joined. So, like the young Wordsworth of The Prelude, she must be disciplined by “Nature.” 
But her more fundamental transgression lies in her cooptation of The Prelude’s keywords of 
poetic privilege. And unlike the poet, her chastisement proves more destructive than edifying: 
 Two passions, both degenerate, for they both 
Began in honour, gradually obtained 
Rule over her, and vexed her daily life; 
An unrelenting, avaricious thrift; 
And a strange thralldom of maternal love, 
That held her spirit, in its own despite, 
Bound by vexation, and regret, and scorn.  
Constrained forgiveness, and relenting vows, 
And tears, in pride suppressed, in shame concealed, 
To a poor dissolute Son, her only Child. 
—Her wedded days had opened with mishap, 
Whence dire dependance.—What could she perform 
To shake the burthen off? Ah! there she felt, 
Indignantly, the weakness of her sex, 
The injustice of her low estate.—She mused; 
Resolved, adhered to her resolve; her heart 
Closed by degrees to charity; and, thence 
Expecting not Heaven’s blessing, placed her trust  
In ceaseless pains and parsimonious care, 
Which got, and sternly hoarded each day’s gain. (6.728-747) 
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Her avarice and her immoderate devotion to her son result from the obliquely sketched marriage 
that “opened with mishap,” apparently by way of out-of-wedlock pregnancy. However, she does 
not resign herself to nature’s discipline. She escapes poverty through the limited means available 
to her gender and station—thrift—and thus reasserts her “unsubdued” independence, without 
need for “Heaven’s blessing.” Yet her satanic ambition leaves her “intolerant of lasting peace” 
(6.753), and when she eventually falls to her deathbed, she lies in immense agitation: 
 She prayed, she moaned—her Husband’s Sister watched 
 Her dreary pillow, waited on her needs; 
 And yet the very sound of that kind foot 
 Was anguish to her ears!—“And must she rule,” 
 This was the dying Woman heard to say 
 In bitterness, “and must she rule and reign, 
 “Sole Mistress of this house, when I am gone? 
 “Sit by my fire—possess what I possessed— 
 “Tend what I tended—calling it her own!” (6.771-779, emphasis added) 
 
We are supposed to observe the sign of her fall in the rhetoric of sovereignty that pervades the 
passage. Because she denies her interdependence, she can only see her worldly demise as an 
injustice. Her recompense for this failing is a bad death—at least, that is the lesson the Pastor 
intends to convey. But to reach this interpretation, he has to make her revolt against coverture a 
symptom of her refusal to submit to death. Social resistance to gendered property law becomes 
indistinguishable from metaphysical defiance of providential will. Providence guarantees both 
the law of property and the law of death. But the equation costs death some of its rarefied 
eschatological significance: the whole ordeal begins to look like a crass transaction.  
The Pastor quickly becomes uncomfortable with this argument—“Enough; I fear, too 
much.” He moves to redeem the episode by finding a kernel of orthodox virtue in her character. 
The attempt is strained: 
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 Of nobler feeling 
 Take this example.—One autumnal evening, 
 While she was yet in prime of health and strength, 
 I well remember, while I passed her door, 
 Musing with loitering step, and upward eye 
 Turned tow’rds the planet Jupiter, that hung 
 Above the centre of the Vale, a voice 
 Roused me, her voice; it said, “That glorious Star 
 “In its untroubled element will shine 
 “As now it shines, when we are laid in earth 
 “And safe from all our sorrows.”—She is safe, 
 And her uncharitable acts, I trust, 
 And harsh unkindnesses, are all forgiven; 
 Though, in this Vale, remembered with deep awe!” (6.780-793) 
 
In every edition published during Wordsworth’s lifetime, these lines are followed by a horizontal 
rule. There are none of what the poem calls “closing words” (7.311). On the other side of the 
rule, we find that “The Vicar paused,” and the party relocates as if to escape its implications 
before the Pastor begins a new tale. This episode (and only this episode) seems to require 
bibliographic closure to compensate for the glaring deficiency of its conclusion.  
For as far as submission to providence goes, this is unconvincing. Her juxtaposition of a 
grandly indifferent astronomy with diminutive human “sorrows” is not properly providential—
it’s fatalistic. Moreover, routing eternity through Jupiter is decidedly unchristian, and it affirms 
her ambition and pride by way of the planet’s mythological associations. Here we recall that 
Jupiter is the star under which Wordsworth was born—his “own belovéd star” in The Prelude—
soliciting both identification and censure ([1805] 4.239). The Pastor has tried to read her stoic, 
skeptical indifference as evidence of resignation, but it remains a long way from the “assured 
belief” of the Wanderer, which, he makes clear, is the only “adequate support” for the 
“calamities of mortal life” (4.10-11). Fittingly, the Pastor must “trust” that the woman’s 
transgressions are forgiven, but he equally trusts they are not forgotten.  
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 The Pastor’s struggles in this episode were Wordsworth’s own struggles. The poet 
thoroughly revised its conclusion for over thirty years, making significant changes even between 
the 1836 and 1845 editions to reconcile the woman’s tale with the moral the Pastor sought to 
derive. By 1845, five years before Wordsworth’s death, the passage arrives at an apparently 
more viable demonstration of submission and repentance: 
 With a sigh 
 She spake, yet, I believe, not unsustained  
 By faith in glory that shall far transcend 
 Aught by these perishable heavens disclosed 
 To sight or mind. Nor less than care divine 
 Is divine mercy. She who had rebelled, 
 Was into meekness softened and subdued; 
 Did, after trials not in vain prolonged, 
 With resignation sink into the grave; 
 And her uncharitable acts, I trust, 
 And harsh unkindnesses are all forgiven, 
 Tho’, in this Vale, remembered with deep awe.” (p. 216) 
 
The Pastor has grown much more liberal with his doctrinal keywords, constructing a smooth 
narrative arc from satanic “rebellion” to “meekness” and “resignation.” In the most revealing 
instance, 1814’s reference to Jupiter has become a problem in need of correction. The observable 
heavens are now no longer eternal but “perishable,” juxtaposed with a “faith in glory” that “far 
transcend[s]” the stars. Wordsworth has the Pastor project his orthodoxy onto this sole example 
of her “noble feeling.” He now insists that at the core of her stoic musing, there must be a true 
faith beyond “sight or mind,” even if she gives no evidence of it.  
Yet even this movement toward properly Christian eternity is tripped up by choice 
Wordsworthian equivocations and double negatives—“I believe, not unsustained….” Indeed, the 
1843 Fenwick note to this episode describes the real-life model for the episode, and reveals the 
woman’s deathbed conversion as an invention: 
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She was a most striking instance how far a woman may surpass in talent, in knowledge, 
& culture of mind those with & among whom she lives & yet fall below them in Xtian 
virtues of the heart and spirit. It seemed almost, & I say it with grief, that in proportion as 
she excelled in the one she failed in the other. How frequently has one to observe in both 
sexes the same thing. & how mortifying is the reflection! (The Excursion 1221) 
 
The poem has clearly toiled to correct its source material, as there’s little hint of the 1845 reading 
to be had in this character sketch. The antithesis between “talent,” “knowledge,” “culture of 
mind” and “Xtian virtues of the heart and spirit” takes on a gendered resonance, verging on the 
much-discussed notion that intellectual cultivation would “unsex” women. But then, as if on 
second thought, Wordsworth extends his reflection to “both sexes.” The gender play runs in the 
opposite direction in the poem’s summary of contents, which lists the episode as “Instance of an 
unamiable Character, a Female” (“a Woman” in 1845). The syntax poses a question: what 
happens to an “unamiable Character”—unsexed and thus implicitly male—when he becomes 
“Female”? The stakes are higher when the unamiable character in question is a female 
doppelgänger of the author who, rather than ascending the Alps (and Parnassus), is dragged by 
coverture into despair. The episode’s revisions find Wordsworth working through this 
uncomfortable identification to find an appropriate idiom for her discipline. Thus the heavily 
worked manuscript experiments with “Heavens chastisement,” a “trial prolong[ed],” and ultimate 
acceptance of “her redeemer,” before slightly softening into the 1845 text. This version ends the 
negotiation between fixed doctrinal imperatives and intransigent source material, as, in a fanciful 
departure from her real-life model, she is finally absorbed into the poetic texture of 
Wordsworth’s consolatory agenda.  
Jane Stabler has noted how the Wanderer, with the “pounding rhythms and urgent 
emphases of a lay preacher,” “swamps the other speakers, makes no concessions to his listeners, 
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and scarcely needs an interlocutor” (142). But where the Wanderer seems a personified system, 
“hermetically sealed against accident and impossible to divert” (143), the Pastor’s demonstrative 
stories evade doctrinal capture. William Hazlitt was the first to recognize this gulf between 
“particular illustration” and “general principle” (The Examiner 348:555). Hazlitt’s dynamic 
registers a fundamental problem in the poem’s logic of consolation: death is the absent center of 
its spiritual and social polity, and yet the more consolatory and conciliatory work death is asked 
to perform, the less stable its meaning becomes. This poetics, in its very immersion in death, 
constantly loses track of its object. We have understood death’s elusiveness in Wordsworth as 
the sign of incomplete mourning, but it also signals the endurance of death itself as a living 
problem.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BLAKE, NATURAL RELIGION, AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEATH 
William Blake’s hostility to natural religion runs throughout his corpus of illuminated 
printing, from the two 1788 pamphlets simply titled There Is No Natural Religion to 1804’s 
Jerusalem, which charges, 
Bacon. Newton. Locke  
Deny a Conscience in Man & the Communion of Saints & Angels 
Contemning the Divine Vision & Fruition. Worshiping the Deus 
Of the Heathen. The God of This World. & the Goddess Nature 
Mystery Babylon the Great (93.30-34)1 
 
These accusations would be quite surprising to the figures named, and to their eighteenth-century 
adherents. While proponents of natural religion would admit to worshipping “The God of This 
World,” they understood their practice of seeking God in nature as diametrically opposed to the 
decadence of Babylonian (that is, Catholic) mystery, and would hesitate to accuse even Catholics 
of “Deny[ing] a Conscience in Man.” The God of nature was remote but nonetheless knowable 
through the genteel methods of empirical observation. Indeed, studying nature was the surest 
way to grasp God’s ingenuity and benevolence—and rather more stable and sociable than 
appealing to revelation. In Blake’s eyes, however, a whole range of religious phenomena from 
high church mystery to natural religion collapsed into the sinkhole of deism, which is why 
“nature worship” is ultimately irreligious:  
Deism, is the Worship of the God of this World by the 
                                                      
1 All citations of Blake’s poetry are taken from David Erdman’s Complete Poetry & Prose of William 
Blake. 
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means of what you call Natural Religion and Natural Philosophy, and of 
Natural Morality or Self-Righteousness, the Selfish Virtues of the Na- 
-tural Heart. This was the Religion of the Pharisees who murderd Je- 
sus. Deism is the same & ends in the same. (Jerusalem 52.33-37) 
 
For Blake, this formula had all the limpid truth of a logical proof—or more, since proofs were 
tainted by their claim to a debased universality. Northrop Frye offers a still-compelling account 
of the Blakean genealogy that follows natural religion to murder with all the inevitability of 
gravity. When religion is conducted through nature, reality is reduced to what is objectively 
sensible. All transcendence, including the afterlife, becomes doubtful. The result is the threat of 
absolute inexistence—what Blake will come to call “Eternal Death.” Eternal Death, both idea 
and grim ethos, is one of the principal catastrophes of Blake’s mythography. If death is absolute 
and permanent, then Blake thinks we are driven to cling desperately to life. By anxiously 
coveting life we are led, paradoxically, to jealous and fearful violence: in Frye’s memorable 
words, “The end of all natural religion, however well-meaning and good-natured, is a corrupt 
and decadent society rolling downhill to stampeding mass hysteria and maniacal warfare” (73). If 
this is where Blake ends up on natural religion, however, his critique begins in very different 
terms. The Book of Thel pictures a significantly distinct relationship between natural religion and 
death, in which death does not lead to eternal inexistence, but instead promises the endless 
recirculation of the body in the economy of nature. One does not truly leave the world, but 
simply becomes insensible to it—a resource to be perpetually reused. For Thel, the problem with 
death is that it leaves too much behind.   
How to Live in a Natural World 
 
Natural religion proposes that because the world is God’s creation, God can be known 
through the examination of the world. To read nature is to read God’s work; design indexes the 
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designer. This premise has the benefit of assimilating empiricism into religious practice. As 
Francis Bacon wrote, empiricism is the hermeneutic method appropriate to nature, which “is the 
book of God’s works, and…a kind of second Scripture” (8:368-369). Even as the textual and 
natural scriptures are held in analogical relation to each other, the practical consequence of the 
focus on natural phenomena is a diminishing emphasis on doctrine—which suited an Anglican 
church averse to doctrinal quarrels just fine. Natural religion thus functioned as an alternative 
and sometimes rival to revealed religion, the direct experience of God’s presence through 
inspired revelation. In place of a divine presence given up in ecstatic revelation, natural religion 
discloses the signature of a remote God, legible only to disciplined study. This was the 
predominant theoretical and rhetorical mode of the Anglican orthodoxy in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, and was equally popularly among rationalist factions of dissent. Blake 
despised it. 
 Yet rather than attack its theoretical premises, Blake psychologizes natural theology. In 
Blake’s diagnosis, if the microscope yields us as much of God as the Bible does, it becomes 
difficult to insist that the unavailable God of scripture in his distant heaven is more real than the 
stuff of the world that signs for him. For the natural theologian, God is evidenced by Lockean 
empirical observation, which is centered on “a consensus of normal minds based on the lower 
limit of normality” (Frye 22). This epistemological mood clashes with the notion of a hazily 
transcendent otherworld, which is defined by its resistance to empirical scrutiny. Bacon’s second 
scripture sows doubt upon the first. The deep psychology of natural religion reveals a despairing 
acknowledgment that nature is all there is. Doubt is installed as a central component of faith, 
schismatically insisting on both the epistemological priority of this world and the ontological 
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priority of the inaccessible beyond. Organized by deferral and fantasy, split between the hard 
ground of “Nature” and the obscure heaven that allegedly awaits, the psyche of natural theology 
is structurally preordained to oscillate between belief and skepticism. And whatever it might 
profess, it instinctively lends greater credence to its skepticism, since skepticism is the 
epistemological motor of its empirical methods. Natural religion thus ineluctably descends into 
deism, which for Blake is not religion at all. There is no natural religion.   
Due to its self-evacuating tendencies, Blake thinks that underneath its polite, mannered 
façade, natural religion is constitutionally anxious. A chief source of anxiety lies in the theodicy 
of natural religion. Of course, any monotheism that insists on a benevolent God may struggle to 
account for evil and suffering. But the problem is especially acute if the whole theological 
edifice rests on an interpretation of the world as an expression of God’s very nature. We may 
assert in ontological terms that the world reflects God’s nature, but in practice we have reversed 
the equation and made the world responsible for what we can infer of God. If, for example, we 
see the world as an unfolding catastrophe, God becomes at best a flawed designer and at worst a 
sadistic tyrant. To this end, William Paley offers a novel and audacious natural-theological 
solution, declaring that the world is a kind, healthy, bounteous, and joyous place. In his words, 
“The air, the earth, the water, teem with delighted existence” (238). Paley wrote the book on 
natural theology (titled, of course, Natural Theology [1802]), synthesizing a long tradition of 
thought into hugely influential form. While Paley’s effort postdates some of Blake’s 
engagements with natural theology, his arguments are both representative and symptomatic, 
distilling precisely what Blake opposed.  
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Paley strives to impart his vision of a delightful world through the effervescence of his 
prose. Observing newborn flies, he finds that “Their sportive motions, their wanton mazes, their 
gratuitous activity, their continual change of place without use or purpose, testify their joy, and 
the exultation which they feel in their lately discovered faculties” (238). It is this excess—the 
sportive, wanton, and gratuitous—that expresses the experience of joy throughout the exultant 
natural world. Paley finds it everywhere, in cats, fish, shrimp, and bees, on down to the smallest 
fly. Astonishingly, Paley is quite comfortable granting to animals the capacity for disciplined, 
goal-directed behavior and the sense of temporal awareness that had long been regarded as 
humanity’s distinction.2 Paley’s animal kingdom is governed by leisure, hedonic satisfaction, and 
contemplative retreat: “At this moment, in every given moment of time, how many myriads of 
animals are eating their food, gratifying their appetites, ruminating in their holes, accomplishing 
their wishes, pursuing their pleasures, taking their pastimes?” (241). But while these animals 
seem in many ways remarkably human, their hedonism remains blameless, and Paley’s 
descriptions often slide enthusiastically into Eros, as when he imagines plants “covered with 
aphides, greedily sucking their juices, and constantly, as it should seem, in the act of sucking.” 
For the aphids apparently trapped in the oral stage, “It cannot be doubted but that this is a state of 
intense gratification” (238).  
Of course, there is suffering in this world. We are scarred by “calamity.” But Paley 
ingeniously uses our awareness of suffering as evidence of the world’s benevolence, since “the 
very notice which calamities excite” demonstrates that “the common course of things is in favor 
of happiness” (241). If tragedy defines our lives, it is only because it is novel: “happiness is the 
                                                      
2 The tradition of thought that identifies the human with a distinctive relationship to time is discussed in 
relation to Wordsworth’s lyrics in chapter three.  
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rule; misery, the exception” (241). Paley’s theodicy thus has two prongs that may arrive at cross 
purposes. First, he declares that the world is on balance unequivocally happy. Second, he 
acknowledges that we may not feel ourselves to be happy, but that is only because we are too 
consistently happy to notice it, and so mistake ourselves for unhappy: “Were the order reversed, 
our attention would be called to examples of health and competency, instead of disease and 
want” (241). Accordingly, he can insist that unhappiness is a human delusion, and as evidence 
point to the happiness of nature. It’s crucial that Paley is very confident in his capacity to 
interpret the feelings of nature, and yet has little faith in the capacity of other people to interpret 
their own feelings.  
Thinking Matter 
The question of whether nature is happy may seem an unlikely philosophical crux for a 
theology developed to accommodate empiricism. But if religion is understood as both Blake and 
Paley intuited it, that is, as a conceptual and practical repertoire for self-orientation, then the 
relationship between religion and the projection of feeling matters decisively. The connection (or 
chasm) between humans and animals recurs throughout Blake’s early poems. A notable example 
is “The Fly,” which addresses itself not directly to natural theology, but to the mechanistic 
empiricism that Blake locates at natural theology’s core: 
Little Fly 
Thy summer’s play, 
My thoughtless hand 
Has brush’d away. (1-4) 
 
A Paleyesque anthropomorphic frame is in place, as the speaker addresses the fly, and reads it at 
“play.” However, this is after the fact. A prototypical apostrophe, the poem is addressed to an 
absent being, because the fly is already gone. Both the metonymy of “thoughtless hand” and the 
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euphemism of “brush’d away” witness the speaker distancing himself from the act. If he had 
initially engaged the fly in the terms of the poem, he would not have killed it.  
This realization elicits reflection: 
Am not I  
A fly like thee?  
Or art not thou  
A man like me?  
 
For I dance  
And drink & sing:  
Till some blind hand  
Shall brush my wing. (5-12)  
 
Mortality and vulnerability link the speaker to the fly—both live and joy until they cease, 
crushed by some vast indifferent power. The analogy hinges on the intuition of the fly’s capacity 
to experience pleasure, which becomes a source of quiet, noble, and hopeless resistance in the 
face of death’s inevitability. But as the analogy is pushed further, complications arise:  
If thought is life  
And strength & breath  
And the want  
Of thought is death;  
 
Then am I  
A happy fly,  
If I live  
Or if I die. (13-20)  
 
The governing “If” sets the terms of the speaker’s relation to the fly. If we read its questions 
rhetorically and interpret the opening “If” as a “Since” or an “Insofar as,” then a radical leveling 
identification follows: I am a fly like thee. Humanity no longer has a monopoly on “thought,” 
which is redefined as life and strength and breath. If living is thinking, fly and speaker become 
equal bearers of life, as each lives until “some blind hand” intervenes. The poem thus recalls 
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King Lear: “As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods / They kill us for their sport” (4.1.38-39). 
Paley’s own flies close the analogical loop, as their “wanton mazes” of flight transvalue Lear’s 
world of irreversible depravity into a world of constantly-consummated joy. This reorientation 
turns on contrasting connotations of “wanton”—the violently incontinent and the joyfully 
excessive—and is equally suggested by Paley’s optimistic usage of “mazes,” over and against 
Milton’s famous image of fallen angels reasoning to “no end, in wandering mazes lost” 
(Paradise Lost 2.561). Blake’s treatment of the fly-human analogy catches and suspends these 
two traditions, defined respectively by original sin and universal benevolence. Here the analogy 
allows the speaker to identify with the fly’s vulnerability, recognizing the value of the fly’s life 
in the same terms as the speaker’s own. Both beings, the speaker can now say, are valuable 
precisely because they are fragile. Yet the value attached to this sheer existence is also an 
indifferent sort of value, reflected in the mechanistic framework that generated the initial 
equivalence between fly and speaker:  
Then am I  
A happy fly,  
If I live  
Or if I die.  
 
From this perspective, the fly has not been elevated toward the human; instead, the human has 
been diminished toward the fly. “Happy” bundles several etymological resonances—fortunate 
and content, but also blithe. The blithe contentment wrought by a mechanistic worldview may in 
fact prove apathetic toward life: alive or dead, the speaker will remain happy, since life is just 
biomechanical animation. In one sense, speaker and fly are both valued for simply existing, but 
in another sense, simple existence in a mechanical universe is fleeting, indifferent, and ultimately 
meaningless. Why not kill a fly—or oneself?  
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Yet this indifferent mechanism can suggest belated guilt: the fly’s life provokes 
philosophical reflection, which leads to the revaluation of the fly’s value, but only after the 
speaker has ended it. Stopped short by the realization of what he has done, the speaker has 
incentive to conclude that it didn’t matter either way. Both of these possibilities follow from the 
argumentative path that takes “Am I not / A fly like thee?” as a rhetorical question and takes the 
“If” that opens the third stanza (“If thought is life / And strength & breath”) as a viable premise: 
I am a fly like thee, and thought is (nothing but) life and strength and breath. But what if we take 
the opening question earnestly and challenge the premise that follows? What if I am not a fly like 
thee, and thought is not reducible to mere bodily vitality? Isn’t the consciousness that poses this 
kind of question fundamentally different from its supposed likeness, the thoughtless fly? By 
identifying self with fly, by reflecting upon the relationship between thought and bodily life, 
hasn’t the speaker gone beyond the dumb animation of mere life and strength and breath? 
Doesn’t this thought, this recognition of similitude given verbal form, add something to 
existence? The performative declaration “I am like a fly” goes well beyond species difference, 
crossing whole phyla to generate a likeness that only the human mind, and not the fly’s, can 
recognize. This version of the speaker might intone, It is most unlike a fly to compare oneself to 
a fly. From this angle, the mechanistic equivalence of human and fly is only the first step in a 
dialectical movement that reaffirms the transcendence of human consciousness as that which can 
construct analogies and imagine likenesses. 
But who can say, as this version of the speaker assumes, that the fly doesn’t “think”? If 
the fly has life and strength and breath, then surely the speaker is right to believe the fly “thinks” 
in some sense, too? More damningly, didn’t the speaker begin the poem by identifying his own 
  
151 
hand as equally “thoughtless”? If the faculty of thought couldn’t prevent the speaker from killing 
the fly, then what good is the privilege of human consciousness? How could this ineffectual, 
phantasmal thought qualify the speaker as “alive” in any sense that wouldn’t apply to the fly? Is 
human life uselessly distinguished by the capacity to feel guilty after the fact? 
“The Fly” thus dramatizes an impasse. At the outset, the fly is insignificant, so the 
speaker can thoughtlessly kill it. Once killed, the fly triggers a chiasmus in which speaker 
becomes fly and fly becomes “man,” as cohabitants in the abstract category of the living. 
However, this recognition actually ensures that the speaker is not “A fly like thee” because only 
the speaker, and not the fly, has posited this likeness. We could say that the speaker was like the 
fly up until the moment when the speaker recognized this likeness, awakened from 
thoughtlessness into fated knowledge by an accidental animal sacrifice. By transvaluing the fly, 
the speaker renegotiates both speaker’s and fly’s place in the world. This kind of identification 
uproots the complacent assumptions that separate human and fly. And yet the performative act of 
claiming identification with the fly will in turn differentiate the speaker from the fly, though this 
difference cannot be recognized within the materialist framework that first enabled the 
identification. This tension between what the poem says and what it does is reflected in the 
tension between the playfully skipping iambic dimeter and the logical hypotaxis of the if/then 
argument structure. The syllogism that closes the poem seems an alien presence within the poetic 
form that houses it. Materialism permits the speaker to imaginatively identify with the fly on the 
basis of shared existence, but this same materialism denies imaginative identifications any 
significance. It is in this sense that the speaker can be happy “If I live / Or if I die.” This happy 
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indifference, Blake’s poem suggests, underlies the exuberant joy of the happy animals in Paley’s 
mechanistic natural-theological universe. 
Place and Identity 
What “The Fly” dramatizes, what makes it such an apt partner to Paley’s text, is the 
violently oscillating psychology underlying the empiricism Blake locates at the core of the 
natural-theological worldview. The logical movement of “The Fly” has no end, because every 
conclusion performatively subverts itself. That poem’s minimal exposition of the problem of 
consciousness in a material world receives elaboration in The Book of Thel.  Thel and Thel ask 
how to relate, as a thinking thing, to death.  
An adolescent woman, Thel finds herself in the perfectly engineered world of natural 
theology, where everyone is happy. But unlike her cheerful neighbors, Thel, burdened with 
consciousness, finds herself deeply unhappy, so unhappy that she longs to “gentle sleep the sleep 
of death” (1.13). Her fellow residents of the Vales of Har—a lily, cloud, worm, and clod of 
clay—are baffled by her discontent. If they can be happy, why can’t Thel, the “mistress of the 
vales” and “virgin of the skies,” appreciate her existence? Even the “lowly” lily, though “very 
small” and destined to be “melt[ed]” by the summer heat, nonetheless has an important 
ecological niche. She purifies honey, feeds lambs, “revives the milked cow, & tames the fire 
breathing steed” (2.8, 2.10). True, she does not live a life of hedonic frolic like Paley’s flies. 
Paley’s vision of nature is defined by surplus enjoyment. His world is an immaculate machine, 
but it runs on currents of pleasure that exceed mere function. For Blake’s lily, by contrast, there’s 
little doubt the pleasure-pain balance comes out in the negative. Yet she remains content, since 
“he that smiles on all” has promised that once the world consumes her she will “flourish in 
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eternal vales.” If the lowly lily is provided for, “then why should Thel complain”? (1.15-25). 
However, the lily ends her speech smiling but “in tears,” suggesting that her suffering cannot be 
fully satisfied by the apologetics she recites.  
The story the lily tells is repeated by each of the vale-dwellers Thel encounters. Because 
every being is useful, every being is valuable, and because everyone is valued, everyone is 
happy. The sheer complexity of the natural system that governs the vale is evidence of purpose 
and design. Every node within the natural-theological system is essential to the system, and its 
efficiency is evidence of its virtue. Underwriting the pastoral economy is the metaphor of the 
family, headed by a patriarchal God. God is father to the lily, officiant to the marriage of cloud 
and dew, and husband to the clod of clay. Bathing all his children in “milk and oil,” 
“cherish[ing]” even the helpless worm, he elegizes every death and midwifes every rebirth (5.10, 
11). The incessant turnover of dust to dust thus takes on an all-encompassing significance—the 
book of nature recast as family saga. This narrative does not even need to be understood by its 
subjects, as the clay’s uncomprehending acceptance suggests: “But how this is sweet maid, I 
know not, and I cannot know, / I ponder, and I cannot ponder; yet I live and love” (5.5-6). This 
metaphor system powers the symbolic economy that endows meaning upon the material 
economy of Thel’s world. Because there is no figural alternative to the family, the image of God 
as father or husband stands as a total identification, rather than an analogy that might be qualified 
by difference or interpreted otherwise. The theological narrative cannot be recognized as a 
narrative within the Vales of Har because it reads unopposed. 
Nature’s theology guarantees a sense of purpose and identity, comprehended in Thel by 
the word “place.” “Place” is niche—the array of points where each entity meets another entity in 
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the ecological cycle. These connections generate an immanent sense of significance, as each 
being comes to identify itself through its relationships to other beings. Thel’s world thus models 
what Mark Lussier calls an “ethos of interdependence” (55), where constant transformation 
ensures, as Kevin Hutchings writes, “the very identity of each living thing is infinitely deferred” 
(171). Defined by reproduction and death, these relationships are equally creative and 
destructive. Yet the balance of experience is not equal. To this end, Schopenhauer offers “A 
quick test of the assertion that enjoyment outweighs pain in this world”: simply “compare the 
feelings of an animal engaged in eating another with those of the animal being eaten” (42). The 
triumph of pain over pleasure must be explained away by an ideology of sacrifice. Suffering on 
behalf of others becomes a virtue, transvaluing the preponderance of pain into a mark of the 
world’s holiness. This theology of nature, translating suffering into sacrifice, works to lubricate 
the material ecology of Thel’s world. A supplementary transcendence, in the form of God’s love 
and the promise of the afterlife, buttresses the immanent identities generated within the 
ecological frame.  
However, neither the comfort of “place,” with the hard satisfactions of sacrifice, nor the 
promise of divine love is available to Thel. As the narrative begins, Thel has already rejected her 
place: 
The daughters of Mne Seraphim led round their sunny flocks. 
All but the youngest; she in paleness sought the secret air.  
To fade away like morning beauty from her mortal day (1.1-3) 
 
Throughout her book, Thel declines to join the “round” of the day’s work within the larger round 
of the lifecycle. This abstention clarifies an important feature of this world: identities are 
determined by vocation, and vocations are assigned according to kind. This species logic is 
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governed by strict control of analogy and likeness. To be a lily is to function like a lily, which is 
to be wilted, consumed, circulated, and reborn. Everything is engaged in the work of 
reproduction. For Thel’s kind, as “daughters of Mne Seraphim,” reproduction entails husbandry 
of “sunny flocks” and, as the book’s conclusion reveals, sexual procreation. To opt out of 
reproduction is to forfeit likeness and thus surrender identity.  
The relationship between kind, identity, and value was the object of “The Fly,” which 
queried an expanded sense of what it means to be like something else, transcending species 
difference to explore an underlying likeness rooted in shared mortality. As soon as Thel abstains 
from the work of the world, she has no kind. She retreats to the “secret air” where she might 
“fade away,” and soon she will long to “gentle sleep the sleep of death,” which might release her 
from her delicate cage (1.2-3, 1.13). This desire for nothingness resembles Freudian melancholia, 
the internalization of loss into a sense of one’s own emptiness; in this case, Thel’s lost object is, 
recursively, her own sense of self. But Thel also draws on the Renaissance sense of melancholia 
as a mode of being—the phenomenon that led Richard Burton to claim, “They get their 
knowledge by books, I mine by melancholizing” (22).3 Cast into the wilderness outside of the 
vale’s symbolic order, she can no longer “hear the voice / Of him that walketh in the garden,” the 
God of nature that blesses her neighbors but never appears to Thel (1.14). This thoughtful loss 
renders her painfully immune to the theocratic apologetics of natural religion, predicated on 
likeness, utility, and reproduction. It also costs her identity, if identity as self-sameness requires a 
                                                      
3 Anca Violeta Munteanu develops the connection between Thel and melancholy, noting that Blake kept a 
print of Albrecht Dürer’s Melencolia I above his own engraving table, which was the only item he 
retained when he was forced to sell his collection of prints in 1820. 
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mirror, since Thel has nothing to affirm her reflection. She gestures instead toward a less 
substantial and yet perhaps more sustainable way of placing herself: 
Ah! Thel is like a watry bow. and like a parting cloud. 
Like a reflection in a glass. like shadows in the water.  
Like dreams of infants. like a smile upon an infants face, 
Like the doves voice, like transient day, like music in the air (1.8-11) 
 
The analogical work of “The Fly” explodes into fragments of abbreviated comparison. These are 
apparently depressive figures, reflecting a lack of confidence and a deteriorating sense of self. 
They trade in ephemerality and weakness. A long tradition of twentieth-century criticism cited 
passages like these to chastise Thel for withdrawing from the lifecycle of the natural world, often 
in vituperative terms: Thel was “indolent” and “hysteric,” defined by “consummate ignorance,” 
“wallow[ing] in self-pity and cynicism,” and at core “ugly, cold, mean, dark” (Fisher 206, Read 
167, Behrendt 78, Gleckner 168). Recent criticism has upended the masculinist assumptions 
undergirding these assessments, but even Thel’s most sympathetic readers do not look fondly on 
these similes. For Deborah McCollister, Thel’s soliloquy reveals that though she is “essentially 
selfish, she does not possess identity” and “does not realize her essence”—weaknesses which 
render her vulnerable to seduction by the vale-dwellers (91). Gerda Norvig’s sensitive reading is 
focused upon Thel’s “liminal identity,” and yet Norvig finds in Thel’s similes a “plethora of 
grafted discourses” that “function as a kind of background glossolalia or echolalia calculated to 
confuse rather than define” (260). Curiously, even as Norvig depicts Thel as a “self-reflexive 
theorist,” her argument does not attempt to recuperate the reflexive work of these similes (257, 
266). The adolescent, depressive trappings of Thel’s unhappiness remain a problem across 
diverse critical accounts. I suggest we turn the issue around: unhappiness problematizes in 
Thel—it is Thel’s way of knowing.  
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  This is not to dismiss Thel’s confusion and anguish. She at once is haunted by transience 
and enchanted by death (“Why fade these children of the spring? born but to smile & fall” [1.7]). 
But Thel’s depressive position does not render her “thoughtless” like the speaker of “The Fly.” 
Instead, it offers a lucid picture of the problem of identity in a world that has no place for her. 
“Thel is like a watry bow” in the sense that she is an image, an epiphenomenon, a haphazard 
appearance without utility. Ensconced in the melancholic “secret air,” Thel is displaced within 
her own narrative world, having left behind its identity-producing order. When she compares 
herself to a “parting cloud,” she pictures herself straddling the nebulous boundary that divides 
existence from inexistence. Combining these similes gives us less, not more, of Thel, combining 
the barely-there transience of the parting cloud with the illusory bearing of the rainbow reflected 
in water. When Thel casts herself “Like a reflection in a glass, like shadows in the water,” she 
identifies herself as an index without a referent, likening herself to likeness as such. She appears 
as a figure of representation, a blurry copy of what Blake will call “unnam’d forms,” with no 
original (Marriage 15.18). By figuring herself “Like dreams of infants, like a smile upon an 
infant’s face,” Thel imagines herself as essence without appearance, and then as appearance 
without essence. If dreaming is a fundamentally private form of experience, this should be 
especially true for infants, who may not have much use for conceptual distinctions between 
dreams and reality, and who lack the means to express, record, or convey their experience. 
However vivid, the infant’s dream leaves no trace. The infant’s smile inverts this scheme: it’s a 
visible material event, but the infant’s smile has no certain relationship to any interior 
experience. It might reflect happiness, contentment, and Blakean “infant joy,” or it might be a 
superficial phenomenon, skin deep. The dream figures Thel as a definitive but unrepresentable 
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being. The smile casts her as a visible appearance unmoored from essence, a representation that 
may signify nothing at all. 
Taken collectively, these similes offer variations on what Elizabeth Effinger calls Thel’s 
“co-emerging and co-fading” (127). Thel’s figures are negations that do constructive work, 
replacing the hard ground of an ecological “place” with abstract identifications linked by 
transience and vulnerability. Crucially, these resemblances are not based in species, natural kind, 
reproductive relationships, or metonymical connections within the ecosystem. Her similes have 
no reference to biological or ecological function. Nelson Hilton registers the link between 
identity and place when he characterizes Thel’s lament as “not going anywhere, not standing 
firm, but assimilating everything to its vision. Narcissus-like, lamentation centers on itself and so 
defeats its fulfillment” (30). This is especially interesting since the similes of “reflection in a 
glass” and “shadows in water” seem designed to dissolve the rapturous image of self that 
engrosses Narcissus. These images indeed defeat fulfillment, but I will argue that for Thel the 
defeat of fulfillment is a means of survival. There’s a vital dimension to wishing for 
disappearance without actualizing it.  
Exploded Intimacy 
Thel’s account of self is unmoored from the familial-ecological matrix, but it also evades 
the logical bind that ties life to thought in “The Fly.” To exist—even as a mere optical illusion 
dependent on a perceiver, even in the mind of a sleeping infant—is to share something with Thel. 
It no longer matters whether one is biologically alive, or how one apprehends the vexed 
relationship between life and consciousness. In Thel’s world, likeness is governed by species, a 
logic upended by “The Fly” in favor of the more fundamental likeness of life to life. For Thel at 
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this moment, likeness goes even further, expanding beyond life to the very limits of language 
and thought. When Thel hazards her similes, she challenges her world’s single regulating 
analogy of nature as family. This response to natural theology’s use of analogy is quite 
distinctive, as we can see by comparison to the era’s most important argument vis-á-vis natural 
religion and analogy, David Hume’s posthumously published Dialogues concerning Natural 
Religion (1779).  
In Hume’s account, natural religion argues as follows: Machines are self-evidently 
designed. This means they must have a designer. The world is like a machine in that it evidences 
design, so it too must have a designer. Finally, the nature of that designer must be revealed in the 
nature of his design, since the capacities and sensibilities of human designers are evident in 
human designs. In the Dialogues, Hume’s representative skeptic Philo launches a devastating 
series of attacks on this reasoning. For example, “design” in the human sense is not creation but 
rather the manipulation of materials that already exist. Human design, then, is a weak point of 
reference for a creator who is supposed to have created the world ex nihilo and then organized its 
materials. Should we suppose a distinction between the creator and the designer? To that end, 
human designs are often collaborative, so why should we assume there is only one 
creator/designer as opposed to many? Moreover, human designs often go through several 
imperfect attempts. We have no other world with which to compare our own, so why should we 
assume ours is the sole and final version? Indeed, all experience suggests it is more likely a 
faulty unfinished prototype. And finally, “does not a plant or an animal, which springs from 
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vegetation or generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial 
machine, which arises from reason and design?” (53).4  
For Hume’s Philo, these arguments expose natural theology’s promiscuous use of 
analogy. The world is only like a human-designed contrivance if we use “like” in a grossly 
irresponsible manner, without attending carefully to the similarities and differences of the two 
terms. For every way in which the world is “like” a machine, there are countless other ways in 
which the two terms are extremely unlike. Under scrutiny, the argument from design can’t 
support the cascade of inferences that its practitioners derive from its controlling analogy, 
leaping from the evident design of commonplace objects all the way up to the designer of the 
universe. Philo’s arguments thus work to radically constrain the use of analogical reasoning, with 
the larger aim of dissolving empirical apologetics for Christian belief. Keep your faith, Hume 
seems to say, but do not appeal to nature to affirm what you already believe about the biblical 
God.  
Like Hume’s Philo, The Book of Thel trains its critical focus on the use of analogy in 
theological justification. Thel is preoccupied by the figure of nature as family, which is leveraged 
to imply that the violence of the lifecycle is necessary and ultimately motivated by patriarchal 
love. But Thel’s strategy is the opposite of Philo’s: rather than attempting to sever the figure 
from the referent and disqualify the analogy, she appropriates the theological apparatus of 
                                                      
4 Though readers historical and modern have assumed that Philo speaks for Hume, and though Philo’s 
arguments appear decisive, he ultimately turns about-face and accepts a version of the natural-theological 
argument. This may be a perfunctory gesture of conciliation, but Colin Jager has argued that the actual 
terms Philo assents to—namely “that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some 
remote analogy to human intelligence” (Hume 101)—are so attenuated that natural theology in this form 
has no consequence for human conduct. Accordingly, Philo’s concession implies that “If this is all that 
natural theology amounts to…it’s not an enemy worth fighting” (Jager, Book of God 64). 
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figuration for her own use. Her soliloquies consist of rampant and promiscuous analogizing. In 
The Rule of Metaphor, Paul Ricouer argued that metaphor “redescribes reality” by transforming 
the meaning of the copula to be: “The metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is not’ and ‘is 
like’” (24, 6). Ricouer offers an alternative to the substitution theory of metaphor, which 
conceives metaphor as a “purely rhetorical” operation that posits a proper word, then replaces the 
proper word with a figurative word, and finally asks the audience to perform a “restitutive 
paraphrase” by deriving the proper word from the figure (52). According to this conventional 
theory, metaphor provides no new information and is strictly decorative in function (49). By 
contrast, Ricouer proposes a tension theory of metaphor defined by “split reference,” in which 
“what is is redescribed” by the irresolvable splitting of its predication into, simultaneously, “not” 
and “like” (351, 292). This split predication is not narrowly ornamental: “it says that things 
really are this way” (292). The tension dynamics that propel metaphor become explicit in simile, 
which does not even rhetorically assert the pure equivalence of its terms, but claims they are 
merely “like” each other.  
Thel’s declarations of likeness project a split identification in Ricouer’s sense. There is 
no proper word that might substitute for any figure to make it whole—my own explications of 
her similes suggest the difficulty of achieving a satisfactory account of their descriptive or 
referential work. Because they are similes, each figure explicitly sustains the gap between tenor 
and vehicle. Thel is like a watry bow, and thus not a watry bow. The figure is constitutionally 
incomplete. But moreover, each figure is displaced by the next, such that none is allowed to 
assert its own self-sufficiency. The similes compound, qualify, or interfere with one another. One 
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likeness gives way to the next, such that any replete identity is indefinitely deferred. Identity 
derived from natural kinds gives way to similarity hazarded through incomplete comparisons.  
And unlike the speaker of “The Fly,” Thel does not need to determine whether her figures 
are descriptively adequate. To borrow Nancy Yousef’s terms, Thel appeals to “intimacy” rather 
than “sympathy.” Unlike the eighteenth-century motif of sympathy, Yousef argues that 
“intimacy need not and rarely does, entail a symmetrical relationship between one another; need 
not, and rarely does, involve the discovery of similitude between one another” (2). Intimacy thus 
circumvents any demand for “intersubjective symmetry” with its attendant notions of equality 
and reciprocity. The problem of intersubjective symmetry is the wrench thrown into the gears of 
“The Fly,” sending the poem into infinite regress, and it is a problem Thel sidesteps by asking 
less of her comparisons in order to give and receive more. While Yousef limits her study of 
intimacy to the interpersonal realm, the “asymmetrical and nonreciprocal forms of relation, 
attention, and appreciation” she theorizes inevitably disturb the category of the human even as 
they presuppose it (3). 
Thel’s figures imagine a vexed intimacy. But there is a second, distinct layer of figuration 
in The Book of Thel: the representation of nonhuman beings—lily, cloud, worm, and clod of 
clay—that converse in English, maintain religious beliefs, and participate in human institutions 
like marriage. These verbal representations are supplemented by a visual text that depicts, for 
example, the lily as a young woman looking and playing the cultural role of the “gentle maid” 
(1.22). Tilottama Rajan suggests that Thel (alongside Visions of the Daughters of Albion) invites 
confusion between “literal” referents in the social world and the “figurative” drama of Blakean 
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mythology.5 Kevin Hutchings has argued that there is a fundamentally exploitative current to 
reading Thel’s nonhuman beings as, whether as allegories of human epistemological questions, 
as props in the Blakean drama of Innocence and Experience, or as unconscious mouthpieces of a 
repressive natural order. Marjorie Levinson has claimed that these creatures are best understood 
as Thel’s ventriloquized projections: “she projects her answers into them, listening to them as to 
an ‘other,’ and so hearing what it is she knows, and thus getting a glimpse of what she does not 
know” (289). In a distinct but compatible interpretation, Hutchings sees Thel’s personifications 
as a product of “discursive conditioning” rather than “narcissistic compulsion,” evidenced by 
Thel’s own obsession with the question of utility (169). In each case, Thel appropriates the vale 
creatures as material for her own projections, staging confrontations with othered versions of 
herself that repeat her own disavowed knowledge back to her.  
But there is another way to approach the poem’s anthropomorphism. As Paul de Man 
proposed,  
‘Anthropomorphism’ is not just a trope but an identification on the level of substance. It 
takes one entity for another and thus implies the constitution of specific entities prior to 
their confusion, the taking of something for something else that can then be assumed to 
be given. (Rhetoric of Romanticism 242) 
 
One entity can be taken for another only after each has been constituted as distinct. This prior 
constitution is the more fundamental work of the trope. The similes of Thel’s lament are not 
                                                      
5 As Rajan notes, Thel may be about female identity, but not in the sense that, say, Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
novels are about female identity. This is because Thel doubles as a person and a symbol. She asks to be 
interpreted (“who will find my place?”), marking her identity as an irresolvable question. Thel might be at 
once a young woman circa 1789, a figure in the drama of innocence and experience, a wandering 
Neoplatonic soul, and so forth. This continual crossing between the personal and the symbolic marks 
Thel’s figuration as a “site of resistance to any attempt to fit it into the system,” where the eternal 
visionary dimensions of Blake’s thought are disrupted by the vividness of its historical particulars (243). 
The irruption of history means that in Thel, unlike the late prophecies, Blake is still making art for “an 
audience composed of men and women instead of sheep and goats” (252). 
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anthropomorphic in this sense, since they question the nature of the difference between Thel and 
her figural vehicles. These figures do not perform the prior constitution of their terms, but 
instead work to unsettle and displace both Thel and her others in the Ricouerean play of “like” 
and “not.” Anthropomorphism only emerges once the same beings with whom Thel analogizes 
herself are summoned into the literal dramatic space of her world to talk to her. Here the pre-
constituting process of anthropomorphism de Man describes is rendered visible and subject to 
explication. The dialogues actively differentiate Thel from the same beings to whom she has 
claimed likeness—they work to shut down her thought.  
Even as Thel shares with the lily a vulnerable existence within a gendered ecosystem, the 
lily is conjured forth to explain that they are not in fact alike. They have different roles in the 
natural economy, and moreover, Thel is unhappy while the lily is content—even if her tears say 
otherwise. The imaginative link between their positions is severed. The lily has a defining 
purpose, “But Thel is like a faint cloud kindled at the rising sun: / I vanish from my pearly 
throne, and who shall find my place” (2.11-12). Thel’s invocation of the cloud summons forth 
the same, and he appears “hovering and glittering on the air before the face of Thel” (3.6). Like 
the lily, however, the cloud refuses to stand as Thel’s likeness. Yes, they are both ephemeral—
the cloud is daily burned apart by the sun—but in perishing, he disperses and falls to earth, 
where he is gloriously reborn in marriage to the “fair eyed dew.” (Described as a “weeping 
virgin, trembling,” the dew is unavailable for comment [3.6, 13, 14]). Against this one-sided 
picture of marital bliss, Thel is forced to admit, “I fear that I am not like thee.” The cloud nobly 
contributes to the lifecycle, while Thel’s distinction is for naught: “all shall say, without a use 
this shining woman liv’d, / Or did she only live. To be at death the food of worms” (3.17, 22-23). 
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This remark in turn calls forth the weeping infant worm, a “helpless form” so pitiful it cannot 
speak, embraced by a maternal clod of clay, who attests to the care and love they receive for their 
sufferings (5.10).  
Through these exchanges, Thel’s world prosecutes her similes. It subjects them to the 
weighing of similarity and difference, striking down each of Thel’s figural attempts to establish 
intimacy with the other beings of her world. Put differently, Thel’s world reasserts control over 
the technology of analogy—the technology responsible for the generation and maintenance of 
identity. The world literalizes and then litigates Thel’s figures, rejecting any commonality or 
solidarity with Thel, and by extension refusing the Ricouerean splitting of predication that would 
unmoor both Thel and her metaphorical vehicles from their signifying place. Lily, cloud, and 
clod understand their existence as defined by continuous sacrifice for those beings with whom 
they are in ecological contact. These material relationships are the hard ground of value in this 
world, whereas Thel’s imaginative likenesses rely upon abstract affinities (weakness, transience, 
illusion) that her interlocutors compel her to relinquish. In the voices of her likenesses, Thel 
encounters a single overriding analogy that denies its own figural status.  
The dialogues thus reeducate Thel, convincing her to forfeit her own figures and adopt 
the incumbent religion of nature modeled on familial sacrifice. Eventually Thel herself is 
supplying the family metaphor, self-consciously transforming the worm from an “image of 
weakness” into the image of an infant: “Art thou a Worm? image of weakness. art thou but a 
Worm? / I see thee like an infant wrapped in the Lillys leaf” (4.2-3). This image is distressing, as 
the worm “lay helpless & naked: weeping, / none to answer, none to cherish thee with mothers 
smiles” (4.6). But here the clod of clay materializes to play the role of mother, stabilizing the 
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narrative picture and reassuring Thel that the infant worm receives appropriate care. This 
sentimental image leads Thel to relent, persuaded that God’s “milk and oil” softens the pains of 
continual sacrifice. She agrees to enter the house of clay and accept her place in the grave.  
The Impossibility of Death 
From the outset of her book, Thel has sought “To fade away like morning beauty from 
her mortal day,” to “gentle sleep the sleep of death” (1.3, 1.13). Why, exactly, must Thel be 
persuaded to enter the land of the dead? A central thrust of Blake’s critique of natural religion, as 
described by Frye and updated by Laura Quinney, holds that natural religion deteriorates into a 
form of mechanistic deism that extinguishes the afterlife. Of course, we won’t find this in the 
Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, but for Blake it’s the place toward which the 
belief structure that worships the “God of this World” inexorably slides. According to this 
reading, the name Blake will use for the threat of perfect inexistence that haunts the materialist 
psyche is “Eternal Death.” As Quinney writes, “Nature worship, although it seems benign, 
actually conceals submission to the truth of Eternal Death, and a submission of this kind, 
however tacit, leads to self-centered anxiety and desperation” (30). The Book of Thel is ground 
zero for this problem—a poem which insistently asks, “How can a thinking being be integrated 
into a world that apparently has no use for thought?” (31). The prospect of losing consciousness 
is, paradoxically, all the more devastating for the empirical subject who knows it has never really 
existed.  
However, the deistic vision of Eternal Death as inexistence is not on offer in Thel, though 
such inexistence is perhaps what Thel seeks. Blake first references “Eternal Death” in 1793’s 
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America a Prophecy, and may have drawn the phrase from the Book of Common Prayer’s burial 
rites: 
   MAN, that is born of a woman, hath but a short time to live, and is full of misery. He 
cometh up, and is cut down, like a flower; he fleeth as it were a shadow, and never 
continueth in one stay.  
   In the midst of life we are in death: of whom may we seek for succor, but of thee, O 
Lord, who for our sins art justly displeased?  
   Yet, O Lord God most holy, O Lord most mighty, O holy and most merciful Saviour, 
deliver us not into the bitter pains of eternal death. (105) 
 
We can observe here the full range of Thel’s preoccupations: the theme of procreation, flower 
and shadow as figures of ephemerality, the elision of ephemerality into death, sin, and 
punishment, a “merciful Saviour” who nonetheless must be begged for mercy, and finally, the 
peril of eternal death characterized by “bitter pains.” The torments of hell imagine the 
persistence of life in death, the resilience of consciousness as a vessel of suffering beyond the 
death of the body. Eternal Death is suffering rather than extinction, a kind of survival against 
one’s will. Sleep, fading away—these motifs imply a sense of death as pure dematerialization 
that has nothing to do with what happens in the grave.  
For there will be no fading away into gentle sleep in Thel’s world. This is why, though 
she seeks something like death, she also defers it. In Thel, death is less a deep terror than a 
broken promise. To die, Thel discovers, is to find oneself all the more implanted in the world 
since, as Blake will later write, “You cannot go to Eternal Death in that which can never die” 
(Milton 33.25). Death is complete absorption into the very economy of nature Thel has sought to 
escape. This is what Thel finds when she enters the earth: 
She saw the couches of the dead, & where the fibrous roots  
Of every heart on earth infixes deep its restless twists:  
A land of sorrows & of tears where never smile was seen.  
 
  
168 
She wanderd in the land of clouds thro' valleys dark, listning  
Dolours & lamentations: waiting oft beside a dewy grave,  
She stood in silence listning to the voices of the ground (6.3-8) 
 
The land of death is not properly eternal but rather sempiternal—it extends infinitely within time, 
rather than transcending time altogether. Nor does death open onto perfect inanimation; indeed, 
the corpses of the dead, “infixed” yet “restless,” are wracked by a continuous material 
interchange that will never cease. The benevolent God of nature reveals himself in death as the 
tyrant of a regime founded on suffering and endeavoring toward perpetual exploitation. This was 
the God Thel suspected might underlie the vale’s ideology of self-sacrifice.  
The core of Thel’s critique of God as nature is this: death offers not eternal relief but 
sempiternal sacrifice. Eternal Death thus captures the conceptual paradox haunting the notion of 
death as a passage to absolute inexistence. Maurice Blanchot uses the limit case of suicide to 
render this point: 
Just as the man who is hanging himself, after kicking away the stool on which he stood, 
the final shore, rather than feeling the leap which he is making into the void feels only the 
rope which holds him, held to the end, held more than ever, bound as he had never been 
before to the existence he would like to leave. (Thomas the Obscure 36) 
 
As the point of transition to inexistence, one’s death cannot be experienced. It lies just beyond, 
and so the sense of death as nonbeing arrives only after it is too late to be had. For Blanchot, 
suicide offers not escape but instead a heightened immersion in the body, in the materiality of the 
world. Here emerges a second, related paradox: the will to die is located in the desiring self—it 
is in fact a desire for control over experience. In Simon Critchley’s words, “the ‘I’ wants to give 
itself the power to control the disappearance of its power”: 
The desire of the suicide is too strong and too hopeful because it conceives of death as 
the action of an ‘I’ in the realm where the ‘I’ and its action no longer pertain. The 
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contradiction of the suicide is analogous to that of the insomniac, who cannot will him or 
herself to sleep because sleep is not an exercise of the will. (Very Little 80) 
 
Thel, by turn, always places emphasis on the wanting, desiring dimension of her death wish. 
Blake’s idiosyncratic take on a conventional diction—“fade away like morning beauty,” “gentle 
sleep the sleep of death”—introduces a interval of figuration into the desire it announces. Her 
seeking and wishing are set in the optative mood, condensing grammar and affect. This mood is 
an expression of desire, “the action of an ‘I,’” directly opposed to the cessation of both desire 
and the “I” in death. Thel’s death wish is in fact a way of life, taking place in the space of 
fantasy.  
Thel asks for new figures, and her world responds with actualities. Thel is disconsolate, 
and the world offers her a grave. This paradox of actualizing death underlies the realization that 
the land of the dead leads not to the end of existence but instead to the fulfillment of materiality. 
Death is only a pivotal moment in an endless cycle of circulation from which there’s no exit. 
Indefinite Flight 
In the same vein, the land of the dead is not a quiet space of melancholic retreat. Death is 
downright voluble. It is the living Thel who is silent, transfixed by the perpetual lamentations of 
those who have gone to grave. As she winds her way through the underworld, she finds herself 
before “her own grave plot”—the place marked for her, the place she was seemingly seeking—
which emits a “voice of sorrow” (6.10). This voice seems to represent knowledge or experience, 
but in fact offers a fantasy of dismembered sense organs deluged by violence and agony:  
Why cannot the Ear be closed to its own destruction? 
Or the glistening Eye to the poison of a smile! 
Why are Eyelids stord with arrows ready drawn,  
Where a thousand fighting men in ambush lie? 
Or an Eye of gifts & graces, show’ring fruits & coined god! 
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Why a Tongue impress’d with honey from every wind? 
Why an Ear, a whirlpool fierce to drawn creations in?  
Why a Nostril wide inhaling terror trembling & affright. (6.11-18)  
 
These dizzying, claustrophobic figures harken back to the chain of similes centering this chapter. 
But crucially, while the similes of Thel’s “gentle lamentation” were provisional and self-
qualifying, the grave plot’s formulae collapse into outright equation: eyelids are stored with 
arrows, the ear is a whirlpool, a nostril inhales terror. Simile, Anahid Nersessian writes, “puts 
into language the desire for two things to be identical, only to show that they might never be so” 
(Utopia, Limited 97). By contrast, there is no such room for the cohabitation of “like” and “not” 
in the grave plot. The senses are pictured as autonomous, warring agents, each asserting their 
own totalizing truth. The sheer incommensurability of their images serves to terrify the 
consciousness which the senses ostensibly serve. The result, as Tristanne Connolly suggests, is 
“an impression of lack of control over the body’s borders, of being helplessly overwhelmed by 
one’s environment” (22).  
This is the endpoint of the mechanism that organizes the ecology of the Vales of Har. The 
discourse of the grave is at once overwhelming and oblique, picturing a total violence that 
exceeds coherent representation. We can think here of Edmund Burke’s definition of the sublime 
as “astonishment”: “that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some 
degree of horror” as “the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any 
other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it” (Enquiry 57). Overwhelmed 
by sense data it cannot process, the subject of the Burkean sublime loses control of thought, and 
the grave plot similarly seeks to paralyze Thel into acquiescence.   
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But while for Burke the sublime instills “admiration, reverence, and respect,” the grave’s 
attack on Thel’s consciousness is strictly grotesque. It does not “astonish” her into submission, as 
the image of the infant worm embraced by the mother clod had (4.1). Instead, as the voice 
climaxes, Thel starts, shrieks, and flees: 
Why a tender curb upon the youthful burning boy!  
Why a little curtain of flesh on the bed of our desire? 
The Virgin started from her seat, & with a shriek.  
Fled back unhinderd till she came into the vales of Har (6.19-22) 
 
This burning boy erupts into the poem as if from a different world. He is the underworld 
counterpart of the smiling father God, veiled until now by the peaceful pastoral narrative that 
organizes the world aboveground. The gendered ecology of natural religion, with its omnipresent 
motif of familial sacrifice, finds its hidden telos in this unaccountable figure. The natural order 
seems to exist for his satisfaction, so that he might burn through Thel’s “curtain of flesh.”6 The 
message of the vale is that this is where she belongs: this is who she is like, and from whom she 
should derive her identity. When Thel recoils and flees, her flight must be understood not only as 
a refusal of sexual exploitation, but also as a refusal of identity wholly predicated on biological 
kind, gender difference, and reproductive function. Importantly, Thel does not swoon or faint, as 
the major tropes of sensibility might have it. Her depressive sensitivity does not render her 
prone, but is in fact the source of the violent revulsion that provokes her to escape back whence 
she came.  
                                                      
6 In versions I and J of The Book of Thel, both printed in 1789 and held respectively at the Bodleian and 
Houghton Libraries, the two lines depicting the burning boy were effaced from the paper after printing. 
Eaves, Essick, and Viscomi speculate that the deletions may have followed from Blake’s interpretation of 
his customers’ sensibilities (110). The excisions have left a visible smear that, in a sense, acts as a curtain 
behind which the burning boy remains perpetually concealed. In these copies, the reader is shielded from 
the culminating figure Thel must confront, and yet solicited to project the object of Thel’s terror into the 
visible absence.  
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Against the natural-theological impulse to derive divinity from nature, Blake’s prophetic 
works will ultimately declare that both God’s predication and self-predication cannot be 
constrained to nature, but rather to the limits of what can be imagined, because the human 
imagination is God. In Blake’s profoundly concise formula,   
God Appears and God is Light 
To those poor Souls who dwell in Night 
But does a Human Form Display 
To those who Dwell in Realms of day. (“Auguries of Innocence” 129-132) 
 
The “Human Form” is itself a moving target, whose contours become visible not at the blinding 
limits of dark sublimity, but instead take whatever form can be traced—and made intimate—by 
figuration.  
Thel’s flight is the tactical counterpart of Thel’s figures. It opens onto an indefinite form 
of life animated out of a death wish. By upholding the gap between desire and satisfaction, Thel 
can go on persisting even with no place to go—a rigorous form of bare but uncompromising 
persistence. The Book of Thel’s last word is more modest than the grand Blakean motifs of self-
annihilation and apocalypse to come. It promises little, offering the at-best restricted resolution 
of withdrawal into minimalist quietude. As Thel flees the grave and the boy, she makes a 
permanent exit from Blake’s mythology. It has been the argument of this chapter that Thel’s 
quiet resistance by figure and flight, precisely insofar as it remains incomplete, is just enough.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DEVOTIONAL POETRY OF FELICIA HEMANS 
For much of the nineteenth century, Felicia Hemans was regarded as the quintessential 
poetess—“by far the most feminine writer of the age,” as George Gilfillan wrote in 1847 (Tait’s 
Edinburgh Magazine 14:360). Modern critics have highlighted the remarkable tension between 
the reception of Hemans as the ideal female poet and her sympathetic dramatizations of women’s 
suicide, infanticide, and murderous revenge. Even poems that became cornerstones of Victorian 
domestic ideology like “The Homes of England” and “Casabianca” now seem to subtly evacuate 
the model of domestic affection they helped to establish. Hemans similarly managed to both 
perfect and hollow out the early nineteenth century paradigm of “Female Poetry,” as defined by 
Francis Jeffrey:  
It is infinitely sweet, elegant, and tender—touching, perhaps, and contemplative rather 
than vehement and overpowering; and not only finished throughout with an exquisite 
delicacy, and even serenity of execution, but informed with a purity and loftiness of 
feeling, and a certain sober and humble tone of indulgence and piety, which must satisfy 
all judgments, and allay the apprehensions of those who are most afraid of the passionate 
exaggerations of poetry. (Edinburgh Review 50:34) 
 
Jeffrey’s overbearing syntax, shot through with negations and qualifications, pictures the 
precarious balancing act of the female poet. Both descriptive and prescriptive, his account settles 
on the management of “passionate exaggerations” as a chief imperative of female poetry. 
Gilfillan drags the shadowy subtext of Jeffrey’s argument into plain sight: reading Hemans, “you 
are saved the ludicrous image of a double-dyed Blue, in papers and morning wrapper, sweating 
at some stupendous treatise or tragedy” (“Mrs. Hemans” 234-235). Female gender performance 
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was set in primordial contradiction to the pathos of the masculine sublime and the agon of 
intellectual labor. Moreover, the female poet’s responsibility was negative in structure, organized 
around “saving” the male reader from any displeasing mental images her text might evoke from 
his fancy. However, there was one exception to poetess’s modest remit—a form of potentially 
transcendent work which female poets could depict, and female protagonists could perform, 
without bruising the projections of the male intelligentsia: dying.  
Death is Hemans’s central trope. It’s a dramatic affordance, one that amplifies the 
emotional and existential dynamics of female experience: the lone vessel of sublimity available 
to a female poetry. Death raises domestic affection to the status of the literary. As Anthony John 
Harding has written, Hemans’s poetry seems to accept that “a woman’s life is more worthy of 
memorializing the more it is played out against the backdrop of another’s death and most 
especially if it finds its own highest realization in death” (138-139, original emphasis). 
According to this reading, Hemans relentlessly celebrates sacrifice as the source and sign of 
female value. Death, as the ultimate sacrifice, becomes the “guarantee of the significance of a 
life” (138). But where Harding finds Hemans wholly and complicitly absorbed in this logic, 
scholars like Susan Wolfson see her poetry reporting the collapse of the domestic ideal amid 
endemic male failure, backgrounded by a vacant social order that pathologically devalues female 
labor to the point of eradication (Borderlines 58-64). Hemans’s heroines may perform incredible 
feats of gender transgression, but an inexorable “‘feminine’ calculus” always pulls them down to 
earth—or more precisely, into the ground: “the more rebellious a woman, the more vivid the 
aesthetic fireworks, the more necessary her death” (67). Yet death is not just punishment for 
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gender transgression. It also releases women from the world-historical order that determines their 
fate. As the ultimate female burden, death is the problem and the solution of Hemans’s poetry. 
Put differently, death allows Hemans to dramatize the limits of the gendered imaginary. 
Readings of Hemans’s treatment of death tend to focus on the middle period of her career, 
centered on 1828’s Records of Woman, a volume that traces a forgotten history of the interplay 
between domestic affection and female suffering. In this chapter, I take up the devotional poetry 
that Hemans wrote near the end of her life, especially 1834’s Scenes and Hymns of Life. My 
interest is in how Hemans’s double-edged sense of domesticity variously facilitates and 
complicates her negotiation of denominational politics. Religious devotion is everywhere 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) in Hemans’s visions of domesticity, but when devotion comes 
to the thematic foreground in this late volume, it proves an equivocal and sometimes contentious 
partner to domestic affection. Death can help to synonymize devotion and domesticity, but can 
also wedge these terms apart.  
Hemans’s devotional project faced considerable denominational challenges. She was 
broadly allied to the Anglican paradigm of practical piety, which was largely indifferent to 
doctrine but strict in its emphasis on polite behavior and affect. But she also wanted to court 
nonconformist readers outside of the Anglican church, who demanded the kind of authentic, 
inspirited devotion that their Anglican counterparts continued to view as a vulgar threat to social 
stability. She was, moreover, deeply invested in the lyric tradition of the prophetic poet, which 
was not always distinguishable from the religious tradition of the poetic prophet. For this reason, 
her lyric poems become embattled sites of denominational perplexity. Just as Hemans had 
introduced death to catalyze her complex vision of domesticity, she uses death here to resolve 
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denominational conflict. In particular, Hemans relies on the conventions and logics of the 
deathbed to outline a rhetorical space that could accommodate both the Anglican mainstream and 
enthusiastic forms of Protestant dissent.  
The Right of Private Judgment: Devotional Poetics after Wordsworth 
Hemans’s devotional poetry is “recognizably Anglican” in its broad outlines, as Emma 
Mason notes, but it also evokes a sense of “spiritual strength” and “intense religious feeling” that 
goes beyond “the dictates of denomination” (14). Its inspired tropology of “high office,” “fiery 
trials,” “immortal longings,” and the “suffering spirit” trades in the outré mixture of high conceit 
and low enthusiasm that Wordsworth pioneered and ultimately normalized (“German Studies” 
2). By the latter half of the nineteenth century, these aggrandizements could scan as harmlessly 
metaphorical, the very marks of the poetic. The itinerant lay preaching that fueled the dangerous 
enthusiasms of the revolutionary era had begun to decline by the 1830s in favor of professional 
evangelism and an emphasis on missionary work, as new dissent was largely institutionalized 
and destigmatized into a tributary of mainstream Victorian evangelicalism.1 But in 1834, the 
                                                      
1 See Lovegrove 55-57 on the decline of itinerant preaching. The Victorian assimilation of nonconformity 
was a vexed, uneven process. In a study of nonconformist obituaries from 1830 to 1880, Mary Riso 
writes,  
With a shift towards the middle classes within their own ranks, a movement towards social 
respectability within their denominations and the passage of national laws that encouraged 
participation in higher education and the civil service, [nonconformists] began to find a home on 
earth. They found themselves increasingly fitting into a world in which their ancestors had been 
strangers and pilgrims. (111) 
But while dissent was normalized in some spheres of life, death remained a site of denominational strife. 
Even if they did not attend the parish church—and even if they were not particularly religious—
nonconformists often sought burial in the churchyard as a sign of belonging in the national community. 
Meanwhile some Anglican clergymen, particularly in rural parishes, claimed the power to decide who 
could be buried in the churchyard and under what terms. For these clergy, the right to refuse burial to 
dissenters was essential to the very integrity of the national church. As Thomas Laqueur details, legal 
(and extralegal) skirmishes over burial rights broke out regularly until 1880, when the Burial Amendment 
Act opened state churchyards to all (160-181). 
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social menace of popular religion was not yet ended. The Reform Bill of 1832 may have 
indefinitely postponed any general insurrection, but still left the working and lower classes 
disenfranchised. These excluded populations were bastions of religious nonconformity. So long 
as there was a strong connection between religious and social identity, religious dissent would 
remain social dissent—a form of “class struggle without class,” to use E. P. Thompson’s 
phrase—and dissenting rhetoric would remain dangerous.  
Back in the “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth had pictured poetry as an 
omnipresent but curiously spectral force, “the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge” (Prose 
Works 1:167). One of Wordsworth’s many aims here was to defend the purview of literary 
language, and especially its license to employ enthusiastic and prophetic rhetorics, by crafting a 
vision of poetic knowledge as both universal and supplemental. In the wake of the French 
Revolution, it became harder to separate literary from religious usage, as counterrevolutionary 
forces seized upon the regulation of sensibility as a matter of national defense. In the Lake Poets’ 
experiments with vulgarized poetic diction and subject matter, critics heard intimations of 
insurrection. By the 1830s, however, the terms of a Wordsworthian covenant were beginning to 
solidify. The clearest example is Arthur Hallam’s 1831 essay “On Some of the Characteristics of 
Modern Poetry: and on the Lyrical Poems of Alfred Tennyson.” Hallam provides a guiding 
interpretation of Wordsworth’s legacy, and particularly of the Wordsworthian idiom of 
egotistical sublimity that had been intuited by readers as different as Francis Jeffrey and John 
Keats (even as Wordsworth’s most controversial pronouncements lay hidden from public view in 
the unpublished Prelude). While Jeffrey saw in the Lake School’s enthusiastic rhetoric a thinly 
coded revolutionary program—a “sect” of “dissenters from the established systems of poetry and 
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criticism”—Hallam instead translates Wordsworth’s conceits of personal election and salvific 
power into an aesthetic principle defined by its social inconsequence (Edinburgh Review 1:65). 
He proposes that the core insight of Wordsworthianism, “the right of private judgment,” outstrips 
even Wordsworth’s poetic preferences, just as “the right of private judgment was stronger than 
the will of Luther” (1191). The will of Wordsworth was a preoccupation with “reflective” and 
“profound” poetry, which mistakes truth for beauty by imposing moral criteria on creation: 
“Whenever the mind of the artist suffers itself to be occupied, during its periods of creation, by 
any other predominant motive than the desire of beauty, the result is false in art” (1191). 
Wordsworth’s insistence on the reflective and the profound threatened to entangle poetry with 
the public faculty of reason, undercutting his own analysis of poetry as a matter of private 
conscience. The real truth of Wordsworthianism, contra Wordsworth himself, is that there are no 
universal poetic truths.2  
Hallam’s Luther analogy borrows from Jeffrey’s critical diction, positioning 
Wordsworth’s Reformation (or heresy) as the poetic analog of a revolutionary Protestantism 
taken all the way to its self-anointing messianic conclusion.3 But if Hallam’s analysis mirrors 
                                                      
2 Hallam’s reading thus categorically banishes Wordsworth’s emphasis on the importance of “accurate 
taste,” an “acquired talent, which can only be produced by thought and a long continued intercourse with 
the best models of composition” (Prose Works 1:157, original emphasis). 
 
3 Coleridge detected the same danger in Luther himself, comparing the latter to Rousseau as instances of 
an archetype that “referred all things to his own ideal” (The Friend 118). Unlike Rousseau, Luther was 
rescued by his grounding in the Bible, but his “inflammatory” pronouncements nonetheless verged on 
declaring a “holy right of insurrection” (122, see also Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm, Regulation 8-9). In 
a similar vein, Jeffrey mocked Wordsworth as “a sincere convert to his own system,” who sought (and 
found) evidence for his beliefs within his own mind (47:3). Wordsworth, for his part, was so anxious to 
regulate claims to inspiration that he had to write all of The Prelude before he could justify to himself the 
public religious intervention of The Excursion. 
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Jeffrey’s to this point, Hallam draws opposing inferences. The Lake Poets’ belief that they could 
reinvent the laws of poetry according to their own private spiritual dictates was, for Jeffrey, the 
reflection of a social disease. Poetic revolutions promoted social revolutions; the logic here was 
sensible enough. But Hallam deftly contains the social implications of private judgment, severing 
any connection between poetry and religious or social realities. Poetic revolutions, for Hallam, 
were always private affairs: poets, as members of an aristocracy of feeling, have always 
“constantly expressed, because they constantly felt, sentiments of exquisite pleasure or pain, 
which most men were not permitted to experience” (1193).  
This elite idiosyncrasy annexes aristocratic distinction for a bourgeois-professional 
milieu. What emerges is not social levelling but a counter-aristocracy of the literary, 
reconfiguring the eighteenth-century vision of a republic of letters, which was populated, as 
Isaac D’Israeli imagined it, by men who would act as “the sovereigns of reason, the legislators of 
morality, the artificers of our most exquisite pleasures” (Essay 2). The interplay of literature and 
criticism was central to this eighteenth-century vision of “letters,” quite distinct from 
Wordsworth’s sense of “Poetry.”4 Yet from Hallam’s perspective, reviewers employing their 
reason had no business attempting to arbitrate poetic value. Review culture is a category mistake, 
an expropriation by the public sphere of a fundamentally private phenomenon. Hallam insists 
that the “errors,” “inaccuracies,” and “visionary” effusions of great poets only prove that “there 
is a barrier between these poets and all other persons so strong and immovable, that, as has been 
said of the Supreme Essence, we must be themselves before we can understand them in the least” 
                                                      
4 The development of literature as a professional domain with its own epistemological parameters is 
detailed in Paul Keen’s The Crisis of Literature in the 1790s, Brian Goldberg’s The Lake Poets and 
Professional Identity, and Clifford Siskin’s The Work of Writing: Literature and Social Change in 
Britain, 1700-1830. 
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(1193). Such godlike poets are beyond judgment, especially by vulgar reviewers who mistake 
Wordsworth’s prophetic rhetoric for some kind of levelling social agenda. On the contrary, the 
true essence of Wordsworthianism lies in the poet’s beautiful and solitary sensorium, as harmless 
as it is magnificent. Such arguments, Paul Keen writes, assert “the power of the poet to give 
voice to anything of enduring human importance, but in a safely internalized world of individual 
subjectivity” (238). While Hallam defends poetic license, he confines his poets to the visionary 
sphere in which he grants them free rein. Supreme Essence indeed, in a world that knows not to 
read such figures literally—that is, to read them as poetry.  
But if the synthesis of license and regulation suggested by arguments like Hallam’s was 
to prove influential, it was just barely emergent when Felicia Hemans published Scenes and 
Hymns of Life in 1834. Low religious rhetorics were not as incendiary as they had been in 1800, 
but the denominational politics of the revolutionary period had not yet waned. Sensibility and 
enthusiasm remained valuable yet unstable resources, essential to poetic and devotional 
authenticity but easily corrupted into vulgarity, or worse. Hemans’s entry into devotional verse 
offers an excellent barometer of the literary-religious complex of the 1830s, in part because 
Hemans was a far savvier negotiator of politics in verse than Wordsworth. The example of 
Wordsworth’s misadventures can nonetheless help to clarify the denominational and political 
challenges Hemans faced when she turned to devotional poetry. Wordsworth’s 1814 epic The 
Excursion is fundamentally a poem about consolation—about the institutions, social practices, 
and beliefs that sustain life in a world of death. Yet it routes these issues through the device of 
character, using a series of representative figures (the Wanderer, the Solitary, the Pastor, the 
Poet) to perform and debate differing perspectives. Dialogue replaces dictum, as the authorial 
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voice is distributed across the poet’s speakers. In a medium-as-message sense, the poem’s 
answer to the problem of consolation is its omnipresent form rather than any particular argument: 
what the poem offers to counter despair is interminable polite conversation.5  
However, Wordsworth’s early readers saw the matter somewhat differently. The mask of 
character did little to mollify critics like Jeffrey. The Excursion’s most verbose character, the 
Wanderer, is a representative enthusiast whose airy and idiosyncratic theology is curiously 
detached from the earthy concerns of his companions. But despite the Wanderer’s blatant 
ineptitude in human matters and the presence of competing voices in the poem, Jeffrey was quick 
to identify this “old Scotch Pedlar” as the poet’s “chief prolocutor” and “chief advocate of 
Providence and Virtue”—a circumstance so obviously loathsome that Jeffrey allows his italics to 
carry the burden of objecting, at least for the moment (Edinburgh Review 47:5).6 If enthusiasm 
was dangerous even in character, it was especially perilous when the poet spoke in his own 
voice. Jasper Cragwall has argued that Wordsworth suppressed The Prelude until his death 
because its enthusiastic tropes were particularly noxious in the context of autobiography, which, 
in addition to bonding textual sentiment to its author, was a genre notoriously dominated by 
                                                      
5 See chapter three for fuller discussion of this argument.  
 
6 Twenty-five pages later, Jeffrey returns to the subject of the Wanderer with an astonishing rant that 
begins,  
What but the most wretched and provoking perversity of taste and judgment, could induce any 
one to place his chosen advocate of wisdom and virtue in so absurd and fantastic a condition? Did 
Mr Wordsworth really imagine, that his favourite doctrines were likely to gain any thing in point 
of effect or authority by being put into the mouth of a person accustomed to higgle about tape, or 
brass sleeve-buttons? (47:30) 
William Hazlitt was less certain that the Wanderer was Wordsworth’s sole spokesman. Hazlitt thought the 
cast of the poem were not actually distinct characters, but thinly veiled versions of the author himself, 
“three persons in one poet” (4:113). The fact that Jeffrey and Hazlitt could disagree about who was 
speaking for Wordsworth (and to what degree) suggests that character did indeed complicate authorial 
perspective, even if the general tendency of Wordsworth’s devotional epic was clear enough to both 
critics.  
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Methodist print culture in the early nineteenth century. Indeed, The Prelude’s project of 
generating endlessly expansive meaning out of the poet’s most mundane and trivial experiences 
would smack above all of Methodist self-accounting. Wordsworth’s quotidianism was less likely 
to be read as a sophisticated poetics of the everyday7 than a self-debasing appropriation of the 
Methodist’s tendency to interpret even the most banal events in spiritual terms (Cragwall 93-94).  
The Lyric “I” and the Devotional Subject 
While the reception of The Excursion demonstrated that the mask of character could not 
protect the poet from charges of transgression, it was still a safer bet than speaking in one’s own 
voice about oneself. In Scenes and Hymns of Life, Hemans wisely forgoes the embarrassing 
length of Wordsworth’s epics. The Lake Poet is, however, the volume’s dedicatee, the source of 
seven epigraphs, and its preeminent influence. Julie Melnyk, Emma Mason, and Jonathan 
Roberts have detailed the conceptual resources that Wordsworth’s devotional poetry offered 
Hemans (“William Wordsworth and Felicia Hemans”; “Felicia Hemans’s Sonnets on Female 
Characters of Scripture”). Wordsworth’s example also provided formal resources. From The 
Excursion, Hemans absorbed a method for negotiating denominational politics, carefully 
modulating theological issues through representative speakers. As Gary Kelly writes, Hemans 
hoped her late poetry would unite fractious Britain into “a single devout reading 
public…transcending sectarian divisions” (“Introduction” 73). But the challenge of negotiating 
the schisms between Anglicanism and the various faces of dissent would not be easily 
surmounted. Moreover, this unifying aim came into tension with the intensely personal vision 
                                                      
7 Explored, for example, in Markus Poetzsch’s Visionary Dreariness: Readings in Romanticism’s 
Quotidian Sublime. Jeffrey had damned The Excursion’s airy quotidianism as at once “exceedingly dull 
and mystical” (47:8). 
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she outlined before she began the project, writing to William Rowan Hamilton, “I am going soon 
to employ myself upon a volume of sacred poetry, upon which I shall earnestly desire to pour out 
my whole heart and mind” (Graves 1:603). Contra this effusive ideal, her lyrics turn out to be 
aggressively self-regulating, as if her poetic “I” was tasked with shouldering the entirety of the 
British devotional state. These poems evince the difficulty of sustaining a devotional orientation 
at once polite and profound, furnished with affects and rhetorics that might prove acceptable to 
all walks of religious life.  
Many critics have commented on the way Hemans uses the “generic” subjectivity of the 
lyric form to construct an “outside position” that distances the voice of the poem from any 
authorial platform (Jackson and Prins 524-525). Indeed, I don’t mean to imply that lyric voicing 
expresses an unmediated, authentic inner world, but rather that this sense of expressive 
interiority is the rhetorical trick of lyric, and a dangerous trick at that. Accordingly, the first-
person lyrics in Scenes and Hymns reveal an extreme sensitivity to social and theological 
implication. Hemans saw her own voice as intertwined with her lyric personae, or at least knew 
very well that her poetic “I” would be understood to “pour out my whole heart and mind.” 
Following her lead, I will treat the speaker of Hemans’s lyrics as Hemans herself. These poems 
are enamored of the tradition of the prophet-poet, but wary of its vulgar and even insurgent 
resonances in early nineteenth-century Britain.  
Just as Hemans was beginning the project in 1832, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, in his short-
lived editorial capacity at the New Monthly Magazine, had declared her the English poet “most 
suited to religious subjects,” with a “muse peculiarly adapted to the serious and august strains 
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that belong to human worship.” His program for religious poetry accurately forecasts Hemans’s 
approach, while also situating that approach as a response to the pitfalls of denominational strife:  
there is in her a certain soft and tender spirit which would free religious effusion from the 
ascetic and small bigotry which so frequently mars its music. There is always something 
offensive in religious poetry when you see the devotion, but not the benevolence—when 
the religion grows harsh and fierce, and your recognise the sectarian in the worshipper. 
(35:150) 
 
Bulwer-Lytton’s notion of “religious effusion” freed of “ascetic and small bigotry” suggests a 
devotional aesthetics stripped of specific denominational content, an enthusiasm without 
enthusiasts. This sense of practical piety is exactly what is at stake when Hemans’s preface 
declares that her religious poetry will be “enlarged” by the “active influences upon human life” 
(vii). While her tone is less contentious than Bulwer-Lytton’s, it is clear she detects the same 
narrowness in religious poetry that trades in “meditative joys and solitary aspirations…the poetic 
embodying of which seems to require from the reader a state of mind already separated and 
exalted” (ibid.). “Separated” and “exalted” code for sect: already ensconced in God’s grace, such 
a self-aggrandizing poetics can only reach similarly presumptuous saints. The challenge for 
Hemans is to construct a sense of transcendent grandeur that goes beyond a merely didactic 
Christianity, but equally avoids the contentious vulgarity of the enthusiast—to be a “worshipper” 
but not a “sectarian.” One solution is to write religion through drama, which can deemphasize 
theological niceties by focusing on setting, character, action, and devotional affects rather than 
doctrinal dictates. But she does not give up on the lyric, even though the terrain will prove 
almost impossible to navigate in a first person authorial voice. Hedged in between competing 
discourses, Hemans’s lyrics engage in a fascinating struggle to construct a viable scene of 
devotion. 
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The sonnet “The Sacred Harp” offers a clear sense of the denominational and generic 
challenges of writing as oneself. In the terms laid out by Madame de Staël, whose extensive 
influence on Hemans has been well documented,8 the poem is a prototypical lyric:  
Lyric poetry is expressed in the name of the author himself; he no longer assumes a 
character, but experiences in his own person, the various emotions he describes…. In 
order to conceive the true grandeur of lyric poetry, we must wander in thought into the 
ethereal regions, forget the tumult of earth in listening to celestial harmony, and consider 
the whole universe as a symbol of the emotions of the soul. (1:296-97)  
 
De Staël’s high romantic reading suggests an affinity between the ritualistic elements of the lyric 
and the devotional technologies of prayer, bonding subjective interiority to the book of nature. 
“The Sacred Harp” performs a troubled longing for such a union, lamenting poetry’s loss of its 
prophetic calling:  
How shall the Harp of poesy regain  
That old victorious tone of prophet-years,  
A spell divine o’er guilt’s perturbing fears,  
And all the hovering shadows of the brain?  
Dark evil wings took flight before the strain, 
And showers of holy quiet, with its fall, 
Sank on the soul:—Oh! who may now recall 
The mighty music’s consecrated reign?— 
Spirit of God! whose glory once o’erhung 
A throne, the Ark’s dread cherubim between, 
So let thy presence brood, though now unseen,  
O’er those two powers by whom the harp is strung—  
Feeling and Thought!—till the rekindled chords  
Give the long buried tone back to immortal words! (215)9 
 
The distance between “prophet-years” and the fallen present riddles the sonnet with a 
combination of fervor, anxiety, and doubt—all of which might seem the artifacts of a 
disenchanted modernity. In fact, as Jonathan Culler notes, “skepticism about the efficacy of lyric 
                                                      
8 See for example Wolfson, Borderlines 73-75. 
 
9 Citations of Scenes and Hymns of Life refer to the page number of the 1834 edition.  
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discourse” is already present in the earliest extant examples of lyric poetry (6). Hemans 
unequivocally establishes herself as an inheritor of a lyric tradition, signaled by the figures of 
poet as harpist (or lyrist) and verse as music. And yet, though a convention of the lyric, the 
poem’s disenchantment has local historical coordinates. For example, the vision of prophecy it 
describes is significantly constrained. Hemans is less concerned with heralding the return of 
divinity than with assuaging psychological trauma—what the volume elsewhere terms “self-
accusing thought” (39, 50). Instead of holy ardor, she yearns for the return of “holy quiet.” Quiet 
devotion was a common motif in eighteenth-century Anglican theology, which defended a 
pacific style of worship engineered to quell rather than arouse. Yet this motif chafes against the 
promise of prophetic inspiration. A prophecy of quiet suggests an ambivalent commentary on the 
poetic vocation and the Christian belief it queries, as the desire for inspiration gives way to the 
desire for relief. 
 In the poem’s closing sestet, Hemans hazards an apostrophe to no less than the “Spirit of 
God,” asking divinity to “brood” over her poetic utterance. But if the rhetorical grandeur tends 
toward enthusiasm, its affect is ultimately closer to polite. At the invisible center of the problem 
is the unseen “Spirit of God,” who no longer materially intervenes in the world, and may not 
even feel up to the more limited miracle of poetic inspiration. As Maureen McLane writes, 
“Intimacy happens if apostrophe works. Where apostrophe is, intimacy may be” (436). In “The 
Sacred Harp,” Hemans has hedged her bets: this apostrophe does not anticipate success. Its 
desire for intimacy with God is foreclosed by the passing of ages. Enthusiasm is quickly troped 
into failure, recalibrating the heat of the spirit toward the cool of polite elegy. As J. G. A Pocock 
has explained, in the wake of the English Civil War, Anglican theology increasingly espoused 
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“an independently existing God, who made himself known by the wonders of his works, seldom 
by direct revelation, and never by his immanence or inherence, which he had made the human 
mind incapable of grasping” (17). At the far end of this trajectory, “The Sacred Harp” tacitly 
accepts the anti-enthusiastic vision of a heavily mediated relationship with a remote God. What 
Hemans adds to this discourse is an elegiac postscript. It will take a miracle to reconcile “Feeling 
and Thought,” and, as Hemans intones, the age of miracles is over.  
However, the poem also tests the miraculous on a smaller scale. Underneath the question 
of God’s presence lies the question of lyric presence. The precondition for “intelligibility in lyric 
poetry,” Paul de Man argued, “depends on the phenomenalization of the poetic voice” (“Lyrical 
Voice” 55). To make lyric make sense, de Man claimed we must imagine that text is voice and 
reading is hearing. Phenomenalization is crucial to the performative, incantatory nature of the 
genre, rendered explicit in this poem by the apostrophic invocation of divinity. Several critics 
have discussed the way the phenomenology of reading takes on specific shapes in romantic 
writing, where the figure of the spontaneous voice seeks to repair the alienation of an expanding 
print culture.10 The trick of “The Sacred Harp” is to treat the minor miracle of text as voice as a 
fait accompli by demanding the more elaborate miracle of divine inspiration—or more precisely, 
divine accompaniment, which would return the “long buried tone” of “rekindled chords” to 
“immortal words.” Hemans smuggles her blessings under the convention of lyric failure.  
 
 
                                                      
10 These issues have been developed in Lucy Newlyn’s Reading, Writing, and Romanticism: The Anxiety 
of Reception, Timothy Clark’s The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis of Subjectivity in 
Romantic and Post-Romantic Writing, Angela Esterhammer’s Romanticism and Improvisation, 1750-
1850, and Andrew Bennett’s Romantic Poets and the Culture of Posterity.  
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Superstition and Enthusiasm 
This pattern of demystification and remystification appears again in “Angel Visits,” which can 
be read as an elaboration of the vexed interplay between devotional desire and elegiac 
disenchantment that drives “The Sacred Harp.” But where “The Sacred Harp” entangles itself in 
the discourse of enthusiasm, “Angel Visits” takes up superstition. These complementary terms 
continued to circulate in the 1830s; especially popular were the definitions given in George 
Campbell’s 1762 A Dissertation on Miracles, which was republished in 1824 and widely quoted: 
it is evident, that the terrors of superstition imply weakness or imbecility of mind; as they 
arise from ignorance of God, and of one's self, a vitiated understanding, frequently 
accompanied with a perverted conscience. But the same cause produces different effects 
on the temper, as it happens to be differently allied. In the apprehensive and timorous, the 
effect is Superstition; in the arrogant and daring, it is Enthusiasm. Ignorance is the 
mother of both by different fathers. The second she had by Presumption; the first by 
Fear. Hence that wonderful mixture of contrariety and resemblance in the characters of 
the children. (148) 
 
Campbell’s explanation was a refinement of the religious-psychological map drawn by Joseph 
Addison in the pages of The Spectator, which designated one pole for superstitious Catholicism, 
the other for enthusiastic Protestant dissent, and placed the moderate, virile Church of England 
squarely between the two (no. 201, 2:289).11 Enthusiasm was the more combustible half of this 
                                                      
11 Wordsworth, writing to the Anglican minister Francis Wrangham in opposition to Catholic 
emancipation in 1809, offered a version of the same schema, but retuned the established church’s virility 
toward honored poverty: 
With the Methodists on one side and the Catholics on the other, what is to become of the poor 
Church and people of England, to both of which I am most tenderly attached, and to the former, 
not the less on account of the pretty little spire of Brompton Parish Church, under which you and 
I were made happy men, by the gift from providence of two excellent wives. (Middle Years 
1:313) 
In Wordsworth’s hands, the sprawling national bureaucracy of the state church becomes “poor,” its 
majoritarian power incongruously shrunk down to the “pretty little spire” of the local parish church, 
which sealed and consecrated the poet’s domestic bond. Catholic emancipation is thus cast as an attack on 
the local community, the “people,” and the family.   
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twinned discourse in England through the eighteenth century, the “monstrous alter ego of 
eighteenth-century civility,” as Jon Mee writes (Romanticism, Enthusiasm, Regulation 24). But 
the period from 1791 to 1829 was bookended by controversial relief acts that steadily dismantled 
the legal barriers obstructing Catholics from participation in public life. Hemans herself resided 
in Catholic Dublin from 1831 until her death, where she had ample exposure to the religion that 
had long functioned as the continental other of proper English Protestantism.12   
 This is to say that while “Angel Visits” is not a specifically Catholic poem, Catholicism 
represents one reference point for the trans-denominational sense of traditional belief it explores. 
Like “The Sacred Harp,” “Angel Visits” begins in wistful, apparently rhetorical questions that 
establish both an epistemology and an elegiac orientation: 
 ARE ye for ever to your skies departed? 
 Oh! will ye visit this dim world no more?  
 Ye, whose bright wings a solemn splendour darted 
 Through Eden’s fresh and flowering shades of yore? 
 Now are the fountains dried on that sweet spot, 
 And ye—our faded earth beholds you not! (194) 
 
While the first four lines seem to supply their own answer (yes, the angels have departed and will 
visit this dim world no more), the questions, however rhetorical, leave open the possibility of 
angelic presence. In the devotional context, we can imagine that the apparently forgone 
conclusion is only a feint, and the poet will surprise us with the angel visits the title promises. 
This possibility is teased, and then foreclosed by the last two lines—“our faded earth beholds 
                                                      
12 Hemans’s engagements with the question of superstition date back to an aborted experiment in 
syncretic theology, 1820’s Superstition and Revelation. As Nanora Sweet has shown, the poem was 
abandoned when Reginald Heber, an associate of the Tory Quarterly Review known for his massive 
edition of the works of Jeremy Taylor, severely criticized Hemans’s attempts to draw archeological 
connections between Christianity and “superstition” (“Hemans, Heber, and Superstition and Revelation,” 
see also Mason, Women Poets 42). “Angel Visits” treads much more carefully on the same ground.  
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you not!”—which firmly situate the poem in a desiccated, self-conscious modernity. Hemans 
then leaps back to that lost age, as five central stanzas eloquently rehearse the biblical exploits of 
the angels. As this fancy takes over, she becomes increasingly engrossed in a world that the 
opening stanza has already dispelled. These central stanzas acknowledge the allure of beliefs that 
a reasonable religiosity can no longer maintain. When the transport ends, we make a sudden 
temporal and epistemological leap from the age of miracles back to the sophisticated, elegiac 
present. 
 Now have ye left us for the brighter shore, 
 Your presence lights the lonely groves no more. (195) 
 
This present without presence appears all the dimmer in contrast to the miraculous world we 
have just left behind. Unable to bear the contrast, Hemans then attempts to close the distance 
between the age of miracles and her leaden “Now.” Disenchantment soon revolves into a new 
sense of hope, as angels are reconceived in de-literalized, dematerialized terms, as a supplement 
to a human economy of feeling:  
Are ye not near when faith and hope rise high,  
When love, by strength, o’ermasters agony? (ibid.)  
 
Devotional virtues are naturalized miracles, signs of the unseen “sweet influence” of angelic 
presence. Perhaps we are still in the age of miracles, if we only learn to read the Biblical exploits 
figuratively. This is a way of translating the miraculous into compatibility with a polite, modern 
religiosity, in the form of metaphor—coded to suspend the very belief it expresses. The angelic 
presence is quarantined to the province of poeticism. It is a trope, rather than a superstition 
endowed with the weight of literalistic belief. The miraculous dissolves into the everyday, which 
  
191 
may permit but by no means requires supernatural explanation. Angels are back on the belief 
menu, but as a wholly superfluous option.  
 So far, the poem’s attempts to pull angels into the present world have risked enervating 
the whole discourse, with very little to show for it. However, Hemans begins to strengthen her 
case by turning to death. As the point of intersection between the natural and the supernatural, 
the human and the divine, death could remain a site of mystery—and holiness—in even the most 
reasonable Christianity. In this thinking, as Charles Taylor explains, “the locus of death, as the 
place where one has given everything, is the place of maximum union with God; and therefore, 
paradoxically, the source of most abundant life” (Secular Age 726). “Angel Visits” thus finds its 
perfect synthesis of nature and revelation in martyrdom and “unrepining” holy death: 
 Are ye not near when sorrow, unrepining, 
 Yields up life’s treasures unto Him who gave? 
 When martyrs, all things for His sake resigning, 
 Lead on the march of death, serenely brave? (196) 
 
How can such deaths be explained without angelic intervention? These demonstrations of faith in 
the face of death are surely nothing short of miraculous. This is the strongest form of the poem’s 
conceit: even a skeptical modernity must greet these holiest of deaths with wonder and awe.  
And yet the next word instantly dismisses the whole edifice: “Dreams!” The discourse of 
angels is dispelled, a mere bubbled illusion. Hemans shockingly rejects even the naturalized 
figure of angelic presence recast as “gentle promptings” and “sweet influence”—would-be 
miracles, modest to the point of harmlessness. And even death, which, in all its unthinkable 
transcendence, so often functions as the linchpin of consolatory arguments, is unable to secure 
the miraculous. But as “Dreams!” gives way to the astonishing closing couplet, it becomes clear 
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that the purpose of this demonstration has been to establish the poet’s skeptical credentials so 
that she can credibly affirm God’s presence:  
Dreams!—but a deeper thought our souls may fill—  
One, One is near—a Spirit holier still! (196)  
 
Angels are sacrificed to save God, and the virtues that had been attributed to the angelic presence 
are retained and transferred to an unnamable higher author. All of the poem’s disenchanting 
gestures work in the service of this moment of replete devotion.  
 Yet the gesture is a troubled one, since this God is “deeper” and “holier” than angels but 
conceived in the same logic of presence, as one who is “near.” As a belief-object, God differs 
from angels in degree but not in kind. Sublimity, in a word, is what differentiates this holier spirit 
from the angels that came before, and this same sublimity demands the poem’s instant 
termination. Spinning from an ejaculation of sudden disenchantment back to renewed belief, the 
speed and force of the revelatory closing couplet seems to repel this kind of analysis. But its 
vexed affirmation of presence is carefully coded to permit—and perhaps even encourage—a 
skeptical reading. For the poem implicitly defines and contains the “One” of its unnamed 
divinity as a “thought,” and thought may be the limit of that divinity’s jurisdiction. Just as angels 
were naturalized into “sweet influence,” God is naturalized into a very deep idea. We are left 
with superfluous supernaturalism, however vigorously avowed. “Angel Visits” is a deeply 
defensive poem, whose energies are chiefly devoted to establishing an ethos of skeptical 
reasonability. Belief seems to levy a severe argumentative and epistemological tax, demanding 
new offerings and oblations to protect its shrinking territory.  
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Polite Revelation and the Good Death 
These poems are especially revealing because they run counter to the declared purpose of 
Scenes and Hymns of Life. Both are lyric contemplations of theological questions, centered (as J. 
S. Mill wrote) on “feeling confessing itself to itself in moments of solitude” (359). Yet in the 
volume’s preface, Hemans proposes to “enlarge… the sphere of Religious Poetry by associating 
with its themes more of the emotions, the affections, and even the purer imaginative enjoyments 
of daily life” (vii). The preface envisions a devotional poetry that would move away from a 
cloistered lyric solitude, “not alone in its meditative joys and solitary aspirations,” but set in 
dynamic lived situations, including “the gloom of the prison and the death-bed” (viii). Hemans’s 
emphasis on practical religion seeks to shift the focus away from doctrinal questions that might 
lead to denominational entanglements—precisely the sorts of entanglements that entrap “Angel 
Visits.” Accordingly, most of the poems in the volume are verse dramas or monologues voiced 
by situated speakers (e.g. the sonnet sequence Female Characters of Scripture), under the 
theoretical assumption that dramatic settings will make devotional discourse relevant to daily 
life. But in practice, it is not simply that a poetry tuned to the everyday trials of living has more 
consolatory traction than theological meditations. As I have argued with respect to “The Sacred 
Harp” and “Angel Visits,” Hemans’s theology founders when left in solitary to its own devices. 
The introduction of dialogic dramatic contexts loosens the political, denominational, and 
spiritual knots that bind her lyrics. Hemans’s devotional poetry needs dramatic exigencies to gain 
purchase on the practical work of consolation, but more importantly, to provide the mask—or 
veil13—of character. Released from the burden of writing as herself, Hemans explores a more 
                                                      
13 In 1829 she admitted, “I have so often found a kind of relief in throwing the colouring of my own 
feelings over the destiny of historical characters, that it has almost become a habit of my mind” (Chorley 
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various and even heterodox theology in her dramatic poems. These dramatic poems represent a 
range of religious feeling from enthusiastic impulses to doubt and loss of faith, while her lyrics 
are by comparison highly constrained and carefully modulated. 
In “Angel Visits,” we saw that holy death, even martyrdom, could not generate a credible 
basis for the presence of angels. Yet death remains abstract in that poem, an ephemeral image in 
a poetic montage, produced as the crux of a theological argument. The situation changes 
considerably once death takes on the particularity of a life, a name, a body. The clearest example 
of the distinction between lyric and dramatic devotions is found in “Flowers and Music in a 
Room of Sickness,” whose title plays up the juxtaposition between worldly sensuality and 
impending death. Set in an “English Country-House,” the poem focuses on a terminally ill 
adolescent girl nursed by her mother and sister. This classed, homosocial domestic setting, 
rendered in stately blank verse, furnishes a controlled environment for testing various affects and 
rhetorics of consolation. In the opening, the ailing Lilian sleeps while her sister Jessy arrives 
with flowers from the surrounding woods. Their mother worries that the flowers will disturb 
Lilian’s recovery: 
Dost thou forget the passion of quick tears 
That shook her trembling frame, when last we brought 
The roses to her couch? Dost thou not know 
What sudden longings for the woods and hills,  
Where once her free steps moved so buoyantly, 
These leaves and odours with strange influence wake 
In her fast-kindled soul? (20) 
 
                                                      
2:50-51). Kevin Eubanks proposes that the recurring figure of the veil in Hemans’s poetry “functions as a 
metaphor for the outward, socially-constructed gender identity of woman, a screen interposed between the 
self and the outside world” (346). The dramatic mode is one such screen, buffering the author from the 
ideological and theological currents that run through her poems. 
  
195 
She frets that the flowers will “wake” Lilian’s yearning for what she has lost: the mobility of her 
“free steps,” and the scent and tactility of nature. But Lilian overhears her mother, and assures 
her otherwise: 
 Nay, fear not now thy fond child’s waywardness, 
 My thoughtful mother!—in her chasten’d soul 
 The passion-colour’d images of life, 
 Which, with their sudden startling flush awoke 
 So oft those burning tears, have died away; 
 And night is there—still, solemn, holy night, 
With all her stars, and with the gentle tune 
Of many fountains, low and musical, 
By day unheard. (21) 
 
“Chasten’d,” Lilian speaks of herself in the third person to signal her detachment from the 
sensuality of worldly existence, cast in softly erotic terms. Yet this detachment is not anaesthetic. 
Rather, Lilian enters into a new sensory array, figured by the heretofore unheard “gentle tune” of 
night. Dying is a kind of sensual revelation. By extension, as this new sensuality enters into 
language, the dying person’s speech takes on the status of revelation. For good Anglican 
subjects, the deathbed was perhaps the sole context in which prophetic speech could be 
welcomed.14 But her mother is not yet ready to give her over to death, insisting she “yet shalt 
rise” from her “couch of sickness.” Lilian swiftly divests her mother of this hope:  
 Hope it not! 
 Dream it no more, my mother!—there are things 
 Known but to God, and to the parting soul, 
 Which feels his thrilling summons. (21) 
 
The “passion” and “flush” of the lifeworld are succeeded by the “thrilling summons” of God. 
Death promises to replace the stimulations of life with its own rich sensuality, yet the erotic 
                                                      
14 As noted in chapter one, the convention of deathbed prophecy had particular consequence for women as 
a rare venue for authoritative religious speech. 
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currents are defused by the homosocial devotional context and the stiff, dignified blank verse. 
Christopher Stokes has argued that throughout Scenes and Hymns and Life, the deathbed features 
as a site where the personal “prayer of deep interiority” receives a viable social outlet that can be 
“reconciled with domestic intersubjective duty”: in deathbed prayer, “the inner, anti-worldly 
voice can hypothetically become the socially proper, structured voice” (106). The deathbed 
enables the play of revelatory inspiration by binding it to an expiring body, whose unsettling 
desires can be interpreted under the auspices of deathly transcendence. But while Stokes treats 
the “anti-worldly” deathbed prayer as a transdenominational phenomenon, it nonetheless 
retained an audible dissenting resonance, as Mary Riso’s study of evangelical deathbed 
narratives makes clear: “Nonconformists often spoke as if they were already citizens of heaven 
and hence expressed their desire to depart for this new spiritual world” (194).  
Even as Lilian moves beyond the world, Hemans makes clear that she does not disdain it. 
From a liminal space between earth and heaven, Lilian conducts a studied negotiation between 
the sweetness of life and the relief of death. Presented with Jessy’s flowers, Lilian shows that she 
can index each to its precise origin amid the “garden bowers” and “wilder haunts,” from the spot 
where “golden willow bend” to the “cool green shadowy river nook” (22). Her remembrances 
begin to intensify until she is hushed by her mother. She is apologetic, but won’t relent: 
 In my soul the thoughts 
 Burn with too subtle and too swift a fire; 
 Importunately to my lips they throng (24) 
 
These effusions of memory do not, however, represent a refusal or denial of her fate, for she 
insists that her sense memories are “purified” into a beautiful counterpart to Wordsworth’s 
sublime “characters of the great apocalypse”: 
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God hath purified my spirit’s eye, 
And in the folds of this consummate rose 
I read bright prophecies. I see not there, 
Dimly and mournfully, the word “Farewell” 
On the rich petals traced: No—in soft veins 
And characters of beauty, I can read— 
“Look up, look heavenward!” (25) 
 
We can find an effective point of comparison for this moment in Anna Lætitia Barbauld’s 1773 
“Address to the Deity.” After the French revolution Barbauld embraced a prophetic poetics, but 
in the 1770s she was committed to a polite, conciliatory version of dissent. She was at that time 
nonetheless quite comfortable raising natural religion into intimate revelation: 
 Nor less the mystic characters I see 
 Wrought in every flower, inscrib’d in every tree; 
 In every leaf that trembles to the breeze 
 I hear the voice of GOD among the trees. (59-62) 
 
Sixty years later, Hemans’s “bright prophecies” mirror Barbauld’s “mystic characters” only to a 
point. The trope is doubly veiled on Hemans’s side, first because Hemans gives the words to 
Lilian while Barbauld addresses her God directly in the first person, and second because Lilian’s 
imminent death contextualizes her revelation as a deathbed convention. Moreover, the 
transformation of sensuality into revelation suggests a pathway to divinity that does not neglect 
the world it departs; in Lilian’s words, “the loveliness of earth / Higher than earth can raise me!” 
(25). This is a good example of what Jeffrey Robinson terms Hemans’s “poetry of expiration,” in 
which the dissolution of the self “recovers in new forms which can include an accounting of 
elements of the referent, the world” (186). Robinson finely describes this process as “the 
conversion of the implication of an expiring breath—an emptying out, an entropy, dying itself—
into a filling and celebrating” (185). This poetics resolves what Robinson views as a tension 
between “the call of holiness and the call of poetry,” spurning monumental idols for an ethic of 
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the ephemeral, but it also has distinct rhetorical advantages as theology (188). In this case, the 
sensible elevates Lilian toward divinity by degrees, merging devotional and sensual currents 
within the discursive stream of sensibility. There are risks here, however, as at moments the 
result verges on the erotics of spurious modern saints: 
There are hearts 
So perilously fashioned, that for them 
God’s touch alone hath gentleness enough  
To waken, and not break, their thrilling strings!— 
We will not speak of this! (26) 
 
Leigh Hunt, pilloried in the Tory press as a purveyor of “Cockney” vulgarity and imprisoned for 
libeling the Prince Regent, was nonetheless eager to police the sensuality of popular religion. 
Female converts, he declared, “are acknowledged to possess the greater bodily sensibility, and it 
is the women who chiefly indulge in these love-sick visions of heaven” besotted with “bridal 
sensuality” (Methodism 55). Hemans’s Lilian gestures toward the sort of “amatory” devotion 
denounced by Hunt, but pointedly breaks off where she reaches the boundaries of decorum, 
submerging the remainder of the fantasy in the unspeakable. This erotic excess is then quickly 
sublimated into other senses. Synaesthetic hallucinations transform the visual into the aural:   
 By what strange spell 
 Is it, that ever, when I gaze on flowers, 
 I dream of music? Something in their hues 
 All melting into colour’d harmonies,  
 Wafts a swift thought of interwoven chords, 
 Of blended singing-tones, that swell and die 
 In tenderest falls away. (26-27) 
 
This musical hallucination leads her to ask her sister to play a song on the harp, and Jessy 
provides a list of options, from an “Italian Peasant’s Lay” to Sicilian madrigal, “Moorish 
melody,” “the old ditty left by Troubadours,” and an Alpine strain “which pierce the exile’s heart 
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/ Even unto death” (27-28). This is a recapitulation of Hemans’s own cosmopolitan verse 
catalog, which Lilian promptly repudiates. She instead pleads for “a loftier strain, / A deeper 
music!” and settles on a decidedly British hymn, 
that antique strain which once I deem’d  
Almost too sternly simple, too austere  
In its grave majesty! 
 
The hymn is not in fact an antique but rather a Hemans original, widely reprinted in standalone 
form throughout the nineteenth century, titled “The Saviour’s dying hour.” In it, Christ appears 
as both “Son of Man” and “Son of God,” linking “God” and “Man” not because “Man” is made 
in “God’s” image, nor through the shared faculty of reason, but rather because the “Man” and 
“God” in Christ both suffer  
 All the deep gloom 
 The desolation and th’ abandonment, 
 The dark amaze of death (29) 
 
It is precisely Christ’s “gloom” and doubt as a mortal being—those elements of Jesus’s death 
that troubled eighteenth-century neoclassical theorists of the good death—that bond him to man. 
As “Thou that didst love, / Thou that didst weep and die,” Christ’s struggle to detach himself 
from his earthly ties is what makes him a model for human destiny (32). As his anguish proves, 
he is a being of exquisite sensibility, whose “Mother-tears were mingled / With thy costly blood-
drops” (30). In place of relentless stoicism, this sensitive Christ’s vision of holy dying 
encourages “tearful eyes,” “passionately bent / To drink earth’s last fond meaning from our 
gaze” (31). Hemans gives this hymn the final word, grafting Lilian’s particular story onto the 
template of the “Saviour,” but also subtly reframing Christ on the model of Lilian.  
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“Flowers and Music in a Room of Sickness” advances a model of holy dying that 
negotiates between the materialist discourse of sensibility and the devotional imperatives of the 
afterlife, allowing the dying Lilian to reflect fondly on earthly pleasures without clinging to 
existence or sinking into despair. Death opens space for Hemans to play with prophetic and 
erotic verse in a safe context. The poem’s prophetic impulses are defanged by the country house 
locale and the dying woman’s privileges of spirit. The erotic impulses, meanwhile, are governed 
by the exclusively familial and female dramatis personae—men, as in so many of Hemans’s 
domestic poems, are never mentioned.15 Strip away the veil of character and the ideological 
security of the genteel domestic setting, and the revelations of “Flowers and Music” might smack 
of sectarian zeal. While Hemans’s devotional lyrics are more anti-skeptical than positively 
Christian, “Flowers and Music” offers an affirmative vision of the otherworldly and 
transformative elements of belief, unshaken by theological quibbles and doubts. In this instance, 
doubt pales in the face of Lilian’s death.  
The Inconsolable 
The success of “Flowers and Music” lies in its development of a synergistic relationship 
between domestic affection and devotion. The carefully staged setting allows these discursive 
formations to reinforce each other. But though domesticity and devotion might seem like natural 
allies, such synergy was by no means inevitable, especially outside the sanctuary of the gentry 
                                                      
15 The absence of men from the homes of Hemans’s poetry has been widely recognized: as Norma Clarke 
notes, Records of Woman is “eloquently empty of adequate men,” while Jerome McGann declares that 
“Hemans’s central myth represents a home where the father is (for various reasons) absent” (71; 76). This 
dynamic takes a unique form in the devotional context of Scenes and Hymns of Life. Emma Mason and 
Jonathan Roberts find in the volume’s sonnet sequence Female Characters of Scripture “a circularity of 
female identity that effectively closes the ‘male’ out of the loop” (72). The two exceptions—Wordsworth 
and Jesus—are, according to Mason and Roberts, represented as “beyond gender,” allowing Hemans to 
imagine a sisterhood with room for these two men (82). 
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home. This point becomes clear in “Burial of an Emigrant’s Child in the Forests,” which leaves 
behind the polite milieu of “Flowers and Music” for exile in America. In this Dantesque setting, 
a “fever-dream” of “gloomy woods” with “dark giant boughs,” the imperatives of devotion and 
domestic affection come into open conflict.    
As the poem begins, a mother, Agnes, holds her child and fantasizes that they are back in 
England, she listening to his “wild, singing tones.” As she kisses him and feels his “strange damp 
thrilling touch,” it becomes clear that he is dead, and has been dead for some time—a gothic 
shock set up by the stage direction’s foreshadowing: “AGNES sitting before the tent with a child 
in her arms, apparently sleeping” (63). Her husband then returns to inform her that he has dug 
the child’s grave, but she refuses to part with her son. He reminds her that she peaceably gave 
her deceased first-born over to God and said “His will be done!” (65). Yet that was in England, 
she protests, where that “household grave” 
lay beside our home, 
And I could watch the sunshine, through all hours,  
Loving and clinging to the grassy spot, 
And I could dress its greensward with fresh flowers— 
Familiar, meadow flowers. O’er thee my babe, 
The primrose will not blossom! (65) 
 
Agnes’s first bereavement was softened by the connection between the home and the grave, 
accessible at “all hours,” solaced by the “familiar” flora that decorate her grief ritual in “happy, 
happy England!” (63). This pastoral leisure is set in sharpest contrast with “the desolation and 
the agony” of the new world (63). It turns out that the family has fled England, as her husband 
begs to know if she regrets following “an exile’s fortunes” across the ocean. His name is 
Edmund, but his speech is simply tagged “Husband,” and in the same vein, the poem’s title 
refers to the burial of a singular “Emigrant’s Child,” though both Agnes and her husband are 
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emigrants. These omissions suggest that the husband plays a strictly functional role in a poem 
that takes Agnes’s experience as its subject.  
He plays two roles, in fact: he generates problems for which Agnes must answer, 
including the task of relieving him of his guilt for their fate, and he ensures that her answers are 
appropriately orthodox, guiding her toward rhetorics of consolation and domestic peace. When 
he demands to know if she regrets joining him, she promptly begs forgiveness for her grief-
induced resentment. 
 My Edmund, pardon me! Oh! grief is wild— 
 Forgets its words, quick spray-drops from a fount  
Of unknown bitterness! Thou art my home!  
Mine only and my blessed one! Where’er  
Thy warm heart beats in its true nobleness,  
There is my country! there my head shall rest, 
And throb no more. Oh! still, by thy strong love, 
Bear up the feeble reed! (66) 
 
Under coverture, the figure of husband as home is metaphor made law: as a legal entity, she 
resides in him. But this moment reveals spiritual and emotional inadequacy of the trope by 
pitting the domestic law of coverture against the domestic affection of love for child. When 
Agnes’s grief makes Edmund unbearably aware of his own guilt, he can only interpret her grief 
as reproach, and thus a violation of the marital bond. She then has to repair her transgression by 
absolving him of his burden of guilt. Whatever may have transpired to lead to the burial of their 
child on foreign soil, the sin and the guilt are now charged to her account. This transference frees 
him to perform supportive strength, with her feminine “feeble reed” leaning against his virile 
fortitude. But these roles are only viable after her lucid resentment of her husband has been 
reinterpreted as her own failing.  
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 Agnes’s transgressive despair requires forgiveness not just from her husband, but also 
from God. She pleads, 
 If nature hath rebell’d, 
 And from thy light turn’d wilfully away, 
 Making a midnight of her agony, 
 When the despairing passion of her clasp 
 Was from its idol stricken at one touch 
 Of thine Almighty hand—oh, pardon me! 
 By thy Son’s anguish, pardon! (67)  
 
This speech reconceives the tragedy from a divine perspective. Her refusal to give her son to 
God becomes the work of a motherly “nature,” whose bonds of affection threaten to turn the 
sufferer away from the truer affection of God’s light. To adopt this perspective, Agnes has to 
recognize her child as a mere “idol”—an “ark / Fraught with mine earthward-clinging 
happiness.” This ephemeral “treasure” is not hers to hold; it belongs to “Him who gave, and 
might resume” (67). Yet she reminds God that it’s not easy to overcome earthly attachments and 
inhabit the view from eternity, as evidenced by the “anguish” of God’s own son. Here 
Christopher Stokes suggests that “Agnes revokes her grief entirely” as “a cry from the wilderness 
becomes a cry for pardon” (96), but I see her petition as quietly contentious. She suggests first 
that her attachment is an effect of “nature” and thereby indirectly the work of God himself, and 
second, that her covetous love for her son links her to the Son, who struggled to let go of his own 
worldly bonds.  
Having offered both apology and justification, she can now hand her son to his father and 
declare, “I yield thee to thy Maker!” (67). Edmund praises her “meek holiness” and begins to 
take the child away. But she stops him: “where— / Where wilt thou lay him?” (68). His 
description of the grave plot leads to reminiscences, and it becomes clear that Agnes has simply 
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adopted a new strategy for deferring the burial. Finally, she asks Edmund to bury the child by 
himself, admitting, “my woman’s nature is still weak— / I cannot see thee render dust to dust!” 
(69). She will remain alone, attempting to “still my soul with prayer.” The poem does not, 
however, transcribe this prayer. Instead it offers a closing “Funeral Hymn,” which declares that 
even though “England’s field flowers may not deck [the child’s] grave,” even though “Woods 
unknown receive him,” “yet with God we leave him” with “hearts of trust” (71). This plural 
“we” seems to speak for Agnes and Edmund together, but the hymn closes with imperatives 
directed to Agnes alone. One implication is that she is only a reluctant partner in the “we” that 
leaves her child to God: 
Turn thee now, fond mother! 
From thy dead, oh, turn! 
[…] 
Only kneel once more around the sod, 
Kneel, and bow submitted hearts to God! (73) 
 
The voice of the hymn, a collective social voice, might initially be seen to give voice to Agnes’s 
inaudible prayer. But the nature of this closing command to a “fond” (that is, waywardly 
affectionate, even foolish) mother, who is enjoined to “submit,” reveals that Agnes has not 
reached acceptance, and that the hymn does not trust her to get there on her own. The orthodox 
language of the hymn is shadowed by its silent counterpart, a mother’s defiant failure to mourn. 
Her undying affection for her child will not yield to the devotional injunction. If, as Emma 
Mason writes, the conclusion of the poem “shift[s] the reader from the apparent subject of the 
lamentation into a focus on God as he who both enables mourning and ultimately evokes a 
stronger emotion in its place,” this transformation is not without violence (45). The consolatory 
mandate, with its dictates of resignation and acceptance, seems to foreclose rather than enable 
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Agnes’s mourning. Insofar as mourning is replaced with devotion, it is at the cost of forgetting 
Agnes’s silent prayer amid the noise of the hymn.  
 The function of this closing hymn is thus very different from the closing hymn of 
“Flowers and Music in a Room of Sickness,” which worked to provide a generalized theological 
rationale for the deathbed rhetorics of that poem. Here, the hymn sits in dialogic contrast—even 
contradiction—to its poem’s protagonist. “Burial of an Emigrant’s Child in the Forest” closes in 
unresolved tension between the hymn’s public ethic of acceptance and the private conscience of 
Agnes’s unheard devotion. There are effectively three voices here: Agnes’s, Edmund’s, and that 
of the hymn, which canonizes Edmund’s perspective as theological dictum with the authority to 
command, as demonstrated in the final stanza. The poem as a whole encompasses each of these 
voices, and while it gives the last word to the view from orthodoxy, it nonetheless protects 
Agnes’s conscience by shrouding it in undepicted silence. Public and private discourses are 
never reconciled. Anne Nichols suggests that Scenes and Hymns of Life proposes that “the depth 
and intimacy of spiritual experience make its expression above law and regulation” (570). While 
I have argued that this reading cannot apply to Hemans’s devotional lyrics, which prove 
strenuously legalistic and self-regulating, it fits a verse drama like “Burial of an Emigrant’s 
Child” perfectly. Agnes’s sublated prayer suggests how the dramatic form allows Hemans to 
represent the kind of limit-case spiritual experience Nichols describes, a spirituality that makes 
room for disconsolation and outright despair. The devotional ecology of the poem leaves space 
for both Agnes’s privately despondent spirituality and the officious public work of the funeral 
hymn—discourses which may even depend on each other at a structural level. This is 
majoritarian religious toleration in action. But the structural rapprochement between silent prayer 
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and public hymn, it must be noted, offers no relief to Agnes. It only offers her a refuge in which 
her unrelenting grief can prevail.  
Inhabiting Revelation 
Agnes’s unvoiced prayer highlights the limits of consolation orthodoxy, but its inaudible 
critique proved very easy to ignore. Scenes and Hymns of Life was met with excitement in the 
Tory press, which found what it wanted: practical piety in broad strokes, without too much 
concern for any dissonant tones in the margins. Consider, for example, the terms of the 
Athenaeum’s praise: 
The religion of daily life—of art—and of nature, has been sung, as it were, sparingly, and 
with timidity, while the religionism of sect has had its hundred zealous minstrels. But the 
day of these last is going by: we cannot but hope and believe that, with so much 
enlightenment and benevolence as are everywhere spreading abroad over the earth, a 
purer and more comprehensive faith will increase among men—a spirit of love and 
intelligence which shall mingle with our pleasures, as well as our devotions, and teach us 
to discern the intellectual from the frivolous, the spiritual from the sensual—which shall 
show us, not only how to endure life, but also how to enjoy it. (353:566) 
 
Hemans’s poetry trades in a moderate, refined religiosity, freed of “sect” and “zeal,” capable of 
dividing pathos from bathos. What is meant by “religion” here is a cluster of reverential affects, 
moods, and postures, rather than any specific faith, creed, or tenet. Indeed, from this perspective 
doctrinal religion is a disputatious “religionism,” and under religionism, even seemingly benign 
quibbling could quickly morph into menacing righteousness. These dynamics were not far from 
what worried Erasmus as he watched the emergence of what would become the Protestant 
Reformation: “Do they not make more for sedition than for piety? Are not riots common among 
this evangelical people? Do they not for small causes betake themselves to force?” (Smith, 
Erasmus 392). The key to composing the affective and rhetorical potency of sect into a secure 
establishment poetics is the amalgamated “religion of daily life—of art—and of nature,” whose 
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syntax distributes the energy of devotion across a range of objects, so that it may be prevented 
from metastasizing into a pathological fixation on any specific sphere. From this universalizing 
Anglican perspective, Hemans was capable of sacralizing everything because she contended 
nothing in particular.  
However, her aim was too broad to hit the mark for some readers—especially the 
nonconforming Protestants that Scenes and Hymns of Life sought to assimilate into a generalized 
Anglican spiritual community. While the dissenting Eclectic Review approved the publication as 
a whole, it hazarded that “Mrs. Hemans does not understand the true character of the hymn”:  
There is more of the poetic spirit than of the religious spirit in her most sacred pieces;—
they breathe more the religion of the woods and mountains than of the sanctuary; and 
approach nearer to the piety of the magdalen muse of Moore, than to the genuine 
devotional inspiration which distinguishes the hymns of Charles Wesley and 
Montgomery. Mrs. Hemans is the professional poet of the cathedral, of “the banner and 
the shrine,” of the crusade and the pilgrimage. (12:180) 
 
Contra the Athenaeum, the religion of nature is no substitute for “genuine devotional 
inspiration.” What Hemans is offering amounts to religious pageantry, richly sensual but lacking 
the authentic (or sectarian) devotion of the Methodist Wesley and the Moravian Montgomery. 
From a dissenting perspective, her universalizing Anglicanism remained, well, Anglican.  
There was, in other words, a certain impersonality in Hemans’s religious verse that 
undermined its devotional aspirations. One feature of a poetry at home in the “woods and 
mountains,” as the Eclectic notes, is its dramatic character. By contrast, Hemans’s lyrics 
carefully approach—and perhaps stop short of—the “sanctuary” of theological meditation, where 
she is clearly less comfortable. This distinction underwrites the epithet “professional poet”: she 
earns her keep depicting antiqued crypto-Catholic historical fixtures. The Eclectic would make 
its case in more explicit terms after her death: 
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Although Mrs. Hemans’s poems contain some occasional and somewhat indistinct 
references to the doctrines of Christianity, it must be admitted that they are deficient in 
that tone of Scriptural piety and devotional feeling which would indicate the ascendancy 
of religious affections in her own heart. (16:40) 
 
Though a fine dramatist, Hemans is no inspired prophet of present Britain. That is to say, she 
effuses best when she’s not effusing as herself.  
However, Hemans’s devotional lyrics took on a markedly different character after the 
1834 publication of Scenes and Hymns of Life. The difference is best exemplified by the poem 
that ran in the May 1835 issue of Blackwood’s under the title “Despondency and Aspiration: A 
Lyric. By Mrs Hemans.” This is a personal prayer of exactly the sort that Hemans’s more 
skeptical reviewers thought beyond her studied grasp. What it shares with previous lyrics like 
“The Sacred Harp” and “Angel Visits” is the intuition of a metaphysical chasm dividing then 
from now, past from present. In the earlier poems, the past was the time of revelation, and the 
present could only be understood privatively, through revelation’s withdrawal. Consolation in a 
fallen age was the theme. The argumentative burden of those poems is to find ways to nuance 
this self-evident reality in order to make space for divinity. By contrast, “Despondency and 
Aspiration” juxtaposes a fallen past with a revelatory present. The movement no longer follows 
the historical passage from a prophetic age toward modernity, but instead takes up the soul’s 
eschatological passage from earthly life to holy death and ascension. Hemans now lyrically 
inhabits the subjectivity of the dying she had dramatically represented via characters like Lilian 
in “Flowers and Music.”  
The opening gambit of “Despondency and Aspiration” is to interpret doubt, skepticism, 
and despair as spiritual states of false revelation. Where in the earlier poems divine presence was 
depicted as a supplemental force that imbued bare existence with the glow of eternity, in this 
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poem doubt and fear are supplements—“dark shadows”—obscuring a fundamentally divine 
world: “My soul was mantled with dark shadows, born / Of lonely Fear, disquieted in vain” 
(793). The poem arcs from this enclosed, solipsistic lyric interiority to an exploded self in unity 
with God. The key here is that the world’s darkness seems like plain truth but is in fact pathetic 
fallacy, whispering sham revelation: 
And when the solemn Night 
Came with her might  
Of stormy oracles from caves unknown, 
Then with each fitful blast 
Prophetic murmurs pass’d, 
Wakening or answering some deep Sybil tone, 
Far buried in my breast, yet prompt to rise 
With every gusty wail that o’er the wind-harp flies. (793) 
 
The long chain of metonymies obscures the provenance of these “Prophetic murmurs,” which are 
either the cause or effect (“wakening or answering”) of Hemans’s corresponding “Sybil tone.” 
This causal confusion is symptomatic of the soul’s darkness, since the sufferer cannot tell if the 
world is whispering in her ear, or if she is speaking to herself. From this angle, the problem of 
disenchantment that provoked the previous lyrics was deeply mischaracterized—false prophecy 
taken for bald fact. This false prophecy reports doubt and failure, “outward ill and wrong, / And 
inward wasting fires!” Human attachments are first among the vain encumbrances it denounces:  
No power is theirs, and no abiding place  
In human hearts; their sweetness leaves no trace,—  
Born only so to die! (793) 
 
This begins a startling rebuke of the idols of domesticity Hemans had venerated and disturbed 
throughout her career, mounting into a violent vision of the “blessed wreath / Of household 
charities” reduced to a “trampled flower,” “pale and withering on the barren ground.” The 
prophetic murmurs conclude, 
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 “So fade on, fade on! thy gift of love shall cling, 
 A coiling sadness, round thy heart and brain, 
 A silent, fruitless, yet undying thing, 
 All sensitive to pain! 
 And still the shadow of vain dreams shall fall 
 O’er thy mind’s world, a daily darkening pall. 
 Fold, then, thy wounded wing, and sink subdued, 
 In cold and unrepining quietude!” (793-794) 
 
This is the dark simulacrum of Christian resignation, a despair altogether beyond aspiration. The 
sibylline voice performs a series of reversals, transfiguring love into a snakelike Satanic force 
coiling “round thy heart and brain.” Love is the engine of procreation but appears paradoxically 
“fruitless,” in a moment reminiscent of Agnes’s recognition that her child is nothing but an 
earthly idol in “Burial of an Emigrant’s Child.” Trapped in the claustrophobic confines of “thy 
mind’s world,” the prophecy insists that there is nothing left but to die.  
 Then comes the turn: Hemans “yields” to despair, “Mutely and hopelessly,” until she is 
suddenly saved. The “vain bodings of the night” are simply dismissed in favor of a “happier 
oracle within my soul” (794). The process is entirely mysterious—a miracle. The relationship 
between the dark prophecy and the redemption remains opaque: it’s not clear whether she 
overcame despondency, or entered into despondency so completely that it transformed into its 
opposite. Her doubts are now banished, but the poem seems to allow them a place in the 
devotional ecology. The title plays on the same ambiguity, since the conjunction of 
“Despondency and Aspiration” declines to specify the relationship between the two states. One 
implication is that the despondency of a world bereft of divine presence is only a temporary nadir 
within a longer salvific trajectory. The ersatz revelation of despondency is what we understand 
as history, which assures us that the age of miracles is long gone. But on the contrary, this poem 
intones, history itself meets its end in death, where another logic prevails. 
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 Having passed through despondency, Hemans moves on to aspiration, ascending through 
a montage of phallic sublimities on her way toward heaven: 
 And then a glorious mountain-chain uprose,  
 Height above spiry height! 
 A soaring solitude of woods and snows 
 All steeped in golden light! (794) 
 
On her way, she surveys each of the miracles she had struggled to recuperate in Scenes and 
Hymns of Life. Her poetic lyre, “Faithful though faint,” can now confidently echo the divine 
music. Angels appear in the most literal sense, “dread wings” and all—a host of “Seraphim” 
singing a “grand Creation-Hymn.” But Hemans ecumenically includes the naturalized reading of 
angels as facilitators of virtue she tested in “Angel Visits,” casting “earthly love, all purified” in 
figurative terms as “An angel of bright power” (795). The revelatory and the natural, the literal 
and the figurative are no longer mutually exclusive, or even distinct. The sublimity of this vision 
tramples over the theological questions that vexed the earlier poems.  
 Poetic challenges begin to subside along with their theological counterparts. Anxious 
apostrophe to an absent God gives way to a supremely confident, even dangerous intimacy, 
which Hemans briefly acknowledges: “Forgive, O Father! if presumptuous thought / Too 
daringly in aspiration rise!” (795). She concludes by imploring God to transform her into “a 
living shrine,” monumental yet mobile: 
O make me Thine, 
So shall I too be pure—a living shrine 
Unto that spirit, which goes forth from Thee, 
Strong and divinely free, 
Bearing thy gifts of wisdom on its flight, 
And brooding o’er them with a dove-like wing, 
Till thought, word, song, to Thee in worship spring, 
Immortally endow’d for liberty and light. (795) 
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Hemans boldly aspires toward a heavenly posterity, but she also has her eye on a poetic afterlife, 
where she can spread God’s “gifts of wisdom” in the form of a unified prophetic utterance that 
fuses “thought, word, song.” It turns out that salvation also solves the problem of lyric address, 
seamlessly translating thought into voice into music. This immortal endowment recapitulates a 
history of posterities, earthly and divine, by opting for all of the above, blending enthusiastic 
transcendence with earthward glances.  
 In short, the visionary rhetoric of “Despondency and Aspiration” looks like a shocking 
departure from the circumspect lyrics of Scenes and Hymns of Life. More to the point, it looks 
like textbook enthusiasm, for which David Hume offered an especially relevant definition: 
a full range is given to the fancy in the invisible regions or world of spirits, where the 
soul is at liberty to indulge itself in every imagination, which may best suit its present 
taste and disposition. Hence arise raptures, transports, and surprising flights of fancy; and 
confidence and presumption still encreasing, these raptures, being altogether 
unaccountable, and seeming quite beyond the reach of our ordinary faculties, are 
attributed to the immediate inspiration of that Divine Being, who is the object of 
devotion. In a little time, the inspired person comes to regard himself as a distinguished 
favourite of the Divinity; and when this frenzy once takes place, which is the summit of 
enthusiasm, every whimsy is consecrated: Human reason, and even morality are rejected 
as fallacious guides…. (Essays 74) 
 
Hemans’s sublime transports, indifference to contradiction, and prophetic presumption would 
seem to mark her with the stigma of the inspirited—what Samuel Johnson’s 1755 Dictionary 
defined as “A vain belief of private revelation; a vain confidence of Divine favour or 
communication” (“Enthusiasm”). John Wesley, too, labored to discipline the very movement he 
inaugurated by distinguishing Methodism from enthusiasm, though he was constantly accused of 
the latter:  
I dislike something that has the appearance of enthusiasm: overvaluing feelings and 
inward impressions: mistaking the mere work of imagination for the voice of the Spirit; 
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expecting the end without the means, and undervaluing reason, knowledge, and wisdom 
in general. (4:193) 
 
On Wesley’s account, enthusiasm lays claim to a grace it hasn’t earned. Hemans, however, could 
unimpeachably assert her intimacy with the spirit when she wrote “Despondency and 
Aspiration,” for the simple fact that she was terminally ill. She died of consumption on May 16th 
of 1835, the same month the poem ran in Blackwood’s. The poem thus enjoys the expressive 
privilege granted to the dying within the Anglican consensus—the same privilege Hemans could 
give Lilian in “Flowers and Music in a Room of Sickness,” but shied away from in her earlier 
devotional lyrics.  
“Despondency and Aspiration” was widely celebrated, always in connection with the 
supplemental text of her death. Her friend and biographer Henry Chorley hailed it as the “last 
and greatest of her lyrics,” while the Athenaeum called it “the song of the swan—its sweetest and 
its last!” (2:299; 395:392).16 More recently, Duncan Wu has highlighted the poem (her “last great 
work”) as an example of her facility with the “visionary experience” of the sublime, a discourse, 
according to Wu, that critics have usually understood as a conventionally masculine prerogative 
(Romanticism 1293, xliii). But Hemans’s apparent gender transgressions must be understood in 
relation to the politics of dying. In a world where social geographies were drawn by religious 
rhetorics, dying persons spoke from beyond the map, transcending the boundaries between the 
                                                      
16 Further examples abound. The Ladies’ Repository found “Despondency and Aspiration” the equal “in 
eloquence of diction and fervor of soul, with the best productions of the best of British bards” (9:12), and 
the Eclectic Review, while generally skeptical of Hemans’s devotional poetry, called it the “noblest 
production” in the posthumous Poetical Remains of 1836 (16:43). The Literary Gazette made the most 
revealing connection between the transcendent rhetoric of Poetical Remains and the circumstance of 
Hemans’s death, announcing that “The volume now before us was chiefly written while passing through 
the valley of the shadow of death. What a touching and yet solemn truth does this give to its aspirations 
for the purer air which is beyond the grave!” (1000:177).  
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orthodox and the heterodox, the polite and the vulgar. As an emissary from eternity, the dying 
person was expected to express an intimacy with God that, in other contexts, would mark her 
with the stigma of enthusiasm. The devotional fervor of Hemans’s last poems signaled true 
religion to dissenters, while the circumstance of her decline ensured the appreciation and respect 
of Anglicans. Hemans was at last able to inhabit the personal voice of the lyric in an address to a 
unified spiritual public, precisely because she was leaving that fiction behind.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUPERANNUATED GOVERNESSES AND IMAGINATIVE EUNUCHS: 
THE STERILITY OF ENDYMION 
 Keats was accruing a deathly cultural legacy even before he died, even before he fell 
terminally ill, in part due to his own preoccupation with “posthumous existence” (Letters 2:359). 
Such timely investments in posterity ensured that when his death came at age 25, it made Keats. 
He quickly proved a more vital symbol dead than alive. Martyred by bloodthirsty reviewers, or 
so the story held, he became an expedient proxy in the poetic and political strife of Regency 
literary culture. As the Metropolitan Magazine wrote, the poet 
might have prospered, though his birth was humble, and his means straitened, had not an 
enmity, as gratuitous as it was wanton, as cruel in act as it was malignant in spirit, met, 
tore, and trampled him to the earth! (14:61) 
 
This victim Keats represented less a closed, extant body of work than a lost future for a literary 
culture far more invested in weaponizing the virtual Keats than in coming to terms with the 
Keats that lived, wrote, and died. For Keats’s elegists, that lost potential measured the failings of 
the republic of letters, which rather resembled the aristocracy of yore.1 Yet even his defenders 
were more likely to imagine literary posterity on the aristocratic model as a patrimonial estate, to 
be figuratively inherited by birthright or won by courtship of the muse. Keats was never going to 
cut the figure of the Wordsworthian patriarch, but by dying, he fell into a different sort of 
                                                 
1 William Hazlitt protested that “it is name, it is wealth, it is title and influence that mollifies the tender-
hearted Cerberus of criticism…. This is the reason why a certain Magazine [Blackwood’s] praises Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, and villifies ‘Johnny Keats’” (12:208).  
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posterity that secured the place “among the English poets” he imagined for himself (Letters 
1:394). Yet Endymion—his major poem in life, if not in literary afterlife—is dedicated to 
draining the blood out of inheritance and dismantling an order rooted in births and deaths. It is a 
reaction against the system of literary valuation that would bar him in life and prize him in death. 
That is to say, Endymion is a revolt against posthumous Keats. 
The myth of Keats is a construction poised between “prospective and retroactive 
reading,” determined, as Andrew Bennett has argued, “by a certain prescience of posthumous 
renown” (Culture of Posterity 141). On the far side of periodical martyrdom emerged readings 
like Paul de Man’s, which saw Keats’s poetics “haunted by a dream that always remains in the 
future,” each of his projects encountering a crux that would leave it conceptually or literally 
unfinished (Selected Poetry of Keats xii). The traces of victimology have become more diffuse, 
but prematurity, death, and futurity remain central to de Man’s assessment. Keats’s canonical 
work often imagines an impossibly sonorous poetry, “images of a virtual music,” from the 
various evocations of “unheard melodies” in the odes (“spirit ditties of no tone”) to Apollo’s 
song in Hyperion:  
A living death was in each gush of sounds,  
Each family of rapturous hurried notes,  
That fell, one after one, yet all at once (Clune 32; Hyperion 2.281-283) 
 
These images of phantom poetry blend with his premature death to generate a Keats always still 
to come. The specter of this virtual Keats transforms the poet into a fragment-poem imbued with 
glimmers of an impossible totality. F. R. Leavis offered a representative distillation of the place 
of Keats in 1936:  
Keats has become a symbolic figure, the type of poetic genius, a hero and martyr of 
poetry, with claims to greatness such as can hardly at any time have, for the devout, 
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invested the symbolic Chatterton; and there is a general consensus that the greatness is a 
matter of promise and potentiality rather than achievement. (241)  
 
The greatness of this Keats lies in possibility itself—at least according to the “general 
consensus” that Leavis neither challenges nor fully owns. This logic turns on the figure of a 
“claim,” which positions the poet as a claimant to a throne, a patrimony, or a “place” of the sort 
Keats imagined for himself (Letters 1:394). The possessor of a legitimate but unconsummated 
claim, Keats’s story is one of usurpation and betrayal, while Chatterton (Endymion’s dedicatee) 
remains merely “symbolic” since he was never a true pretender. The death that intervened 
between promise and achievement becomes the sign of Keats’s unrealized entitlement.2 And so 
his greatness depends upon the reiteration of his death, over and over again. Endymion intuits 
how the game of poetry was figuratively patterned on genealogy—birthrights and good deaths—
a game the living Keats was ill-qualified to play at, much less win. If dying solved the problem, 
Endymion remains Keats’s clearest protest against the estate of literary posterity in which he 
would eventually take an honored place.  
Reproducing Poetry 
The story of Keats’s emergence as a “poet of death” (Robinson, My Ended Poet 4) is well 
known. Caught in the crossfire between the Tory reviews and Leigh Hunt’s circle of poetic 
reformers, Keats became an object of what began as nonchalant derision and steadily veered 
toward intensely invested rancor. When he fell ill and died of consumption, friends, admirers, 
and fellow travelers lionized the young poet as a martyr of culture war. He left behind a body of 
poetry shot through with anxious deviations and experiments in gender, sexuality, maturity, 
                                                 
2 While the image of lost potential remains influential, recent assessments affirm that despite his early 
death, as Jack Stillinger writes, “the imagined poet of promise was in fact a poet of enormous 
accomplishments” (Romantic Complexity 113). 
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education, politics, and class. These vectors often conspired to produce an entrancing and 
discomfiting spectacle of “embarrassment” (Ricks), “solecism” (Bennett), and “badness” 
(Levinson), and yet the writing of the “mature” Keats often ascends to the very pinnacle of 
poetic form (Vendler). Such tensions within Keats’s body of work only emphasize his status as 
an incomplete poet, reinforcing the tragic dimension of his loss.  
Less understood—but no less crucial to the making of Keats—are the omnipresent motifs 
of patrimony and procreation. Literature functioned as a mechanism for the management of 
social reproduction, defining and contesting logics of class with respect to readership, education, 
and taste. It makes sense that procreation could figure prominently in a world explicitly fixated 
on logics of social reproduction, since procreation could offer a biological, “concrete” reference 
point for the cultural work of literature. Nor is it surprising that, despite the heavily worked trope 
of the “republic of letters,” review culture could just as readily appeal to breeding and blood—
older discourses of distinction that had become mild anachronisms, yet still resonated in the 
wake of the eighteenth-century refashioning of gentility as a more cultural, less hereditary 
formation. In the case of Keats, a poet perfectly situated to irritate the discursive zones where 
social and sexual reproduction overlap, procreation became the sign of his failure. The trope 
runs, in one way or another, throughout his reception.   
Consider the first of John Gibson Lockhart’s several lavish condemnations in 
Blackwood’s, which placed Keats among a rash of “farm servants and unmarried ladies” taken to 
writing poetry. Writing as “Z,” Lockhart complained that “there is scarcely a superannuated 
governess in the island that does not leave a roll of lyrics behind in her band-box” (3:519). What 
these figures share, what makes their poetic pretensions self-evidently absurd, begins but does 
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not end with their social marginality. The problem is more precise: each is variously unmarried 
and unmarriageable, excluded in different ways from the sanctioned avenues of procreation. The 
aspersions that follow—Keats is “prurient and vulgar”; he won’t stop penning “amorous scenes”; 
he’s a “boy of pretty abilities, which he has done everything in his power to spoil” —posit a 
bond between poetic and sexual potency that Keats cannot fulfill (3:521, 523, 522). He is not 
simply premature but hopeless, constitutionally incapable of consummation, a pretender in the 
worst sense. Failed filiation is the bedrock of this attack. 
 Blackwood’s hard line on Keats’s reproductive prospects began to waver in the ensuing 
years. First, there was a shift from the spectacle of the critical pillory to a milder discourse of 
censure as rehabilitation. In 1819 Blackwood’s professed,  
We alone like him and laugh at him. He is at present a very amiable, silly, lisping, and 
pragmatical young gentleman—but we hope to cure him of all that—and should have 
much pleasure in introducing him to our readers in a year or two speaking the language of 
this country, counting his fingers correctly, and condescending to a neckcloth. (6:240) 
 
What emerges throughout this discourse is an abiding sense of the poet as gentleman-patriarch 
and poetic language as inheritance, subject to the law of patrilineal descent. Blackwood’s claims 
to have chastised Keats to secure his future by purging him, through ridicule, of the Cockney 
plague. After his death, the magazine’s attitude toward Keats became frenetically divided, 
claiming the high ground of well-intentioned sympathy only to regularly descend into fits of 
finger-pointing seasoned with astonishing vitriol: 
Keats possessed from nature some “fine powers,” and that was the very expression we 
used in the first critique that ever mentioned his name. We saw, however, with mixed 
feelings of pity, sorrow, indignation, and contempt, that he was on the road to ruin. He 
was a Cockney, and Cockneys claimed him for their own. Never was there a young man 
so encrusted with conceit. He added new treasures to his mother-tongue,—and what is 
worse, he outhunted Hunt in a species of emasculated pruriency, that, although invented 
in Little Britain, looks as if it were the product of some imaginative Eunuch’s muse 
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within the melancholy inspiration of the Haram. Besides, we know that the godless gang 
were flattering him into bad citizenship, and wheedling him out of his Christian faith. In 
truth, they themselves broke the boy’s heart, and blasted all his prospects. We tried to 
save him by wholesome and severe discipline—they drove him to poverty, expatriation 
and death. (Blackwood’s 19:xxvi) 
 
It is remarkable how close the “mother-tongue” and “citizenship” lie to lascivious oriental 
sterility, and how vulnerable the former are to the latter. Keats’s castrated poetics are not simply 
laughable but dangerous, even deadly.3 These reactions reveal a thoroughgoing analogy between 
linguistic and social reproduction that undergirds the defense of literary nationhood: on one 
hand, counting one’s fingers correctly and speaking the mother tongue, on the other, banishing 
the superannuated governesses and imaginative eunuchs from the republic of letters.  
 However, establishing a bond between nation, language, and reproduction was not solely 
the pet project of Blackwood’s and its senior associate, the Quarterly Review. This was a 
longstanding, deep-seated motif advanced in different terms by Keats’s friends and Keats 
himself as readily as his opponents. Keats arrived as a child—the romantic child, as theorized by 
Rousseau, sentimentalized by Joshua Reynolds, and elegized by Wordsworth in the Intimations 
Ode.4 This reception vector was present in Keats’s life, and became predominant in death. To 
                                                 
3 Even these claims would only be allowed to stand momentarily, as the author quickly moves to dismiss 
Blackwood’s entire history of attacks on Keats: “we thought these common-places of quizzing were quite 
well understood, and of course harmless” (19:xxvi). If Keats and friends were gentlemen, they would 
have understood that they weren’t really being insulted for their middling status.  
 
4 The infantilizing and feminizing currents of Keats’s reception have been much discussed: the juvenile, 
libertine, and effeminate valences of the Cockney slur (Cox 24), the “puerilising rhetoric” in which Leigh 
Hunt introduced his protégé to the public (Wolfson, “Feminising Keats” 95), William Hazlitt’s claim that 
Keats lacked “the manhood of poetry” (8:254-255), Keats’s own flamboyant developmental anxieties in 
his 1817 Poems, a volume obsessed “with the question of Keats’s career as a poet” (Stillinger, 
Hoodwinking 13), and Percy Shelley’s fraught, competitive elegy Adonais, which pictured Keats not as 
suitor to the muse—that would be Shelley himself—but rather as her neglected and vulnerableson: 
“Where wert thou, mighty Mother, when he lay, / When thy Son lay, pierc’d by the shaft which flies / In 
darkness?” (10-12). These constructions, evoking potential, futurity, nurturance, betrayal, and 
reproductive failure, all belong to the procreative matrix. 
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take one example, John Hamilton Reynolds’s case against the Quarterly Review’s treatment of 
Keats revolves entirely around the figure of filicide. According to Reynolds, “Reviewers,” who 
should act as faithful guardians to the aspiring youths of English letters, “are creatures ‘that stab 
men in the dark:’—young and enthusiastic spirits are their dearest prey” (Examiner 563:648). 
Childlike Keats was entrusted to the care of these literary guardians, who whimsically decided 
“to crush [his promise] in its youth, and forever” (563:649). Predatory exploitation damns the 
hopes of poetic succession. By cutting down potential before it can bloom, these “soi disant 
guardians of public taste” (as Charles Cowden Clarke termed them) end up devouring England’s 
literary future (Barnard 44). The English line of literary succession has been betrayed—not by 
the outré experiments of its youthful heirs, but by the cannibalistic jealousy of an outmoded and 
illegitimate literary patriarchy. The Victorian Magazine put an especially vivid spin on this 
tropology, remembering Keats as “the Daintiest of Poets” while heaping motherly scorn on his 
assailants:  
What shall we say of the malicious, the utterly brutal criticism, the hand of the cloddish 
boy tearing the myriad-hued fragile butterfly to fragments! No words can express the 
loathing every honest educated Englishman must feel for the ruffian tasks which 
inaugurated a long career of prosperity for the two Quarterlies. (67) 
 
This reading inverts Quarterly’s image of Keats as a deviant child in need of discipline from 
right Englishmen. Here, destroying Keats was rather the work (or play) of sadistic children, 
distinguished only by its instrumental role in securing “prosperity” for the perpetrators. The 
elegiac conclusion is straight out of the Intimations Ode: “Glory and loveliness have passed 
away.”5 
                                                 
5 Barbara Garlitz’s “The Immortality Ode: Its Cultural Progeny” and Lawrence Kramer’s “The 
‘Intimations’ Ode and Victorian Romanticism” both explore the vast impact of Wordsworth’s poem on 
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 These representations of Keats as an abandoned and betrayed child sustain the 
procreative literary imaginary governed by the logic of property, only to turn it against his 
assailants. Literary and biological fecundity were the founding figures of poetic posterity, 
rendered as a sovereign domain, a territorial nation-estate, perhaps subject to patrimonial bequest 
via education and station (if not blood), or perhaps to be won by those properly endowed to woo 
the muse.6 Though this metaphor system was often unstable, and was plied to various ends, it 
consistently worked to Keats’s disadvantage.  
Degenerate Verse 
Endymion’s slapdash, “slip-shod” versification has received much attention.7 My 
contention is that Endymion does have a high argument, if not in the Miltonic or Wordsworthian 
                                                 
nineteenth-century elegiac thought, making the case that it was Wordsworth’s best-remembered and most 
influential work. Its language resonates throughout Keats’s reception.  
 
6 In his defense of Keats, Reynolds writes, “Poetry is the coyest creature that ever was wooed by man: she 
has something of the coquette in her; for she flirts with many, and seldom loves one” (Examiner 
563:649). 
 
7 “Slip-shod” was Keats’s own assessment, a deprecation that through the mid-nineteenth century could 
still mean “wearing slippers or very loose shoes” and “of shoes: Loose or untidy, in bad condition; down 
at the heel” in addition to the more familiar “casual, slovenly” (Letters 1:374; OED). Even the most 
sympathetic early readers found Endymion’s verse awkward. Benjamin Bailey complained of the “forced 
rhymes” and “the apparent effort, by breaking up the lines, to get as far as possible in the opposite 
direction of the Pope school” (Keats Circle 2:269). Judged against the carefully crafted effect of ease 
prized in the Popean couplet, Keats’s loose, haphazard treatments seemed unwieldy and, as even Leigh 
Hunt put it, “unnatural” (Letters 1:213). The most important recent work on Endymion’s versification 
includes William Keach’s Arbitrary Power and Simon Jarvis’s “Archaist-Innovators: The Couplet from 
Churchill to Browning.” Jarvis’s comments on Keats’s cataloging practices in Endymion are especially 
salient: 
Because it is so often paratactical, rather than (as Milton’s so generally is) hypotactic, the forward 
movement which pushes us over line endings is often aggregative rather than logical. On several 
occasions here Keats begins a new line simply by adding to a list which has been begun earlier…. 
The lists themselves not only mingle imaginable objects with quite abstract phrases, so that the 
verse yields no pictorially constructible scene…subjected to a series of blurrings and minglings. 
The poem as a whole, in fact, concertedly assaults the very framework for discriminating high, 
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senses, insofar as it endeavors to dismantle the patrilineal authority that issues “high arguments.” 
The most fundamental venue for this argument is the poem’s verse. Critics immediately 
recognized that the poem treats rhyme and meter with a dangerous laxity, deepens the poem’s 
subjection to the suggestive power of words. In his lordly strength, Byron could play at this kind 
of subjection as itself a form of mastery. So Don Juan’s narrator, after rhyming “milk” with “as 
the Scotch say, whilk,” quickly faux-apologizes: “The rhyme obliges me to this; sometimes / 
Monarchs are less imperative than rhymes” (5.615-616). By contrast, it wasn’t clear if Keats was 
playing submissive, or just was submissive. Even if he wasn’t simply an incompetent delinquent, 
he didn’t have any lordly currency to play with. 
By apparently ceding compositional intention to the arbitrary play of rhyme, Keats was 
neglecting what Coleridge in the previous year’s Biographia Literaria had called “the best part 
of human language”: the “voluntary appropriation of fixed symbols to internal acts, to processes 
and results of imagination” (7:54). Meter must be organized “by a supervening act of the will 
and judgment,” and as such, “traces of present volition” should be “discernible” throughout 
(7:66). By contrast, Keats seemed pliant and passive before his own material, just as his 
protagonist surrendered his agency to desire. This failure to exercise control was profoundly 
classed, as in Byron’s objection to the poetry of the Hunt circle: “You see the man of education, 
the gentleman, and the scholar, sporting with his subject,—its master, not its slave” (Works 
5:592). The sexual dimensions of this figure were no accident, as implied in John Wilson 
Croker’s complaint that Endymion was essentially authorless, “composed of hemistitchs which, 
it is quite evident, have forced themselves upon the author by the mere force of the catchwords 
                                                 
middle, and low which the couplet had turned into as Pope’s flexibility, after his death, was made 
to harden into a series of molds for style. (36) 
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on which they turn” (Quarterly Review 19:206). Keats, it seems, can only manage a curtailed 
half-line at a time, and worse, he can’t even claim responsibility for these diminutive discharges. 
They’re forced upon him by the “mere” force of his catchwords. Rhyme is the arena in which 
Endymion’s procreative energy is captured and dissipated by its own material.  
While Z’s attacks in Blackwood’s provide the sociological matrix for Keats’s 
reproductive failings by placing the poet alongside superannuated governesses and unmarried 
ladies, Croker’s assessment in the Quarterly Review demonstrates how Keats’s deviations in 
verse were linked to a queering of reproduction. Keats is accused of propagating, “with great 
fecundity,” a degenerate language. We’re told that Keats “spawns” verbs from nouns and nouns 
from verbs. He births new verbs by “cutting off their natural tails” and “affixing them to their 
foreheads”—i.e. “up-followed,” “up-blows,” “down-sunken.” And yet, “if he sinks some adverbs 
in the verbs he compensates the language with adverbs and adjectives which he separates from 
the parent stock” (19:207). (Here Croker cites the Keatsian coinages “whispers pantingly,” 
“hushing signs,” and “refreshfully.”) Keats has forced English to birth grammatically alien 
offspring, shifted from their native part of speech toward foreign significations. At the level of 
the word, Endymion is built up out of Calibanesque monstrosities. Such unnatural hybrids 
overwhelm what Croker terms “our English heroic metre,” suggesting that these mutations in the 
reproduction of language were an attack on the nation, centered, as Burke wrote, upon “our 
hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars” (Reflections 120). Croker’s scolding thus reveals how the 
bond between language and nation was sustained by the metaphor of reproduction within the 
broader topos of poetry as patrimony. What is especially notable here is that Croker’s reading of 
  
225 
Keats is in fact the polar opposite of Blackwood’s accusations: It’s not that Keats leaks sterile 
dribble, but that he is monstrously fertile, pouring out heinous verbal grotesqueries.  
The divergent censures of Lockhart and Croker suggest how Keats’s literary-reproductive 
deviance was widely recognized yet inconsistently rendered. The Tory reviews could damn 
Keats for his effeminate submission to the power of language, and, in the next breath, charge that 
he was brutishly taking liberties with language, deforming it according to monstrous whims. Nor 
were these charges limited to the Tory press. Even Leigh Hunt pictured Keats as a tyrant 
victimizing his verse: “Mr. Keats, in the tyranny of his wealth, forced his rhymes to help whether 
they would or not: and they obeyed him, in the most singular manner, with equal promptitude 
and ungainliness” (Imagination and Fancy 253). This didn’t stop Hunt from suggesting in the 
same paragraph that Keats’s “tendency to pleasure…sometimes degenerat[ed]…into a poetical 
effeminacy”—excepting only the appropriately phallic “gigantic grandeur” of his Hyperion 
(ibid.). Such fissured readings of Endymion’s rhymes, alternately brutish and girlish, suggest the 
illegibility of Keats’s verse deformations—at once superabundant and impoverished, profuse and 
devoid of sense. These responses help to clarify what is profoundly distinctive about the poem: it 
is a poem of broken births and incomplete deaths, where the trajectory of life no longer obtains.  
Ganymede Grown 
 Endymion is a response to this figural system of validation and valuation. That is to say, 
Endymion recognizes the terms in which it would be judged, not because Keats divined the 
future, but because he accurately read the reception politics of the present and understood the 
motifs that organized poetic legitimacy. Moreover, he recognized that the vision of poetry as 
patrimony was arranged to delegitimize people like him. Endymion is his ambitious and often 
  
226 
incoherent counterproposal, his attempt to imagine a world of poetry unbound by filiation and 
bequest, severed from the logics of procreation and inheritance. While many scholars have seen 
the poem as an expression of Keats’s multifarious sexual and social anxieties, I think Z was quite 
right about the mood of Endymion: “the phrenzy of the ‘Poems’ was bad enough in its way; but it 
did not alarm us half so seriously as the calm, settled, imperturbable drivelling idiocy of 
‘Endymion’” (Blackwood’s 3:519). It is a strangely assured and uncompromising text, blissfully 
committed to outraging good sense. Endymion was also, as Marjorie Levinson notes, the poem 
“that would, literally, make [Keats],” and, we should add, make him in its own image (7).  
 His declared intention to “make 4000 lines of one bare circumstance and fill them with 
Poetry” should be understood as a narrative experiment in the suspension of time (Letters 1:170). 
This is crucial because the genealogy of patrimony depends upon linear, definable chronology. If 
this logic holds in the social world, Endymion will insist that it need not hold in poetry. 
Endymion thus seeks to interrupt the logic of inheritance by imagining what Herbert Marcuse 
termed “the liberation from time”: the renunciation of the future’s claims on the present (162). In 
place of futurity, Keats writes a world of continuous passage without progress, dilating “the slow 
move of time” (4.922), or eddying and looping back on itself, repeating without advancing. It is a 
poem about the postponement of growth and the deferral of ends. It strategically abandons the 
narrative teleologies of climax and resolution and the social teleologies of birth, maturation, and 
death. Endymion, then, is an escapist fantasy that is also a precise reading of the cultural world 
into which it would be unhappily released.   
 From his introduction, the eponymous hero is marked by a curiously uneven maturation: 
His youth was fully blown, 
Shewing like Ganymede to manhood grown;  
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And, for those simple times, his garments were 
A chieftain king’s: beneath his breast, half bare,  
Was hung a silver bugle, and between  
His nervy knees there lay a boar-spear keen. (1.169-174) 
 
Crowded with discordant sexual signifiers, this picture distills a certain sexed and gendered 
illegibility—a permanent adolescence that variously transcends and falls short of manhood. 
Youth “fully blown” might be peak youth or youth concluded, wrapped any which way in the 
still-loose trappings of a “chieftain king.” At the center is the paradox of a Ganymede grown to 
manhood, since Ganymede was granted eternal youth for his service as cupbearer to the 
Olympians. Endymion is not poised between boyhood and manhood on a maturational spectrum; 
instead, he occupies both positions at once. This perplexity is quickly overwritten by two phallic 
markings: first the vaguely suggestive bugle hanging round his neck, and then, as if to insist, the 
unequivocal “boar-spear keen” between his “nervy knees.” An eternal youth in the shape and 
garb of a man wielding too many phalli, Endymion makes for an unseemly assemblage of 
undersold and overblown parts.  
 The sexual subtexts of horn and spear only become clearer in hindsight. For though 
Endymion styles himself a hunter, he shows no interest in his erstwhile profession, leaving these 
items to hang on their symbolism. Instead, Endymion’s proper vocation is dreaming, since it is 
dreams that open onto the countertemporal logic the poem prizes. Crucially, his dreaming 
practice is clearly distinguished from that of his peers. While his fellow shepherds busy 
themselves trading reveries of the Elysium to come within the confines of homosocial ritual (“all 
out-told / Their fond imaginations”), Endymion sits in a “self-same fixed trance,” internalizing 
his fantasy and indulging a luxurious, melancholic solitude (1.371-372, 403). The shepherds’ 
daydreaming is regulatory, future-directed, and defined by its very distance from present 
  
228 
realities. By contrast, Endymion takes his dreams so seriously that they become indistinguishable 
from the waking world, suspending the march toward an agential, militant manhood. Ultimately, 
the poem will affirm Endymion’s decision to pursue his idiosyncratic fantasy over the 
continuation of his patrimony. This is a commitment to perpetual aspiration over arrival. 
 Endymion’s desire to suspend the reality quotient of waking life and its reliance on an 
orderly chronology of past and future does not go unchallenged. Endymion’s sensible sister 
Peona speaks on behalf of the logic of patrimony, chastising her brother for foregoing worldly 
ambition in favor of fantastic delusions. When he confesses that he is in love with a goddess who 
visits his dreams, Peona tries to shame him back into his birthright by imagining what will be 
said of him if he doesn’t stop dreaming. Though he has the potential to “leave / His name upon 
the harp-string” for posterity, he risks becoming a mere cautionary tale, unmanned into “simple 
maidenhood” by unrequited love, only to be killed by a “sprig of yew tree”—a symbol of 
cyclical death and resurrection, planted in churchyards since the early middle ages (Bevan-Jones 
40-41). Endymion’s dreams threaten to feminize him into abject vulnerability that speeds 
directly toward pathetic death. The remedy Peona prescribes is a regular dose of virile hunting 
and trumpeting, and an end to sickly, insubstantial dreaming: 
how light 
Must dreams themselves be; seeing they’re more slight 
Than the mere nothing that engenders them! 
Then wherefore sully the entrusted gem  
Of high and noble life with thoughts so sick? 
Why pierce high-fronted honour to the quick 
For nothing but a dream? (1.754-760) 
 
Contrasted with the eminent substance of ancestry, dreams are nothing born from more nothing. 
By dedicating himself to the nothingness of dreams, Endymion sullies and sickens and pierces 
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the “high-fronted honour” that blazons and defends patrilineal descent. Peona’s hard boundary 
between dream and reality runs from the “high and noble life” to the firm ground of property. To 
refuse patrimony in favor of the dream world is to wilt into a girlish death, crossing oneself out 
of one’s legacy. “Melting into [love’s] radiance”, as Endymion desires, means melting out of the 
hereditary order of the social economy.  
Growing Sideways 
In response, Endymion will stake himself to the “higher hope” of a “self-destroying love” 
beyond the “myriads of earthly wrecks”—imagining a world where history and futurity no 
longer exercise power over life (1.774, 799, 776). As citizens of the waking world, we may be 
compelled to agree with Peona that this on some level puerile and preposterous. Yet Richard 
Marggraf Turley has persuasively recuperated the immaturity that pervades Keats’s writing, 
arguing that his juvenility is a strategy through which he contests mature, established forms of 
authority. “‘Boyishness,’” Turley writes, “is a coherent—or at least coherently incoherent—
position of contestation, power, and personal liberation for Keats” (6). Against “maturational” 
accounts of the poet’s trajectory as a “predominantly uni-directional exertion towards self-
determination of one kind or another—creative, personal, prophetic, historical,” Turley sketches 
a Keats whose persistent “strategic infantilism” poses an often fraught yet compelling challenge 
to the logic of poetic maturation (6). One implication of Turley’s argument is that Keats’s poetic 
strategies aim to disrupt the mythology of lost promise constructed in his wake, since the trope of 
lost promise relies upon the very sort of (tragically suspended) trajectory of maturation that 
Keats’s strategic infantilism works to preempt.  
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Keats’s immaturity is not mere ignorance. If Keats was indeed inexperienced in many 
senses, he was not unfamiliar with death, and I will argue that death is the site of Endymion’s 
most far-reaching transformations. He had lost his father at eight years of age; his mother left at 
ten, returned, and died when he was fourteen; and his brother Tom was declining over the course 
of Endymion’s composition, only to die within a month of publication. He knew plenty of death, 
and yet was able to engage the phenomenon, in verse at least, as a metaphysically pliable and 
contestable concept. However, Keats’s poetry often speaks a different language from his prose. 
Where the poems variously resist and endorse maturational narratives, such narratives are 
consistently supported by his prefaces and letters, which are fairly obsessed with schemas of 
development and progress. Indeed, the reading of Endymion as a pathologically immature poem 
began with Keats himself. In his preface, Keats “castigated” the text as “a feverish attempt, 
rather than a deed accomplished.” He declared its foundations “sandy” and deemed it best “that 
this youngster should die away” while he works at “plotting, and fitting myself for verses fit to 
live” (Poems of John Keats 102). The language recalls the program of Wordsworth’s preface to 
The Excursion, which Keats had recently read, and which sought to arrange his corpus of poetry 
on the model of a “gothic church.” But where Wordsworth architecturally framed his early 
poems as “little cells, oratories, and sepulchral recesses” within the larger edifice (Excursion 38), 
Keats presents Endymion as a living youth disposed to “die away,” forecasting his own poem’s 
disappearance. Keats, then, hopes for Endymion what its text denies: a conclusive death. Instead, 
Endymion would dominate Keats’s reception until the latter nineteenth century, despite his own 
subsequent attempts to position the poem as a necessary but flawed experiment on the path to 
greater achievement.  
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In this respect, Endymion chafes against Keats himself. After its composition, he 
recommitted himself to the logic of development he had broadcast before and after, representing 
his “castigation” of his own poem as a sign of his maturation.8 Keats had a divided relationship 
to these maturational schemas, which seemed to tow images of procreative virility in their wake. 
Even as he resisted logics of manhood, he could not entirely forgo the metaphor systems 
organizing the social and literary world he inhabited. If this world seemed to reject him 
following the publication of his 1817 Poems, Endymion would be sure to preemptively reject it. 
As Marjorie Levinson has argued, Keats was finding ways to make his social alienation the scene 
of his poetry. Endymion is his foremost example of an attempt to carve out a poetic reprieve from 
the organizing figures of maturation, a massively long epic poem that strives, perhaps hopelessly, 
to void itself of birth, growth, development, and death.  
While Turley makes his case for Keats’s strategically arrested development through 
concrete particulars (e.g. Keats’s fetishistic fixation on anatomical [rather than metrical] feet), I 
see Endymion invested in a wholesale reprogramming of temporality. What this requires is a 
conceptual alternative to linear maturation that ties together sexual and narrative deviation. In 
The Queer Child, Kathryn Bond Stockton elaborates the temporal paradoxes that inhere when we 
                                                 
8 Sleep and Poetry, the concluding statement of 1817’s Poems, had declared Keats’s intention to progress 
from pastoral romances (e.g. Endymion) toward mature tragedy (95-125). Keats reprises a version of this 
schema in Endymion’s preface and in his letters, most notably the famous letter to Reynolds that pictures 
life as “a large Mansion of Many Apartments” (Letters 1:280). In life’s second “Chamber of Maiden-
Thought,” he explains, “we become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see nothing but 
pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever in delight” (1:281). Beyond the second chamber 
lies confrontation with social and existential plight, the subject of the mature Wordsworthian poet. 
Keats’s letter seems to place himself in the second chamber, but it also affects an external perspective, 
surveying the mansion from without. Endymion, meanwhile, is dedicated to the absolute supremacy of the 
second chamber. Indolent “delay” is the poem’s platform: “ardent listlessness,” Endymion claims, “might 
bless / The world with benefits unknowingly”—therefore, best to “let occasion die” (1.825-827, 823). 
Endymion denies the very terms of progression implicit in the chamber metaphor and evacuates the 
teleology of maturation that grounds it.  
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try to think about gay childhood, which she likens to a problem of “backward birth.” The child, 
she reasons, cannot present itself as “gay” since it cannot claim a sexual identity—as James 
Kincaid among others has argued, sexuality is a central organizing cleavage between the 
categories of “child” and “adult.” The gay child, then, can only be aware of an embryonic 
difference, a strangeness that will have become gay only in retrospect. This reversed temporality 
becomes a paradigm for childhood at large: the temporality of backwards birth “begins to 
outline, in shadowy form, the pain, closets, emotional labors, sexual motives, and sideways 
movements that attend all children, however we deny it” (3). “A gay child,” she concludes, 
“illuminates the darkness of the child,” since, the child as an object of mature discourse is 
nothing other than adult “future retroaction,” nothing other than “the act of adults looking back” 
(3, 11, 5). Carolyn Steedman’s history of the emergence of psychological interiority converges 
with Stockton’s account:  
The idea of the child was used both to recall and to express the past that each individual 
life contained: what was turned inside in the course of individual development was that 
which was also latent: the child was the story waiting to be told. (11) 
 
For Stockton, once the adult can say what it has been, the gay child no longer exists. And once 
sexuality can be named and claimed, the richly confused particularities by which the child 
experienced and figured its own queerness are extinguished. Those particularities of expression, 
in the form of metaphorical substitutions and imaginative ploys, define Stockton’s notion of 
“growing sideways,” which locates “energy, pleasure, vitality, and (e)motion in the back-and-
forth of connections and extensions that are not reproductive” (13).  
 “Growing sideways” thus explores the figuration of polymorphous perversities that are 
variously restricted from or incapable of mature sexual consummation, including fetishism. This 
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phenomenon resonates with the phenomenon of Keats since, although it would be distortive in 
numerous senses to term Keats “gay,” James Najarian has argued that his poetics did provide a 
language for male writers working through various forms of vexed desire over the course of the 
nineteenth century and beyond. William Michael Rossetti, for example, worried that Keats was 
“manifestly tending to the irregular,” finding in his “minor poems” an “unmistakable twang of 
erotic laxity” (132). This sensuality conveyed only “a specious interest in heterosexual 
participation,” as Najarian suggests: “Keats is made to seem aroused and unclassifiably 
indecent” (33). Keatsian indecency was variously canvassed as gender instability, as immaturity, 
and as infection—his death read backwards into his verse. In the process of mythological 
consolidation, Keats’s consumption was translated into a consequence of his sensuality and 
effeminacy, which were circularly found to be the symptoms of his disease.9 He was his own 
etiology. In this context, Keats’s “indeterminate and free-flowing eroticism” became the diseased 
medium through which a tradition of male Victorian writers formed and articulated their own 
“irregular” desires (37). It is for this reason Najarian argues that Keats “has an important role in 
the invention of the homosexual” (25).  
Against Education 
 These schemas of retrospective construction are foundational to the Keats myth, which 
imagines an alternate history of what might have been to elegize what never was. While the 
Keats myth assumes a consistent trajectory of maturation, its own chronological movement is 
supremely irregular, which is why the promise of Keats is, in a strict sense, the stuff of fantasy. 
                                                 
9 Charles Brown, Joseph Severn, and Charles Cowden Clarke all understood Keats’s disease as a 
manifestation of emotional and psychological strain (whether professional, romantic, or otherwise), rather 
than a matter of epidemiology and infection. See Keats Circle 2:239, 1:166, 1:201, 2:129-130. 
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Endymion’s sideways growth, shaped by cyclicality and reversion, is an extreme instance of 
dynamics intrinsic to the romance genre, which Patricia Parker has characterized as “a form 
which simultaneously quests for and postpones a particular end, objective, or object” (4). 
However, whatever its whimsies and caprices, the conventional romance is not without 
pedagogical or didactic value—it is, essentially, a narrative of growth striving toward 
consummation. Endymion by contrast is organized to defeat any possibility of learning from 
experience, which is how it proceeds with actually progressing. At the opening of the second 
book, with 3,000 lines still to come, the narrator is already gently mocking the aimlessness of his 
“Brain-sick shepherd prince”:  
What promise hast thou faithful guarded since 
The day of sacrifice? Or, have new sorrows  
Come with the constant dawn upon thy morrows? (2.43-46) 
 
Teasing the prospect of some development, however minor, in the form of “new sorrows” to 
mourn, the next line quashes those hopes: “Alas! ‘tis his old grief” (2.47). The next 80 lines 
illustrate this cycle of frustrated development. As Endymion idly wanders through a luxuriant, 
synaesthetic glade, a “wild rose tree” suddenly “Pavilions him in bloom” (2.55-56). He is 
hopelessly subject to stimulation, less an observer moving through an object world than just one 
object among others, driven by an agentless inertia that lacks any of the predictability of 
Newton’s gravity. Once the tree’s bud “snares his fancy,” he plucks it and dips it in the water, 
and it blooms into a golden butterfly. Enrapt, Endymion absorbs the butterfly’s lightness and 
becomes suddenly buoyant, following it for 25 lines to a “splashing fountain,” from which it 
drinks and disappears. This is the theory of “sympathetic touch” in action: desire provokes 
transformative contact, subject and object trade positions and agencies. In place of the carefully 
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orchestrated feints, juxtapositions, and ironies of the odes to come, Endymion revels in a 
discomforting, claustrophobic lack of distance and control. After the golden butterfly’s 
capricious appearance and disappearance, a nymph materializes, assuring Endymion that she 
would give anything to help him. Unfortunately, all she can do is tell him that he must “wander 
far”—as he has been—to transcend “mortal steps, before thou canst be ta’en / […] / Into the 
gentle bosom of thy love” (2.123-127). Why? How? She doesn’t know. “Farewel!” He thus 
resumes the “brood[ing]” this interlude had interrupted (2.132). This is an example of what 
Andrew Bennett describes as the relinquishing of “end, objective, or object,” giving rise to a 
“scandal of exploded form,” a “reductio ad absurdum of the dilation of narrative” (Keats, 
Narrative and Audience 74). There is nothing to be gleaned in the form of knowledge from this 
episode, nothing Endymion can take with him on his journey. It just happens.  
The next episode, the poem’s absurdist take on the trope of the journey to the 
underworld, is expanded in scope but similar in structure to the butterfly passage. In the midst of 
Endymion’s brooding, a voice “borne” from a “deep cavern” strikes him, and he is “froze to 
senseless stone” (2.199-200). The voice commands him to descend, and he obeys. At first he is 
beguiled by the underworld’s sublime scenery and sumptuous treasures, but when the “new 
wonders” cease, he soon finds himself trapped in an unbearable intimacy with a “hated thing”: 
“The journey homeward to habitual self!” (2.274-280). The next line revises this journey into “A 
mad-pursuing of the fog-born elf,” paring away the all-too-familiar “self” to glimpse a fugitive 
core of fairy deception (2.277). This existential scheme—the elf inside the self—is represented 
through the arbitrary serendipity of language at the level of the word. The iconic resemblance in 
play here is doubled by the verse’s descent (we are in the underworld, after all) down the line 
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from self to elf. This profoundly uneventful trip then quickly concludes, as Endymion 
desperately petitions his moon goddess, and by her blessing, he soon discovers the exit. If in the 
classical tradition the journey to the underworld orients the hero with a sense of destiny and self-
knowledge, here Endymion finds only confusion and self-evacuation.   
As the text nears the lip of its 4,000-line container, its methods of deferral become 
increasingly baroque. By the fourth book, Endymion has helplessly collided with an “Indian 
maid,” the human incarnation of a goddess who happens to be the moon (though he doesn’t 
know this), and he falls in love yet again. All that remains is for him to realize that each of these 
figures is in fact the same being. In the midst of this indirection, Endymion and the Indian maid 
are flying toward the heavens on winged horses. Meanwhile the deity Sleep has been dreaming 
of Endymion’s marriage in heaven. Upon waking, Sleep flies in the same direction as the lovers 
in order to dutifully make his appearance, soon overrunning the couple. As Sleep engulfs them in 
his mists, they’re knocked unconscious and sent adrift, suspending the very event Sleep had 
foreseen. The narrative circles into a constricting loop, distending toward its line-count goal by 
consuming itself. Approaching the finish line, the narrative nods. 
Knowledge assumes a certain degree of stability: things that are true must remain true, or 
change in consistent ways, or according to a consistent inconsistency. Yet no law, moral or 
physical, seem to govern the worlds through which Endymion passes, beyond the movement of 
desire toward its objects—and even this proves halting. Thus, the poem’s “events” have little 
apparent relation to what precedes and what follows. Anything might transform into anything 
else, guided and constrained by the play of language rather than worldly relations. Processes of 
development are shattered by contingency, suggestive of a Humean nightmare in which causes 
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are disjointed from effects. The situation evokes Anahid Nersessian’s discussion of “nescience,” 
rendered as 
the cognitive expression of irony: the painful or unsettling sense that there is no 
meaningful link between what is known and what can be known, or what has taken place 
and what might take place. (“Two Gardens” 215) 
 
Nescience accompanies the onset of calamity, as a disruption of certitude that might yet open a 
space for the remaking of knowledge, especially in its relationship to action. It is an interval of 
unlearning, which Endymion dilates as far as it can. The result is a rigorously unstable world that 
curtails the possibility of knowing in advance.  
In a world of calamitous metaphysical instability, birth and death come unmoored from 
their defining biological and hereditary frameworks to become generic figures of transport. 
Endymion frames an antitype to the Bildungsroman, the genre charged with narrativizing 
maturation into an ultimately coherent process. Franco Moretti has argued that the 
Bildungsroman is a “comfort of civilization,” generating a historical justification for the world as 
it is, and thus fashioning the world as a home for both characters and readers. Yet Endymion’s 
depiction of the present state of affairs withholds any reconciliation to the shared world of 
common experience. It opts out of the narrativization of growth that, according to Moretti, 
anchors life in a homely world held in common. Often, the poem’s deviations are staged by quite 
literally uprooting that ground, scrambling cardinal directions in a riot of inversions. Height and 
highness were especially sensitive notions for Keats,10 and he depicts the puffed ascendancy of 
the powerful in aggressively vertical terms: 
                                                 
10 Exhibits include his admission to Marian and Sarah Jeffrey, “I being somewhat stunted am taken for 
nothing,” and his complaint about a positive review of Byron’s work (“you see what it is to be six foot tall 
and a lord!”) set against his own self-conscious measure: “Mister John Keats five feet hight” (Letters 
1:291, 1:342). 
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There are who lord it o’er their fellow-men 
With most prevailing tinsel  
[…] 
With unladen breasts,  
Save of blown self-applause, they proudly mount  
To their spirits’ perch, their being’s high account, 
Their tiptop nothings, their dull skies, their thrones— (3.1-15) 
 
“High account” marks the imposition and imposture of the “present Ministers.” Growth and 
stature might allow the tinseled to lord over “their fellow-men,” but highness here amounts to 
“tiptop nothings,” insignias of the bankrupt endowment Endymion spurns. In the oneiric worlds 
through which Endymion finds himself pulled, he can fly “upmounted” and “dive three fathoms” 
at the same time (1.639, 641). The transports are all metaphorical, and, in a world constructed of 
verse, for that very reason entirely real. Ontology is measured not by substance or presence but 
by beauty. The “essences” of beauty are the very currents of life, “An endless fountain of 
immortal drink, / Pouring unto us from the heaven’s brink” (1.25, 1.23-24). Accordingly, there is 
no distinction between word and thing, between original and copy. Insofar as poetry is beautiful, 
and beauty is what drives existence, poetry does not represent but rather creates. “The moon, / 
The passion poesy, glories infinite” are coequal incarnations of the beautiful, with equal claims 
on existence (1.28-29, 1.25). Filiation and development become affairs of serendipity and 
chance, rather than viable mechanisms of social organization.  
Knowledge and Bondage 
Endymion’s critique of knowledge blends into a critique of agency, as the currents of 
domination and submission at the level of verse reemerge in the poem’s plot. This is best 
demonstrated in the third book, which centers on an episode wherein Endymion is tasked with 
freeing the sage Glaucus from Circe’s bondage. Here the protagonist seems, for the first and only 
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time, to engage in real agon, to actually assert himself—perhaps even heroically. And the bare 
bones of Glaucus’s subplot suggest the outline of a cautionary tale, warning Endymion of the 
dangers of seduction, infidelity, and especially female sexuality. But the episode ends up 
dissolving any redeemable pedagogical value. What remains is a challenge to the sexual and 
poetic distinction between mastery and submission fetishized not only by the Tory traditionalists, 
but also by Keats’s allies like Hunt and Reynolds.   
 When he first comes upon Glaucus—ancient in “forelorn hermitage,” with wand at 
hand—Endymion is terrified (3.227). Glaucus’s cloak is especially foreboding, pictured as a 
densely-confused text,  
O’erwrought with symbols by the deepest groans  
Of ambitious magic  
[…] 
Were emblem’d in the woof: with every shape  
That skims, or dives, or sleeps, ‘twixt cape and cape. (3.198-204) 
 
But as he approaches, Endymion sees that Glaucus weeps, and sympathy takes over: “Lo! his 
heart ‘gan warm / With pity” (3.282-283). It’s not that Endymion learns to read the markings of 
Glaucus’s cloak, or that he arrives rationally at some basic recognition of his humanity. Instead, 
Glaucus’s tears induce an automated change of heart via the mechanisms of sensibility, 
guaranteed by the absolute fidelity of the body—as John Mullan writes, thought to be “powerful 
because it is not spoken,” unlike speech, with its infinite capacity for deceit (61). Glaucus then 
tells his tale: he had loved the nymph Scylla, and pursued her to no end. Distressed, he sought 
the enchanter Circe’s aid, but when he went to find Circe he instead awoke in a bower, enrapt by 
“The fairest face that morn e’er look’d upon” (3.424). Henceforth, “I bow’d a tranced vassal,” 
and Scylla was forgotten (3.460). One morning, Glaucus comes upon his new lover on a throne 
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of roots, surrounded by deformed minions, and discovers her to be none other than the enchanter 
Circe. He flees, and she taunts him in feminizing, infantilizing terms that anticipate Keats’s 
critics:  
Ha! Ha! Sir Dainty! there must be a nurse 
Made of rose leaves and thistledown, express, 
To cradle thee, my sweet, and dull thee: yes, 
I am too flinty-hard for thy nice touch:  
My tenderest squeeze is but a giant’s clutch.  
So, fairy-thing, it shall have lullabies  
Unheard of yet; and it shall still its cries  
Upon some breast more lily-feminine. (3.570-577) 
 
Glaucus’s retelling makes it sound as if he should have known he was being deceived “with 
tears, and smiles, and honey-words”—he should have known that his seducer was a mere 
“arbitrary queen of sense,” and should have remained faithful to Scylla (3.426, 3.459). But 
Glaucus’s seduction is no different from Endymion’s sexual (or quasi-sexual) encounters, which 
in each case lead to self-torment over his love for Diana, the goddess of the moon. These 
encounters unfold in the same vocabulary of tears, smiles, and “the honey-feel of bliss.” They 
similarly dispossess Endymion of rational sense and suspend his agency, weaving, just as Circe 
does, “A net whose thralldom was more bliss than all / The range of flower’d Elysium” (3.427-
428). It just happens to turn out that each of Endymion’s lovers is a differing incarnation of the 
moon goddess to whom he has dedicated himself, so he has been faithful by accident. To refuse 
what seemed like adultery would have in fact been a mistake. Judgment is out of the question. 
Similarly, where Glaucus’s tears reveal his beneficent nature to Endymion, Circe’s tears work to 
entrap Glaucus. No less than speech, the natural language of the heart is subject to counterfeit.11 
                                                 
11 Cf. Ecclesiastes 7:26: “And I find more bitter than death the woman, whose heart is snares and nets, 
and her hands as bands: whoso pleaseth God shall escape from her; but the sinner shall be taken by her.” 
Glaucus’s fate is indeed “more bitter than death,” and his recounting dwells on the language of “snares 
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What follows is equally devoid of instruction. Glaucus’s punishment is to live enchained 
for a thousand years before perishing, to “live and wither, cripple and still breathe,” and Circe 
kills Scylla for good measure (3.597). Glaucus buries her under the sea and bides his time until 
he receives a prophecy that tells of Endymion’s coming. Endymion qualifies for this role by 
virtue of being “A youth, by heavenly power lov’d and led” (3.708). He is chosen because, 
tautologically, he is already chosen. The same susceptible bent that Circe mocks in Glaucus 
renders the duly-bound Endymion the “youth elect” (3.710). Endymion in turn redeems Glaucus 
because he is his repetition: “We are twin brothers in this destiny!” (3.713). There is nothing 
Endymion can learn from Glaucus’s suffering. Everything is fated, nothing is consequential. 
Despite its repeated engagements with the theme of subjugation, Endymion is aggressively 
uninterested in making any conceptual distinction between glorious masochistic pleasure and 
mere abject servitude. There is nothing to distinguish Diana’s benevolent arbitrary power and 
from Circe’s tyrannical arbitrary power—beyond the fact that the former is desired and the latter 
is not. Bondage and imprisonment are certainly not the issue, as the climax of the Glaucus 
episode demonstrates. After he and Endymion perform an obscure ritual, Glaucus is returned to 
youth, and his love Scylla is revived along with all of the sea’s drowned lovers. A revelry ensues, 
featuring reenactments of Glaucus’s thousand-year bondage:  
 
In harmless tendril they each other chain’d,  
And strove who should be smother’d deepest in  
Fresh crush of leaves (3.935-937) 
                                                 
and nets.” Keats would have found one classical setting for the link between sweetness, enchantment, and 
death in George Chapman’s translation of The Odyssey (1616), which Keats extolled in his famed sonnet 
“On First Looking Into Chapman’s Homer.” Chapman gave the sirens “sweet accents that made charms 
so strong,” rendering their singing “the sweetest strain / That ever open’d an enamour’d vein” (414). 
Keats’s Circe is of course modeled on Homer’s Circe, and the latter tells Odysseus how to survive the 
sirens, so these passages were very likely in the mix as Keats wrote the third book of Endymion.  
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Glaucus’s tragedy is repeated as Dionysian farce. Love emerges not as the antidote to 
enslavement, but as its authentic form.  
Worlds without Death 
 The revival of the drowned lovers is only one instance of Endymion’s thoroughgoing 
disregard for the permanence of death. This indifference to death is the central mechanism of its 
refusal of posterity. Indeed, as the poem ambles toward conclusion, Keats hazards a parodic 
rewriting of the supreme representation of Death in English poetry—Milton’s depiction in 
Paradise Lost, upheld by Edmund Burke as the paradigm of poetic sublimity: 
   The other shape, 
If shape it might be call’d that had none 
Distinguishable in member, joynt, or limb, 
Or substance might be call’d that shadow seem’d, 
For each seem’d either; black it stood as Night 
Fierce as ten Furies, terrible as Hell, 
And shook a dreadful Dart; what seem'd his head 
The likeness of a Kingly Crown had on. (2.666-673) 
 
But where Death’s obscurity is wrapped in black on black, supplemented by the iconography of 
the sovereign, Keats offers instead a vision of Sleep in rose and amethyst: 
His litter of smooth semilucent mist, 
Diversley ting’d with rose and amethyst, 
Puzzled those eyes that for the centre sought; 
And scarcely for one moment could be caught 
His sluggish form reposing motionless. (4.385-389) 
 
Translating monochrome death into technicolor sleep shifts Death’s sublimity (“terrible as Hell”) 
toward the innocuous, feminine beautiful, while retaining the indistinction and obscurity of the 
sublime. Sleep thus retains death’s form without its grand finality, substituting harmlessly 
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“puzzled” respite for the sublime terror of demise. There is no death, only sleep, and by 
extension, no end, only suspension and deferral.  
Endymion has long been read as an anticipation of Percy Shelley’s Adonais—or rather, 
Adonais is understood to trope Keats in terms that Keats had developed in Endymion. In Lucy 
Newlyn’s view, for example, when Shelley’s Adonais made “death at the hands of hostile 
reviewers the signifier of eternal life at the hands of sympathetic readers,” Shelley was seizing on 
a tendency toward self-effacement already present in Keats’s text (32). More broadly, Keats’s 
artful diffusions of identity—his “Negative Capability”—invited the martyr makeover Shelley 
administered with such righteous ardor. “He is a portion of the loveliness / Which once he made 
more lovely”: Keats becomes his own thing of beauty, to be enjoyed forever—on Shelley’s terms 
(379-380). Shelley’s version of Keats’s immortality, beaconing from the “inmost veil of 
heaven,” is wholly predicated on death’s finitude. Endymion by turn develops a sense of beauty 
beyond life and death that runs on its own indifferent rhythm. Adonais consolidates the shifting 
sexual and maturational logics of Endymion into an image of Keats as abjectly infantile and 
feminine. It seizes upon Endymion’s imagery but discards its metaphysics, in the process 
affirming the framework of Keats’s Tory critics.  
Shelley pictures the fading Keats in Rome, 
where kingly Death  
Keeps his pale court in beauty and decay, 
He came; and bought, with price of purest breath, 
A grave among the eternal.—Come away!  
Haste, while the vault of blue Italian day 
Is yet his fitting charnel-roof! while still 
He lies, as if in dewy sleep he lay; 
Awake him not! Surely he takes his fill 
Of deep and liquid rest, forgetful of all ill. (55-63) 
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Keats has become the Adonis he depicted in Endymion. That sleeping, embowered Adonis was, 
in Karen Swann’s words, “one in a series of boys, boys, boys—mute, self-enclosed, and 
infinitely seductive, all officiously displayed to the filled sight” (23). In the sexualized logic of 
prone, fainting beauty, Keats’s proximity to death’s door is itself a spur to desire. Keats’s friend 
Benjamin Bailey complained that Endymion adopted “that abominable principle of Shelley’s—
that Sensual Love is the principle of things” (Keats Circle 1:35). But the Shelley of Adonais 
shades this sense of desire as “that unrest which men miscall delight”—an unrest most damaging 
to frail Keats, whom death in effect saved from the torment of desire: “Can touch him not and 
torture not again” (354-355). In Shelley’s vision, death delivered Keats from himself, even as it 
foreclosed his future. This is to read Keats back to front, as a “poet of death” whose life becomes 
a monument to its own end.  
But if death is already with Shelley’s Keats, it never arrives for Endymion. Keats’s poem 
eludes Shelley’s “kingly Death” and the “charnel-roof” of Italian sky, along with the many 
readings of Keats that follow in Shelley’s funereal footsteps. When Endymion revives the 
thousands of lovers drowned at sea, the poem seems to preempt Shelley’s passage:  
 And, as he pass’d, each lifted up its head,  
As doth a flower at Apollo’s touch. 
Death felt it to his inwards: ‘twas too much: 
Death fell a weeping in his charnel-house.  
The Latmian [Endymion] persever’d along, and thus 
All were reanimated. (3.785-790) 
 
Now it’s not Keats but death alone who occupies the “charnel-house.” Death ceases to bind; 
death dies. The charnel house is the place where individual skeletons become indistinct piles of 
bones. When Endymion revives the drowned lovers, he reconnects dissolving matter to its 
individual particularity. The drowned are repersonalized.  
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This undoing of death repeats throughout the poem—Endymion is said to die or nearly 
die twelve times, plus another five or six “swoons” that threaten fatality. Endymion himself is 
perplexed by his uncanny persistence: 
Why am I not as are the dead,  
Since to a woe like this I have been led 
Through the dark earth, and through the wondrous sea? (4.89-91) 
 
The answer is that death does not exist in any recognizable sense. It’s simply another change of 
state, variously linked to sleep, distress, and sexual climax, sapped of stability and finality. The 
narrative, by turn, is evacuated of the drama of mortality. In chapter four, I argued that Blake’s 
Book of Thel pictures a world in which death is horrifically incomplete. Thel cannot bear the 
prospect that though death might extinguish her consciousness, the stuff of her material being 
will persist, to be churned through the gears of nature’s machinery until the end of time. In 
Endymion, the problem takes a different form. Keats’s poem is aggressively indifferent to the 
philosophical distinctions between thought and matter that Blake’s critique engages. The very 
idea of life as a linear, closed interval of time ending in death has little purchase in a world 
without causality, where chronology comes unbound from the figures of line or circle that have 
traditionally defined its operations. With every “death” Endymion awakes unchanged and 
resumes his vocation, which consists solely of experiencing desire.  
Keats is playing with a tradition of interweaving Eros and Thanatos that would include 
(in its English incarnations) Shakespeare’s sonnets and Paradise Lost, and features prominently 
in the culture of sensibility. In Milton’s epic, Adam announces to Eve,  
      I with thee have fixt my Lot,  
Certain to undergoe like doom, if Death  
Consort with thee, death is to mee as Life. (9.952-954) 
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Adam must have Eve in order to live, yet in having her he must die. The conceptual inversions 
brought on by the Fall knot together desire, life, and death. Endymion takes the proximity of 
these concepts very, very seriously, to the point that they become interchangeable. The poem 
retains the aesthetics of deathliness but severs its link to finitude, outlining a vision, in Marlon 
Ross’s words, of “mortality without the finality of death” (“Beyond the Fragmented Word” 115). 
With Milton, Endymion’s love is conceived as a kind of death, but this is a death that reverts 
immediately back into life: 
there’s not a sound,  
Melodious howsoever, can confound  
The heavens and earth in one to such a death  
As doth the voice of love: there’s not a breath 
Will mingle kindly with the meadow air, 
Till it has panted round, and stolen a share  
Of passion from the heart!—  (4.79-85) 
 
Love’s voice confounds the gap between the heavens and earth, edging the lover toward death. 
However, the conventional verse procession from breath to death is reversed, as Keats’s phrasing 
rushes breathlessly through two enjambments, stopping not at death but at love.12 Breath takes on 
its own living autonomy, mingling and circulating until it claims its share “Of passion from the 
heart!” It is love and not the lover that speaks. Lovers appear only as the shadows of the breaths, 
pants, loves, and deaths that do the grammatical work. In the poem’s thesis, love is “self-
                                                 
12 Cf. Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis 929-930 (both titular figures feature in Endymion) and 
Wordsworth’s “We Are Seven” 1-4 (discussed in chapter three). In both cases breath rhymes into death, 
which is to say that death is the breath of life’s inevitable counterpart and destination. The trope appears 
again in Romeo and Juliet, where Romeo addresses the (seemingly) dead Juliet: “Death, that hath suck’d 
the honey of thy breath, / Hath had no power yet upon thy beauty” (5.3.92-93). Death is pictured as a rival 
suitor whose consummation nevertheless fails to impinge upon Juliet’s desirability—indeed, death might 
easily be read as a catalyst of desire in this scene. And since Juliet’s death is at this point a ruse, attention 
is focused not on the empirical actuality of death, but rather on the way that the idea of death structures 
love.  
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destroying” (1.799). Life is thus propelled by the repetition of “deaths,” ambiguously sexual and 
yet neither strictly figurative nor final. Death is not an absolute, but rather a rhetorical and figural 
opening. If this moment draws on the convention of la petite mort, the poem also reverses the 
figure to transform death into a kind of orgasm. Endymion’s love vows take on “a most fearful 
tone, / Like one repenting in his latest moan,” sprinkling the solemnity of the last rites with erotic 
excess (4.323-324). In a world of disordered and incessant creation, desire becomes a force of 
conception detached from human biology, and even from life. Birth and death lose all 
metaphysical privilege as organizing principles, collapsing into markers of change in a world of 
constant change.   
Disjointing causes from effects, Endymion frustrates mechanisms of aperture and closure, 
birth and death. Endymion’s world disarms the sociosexual schema that distributed poetic 
authority through figures of procreative virility. Measured against these criteria, Keats knew he 
was doomed. By evacuating sexuality of consummation and procreation, and voiding death of 
finality, Endymion offers a prescient challenge not only to the politics of reception in his present 
moment, but also to the logics of poetic posterity that would birth his own “posthumous 
existence” (Letters 2:359). If recent scholarship has sought to replace the virtual Keats of lost 
promise with an actual poet of real achievement, Endymion’s unworking of time suggests a more 
outlandish possibility. By imagining existence without beginning or end, Endymion encourages 
us to ask—impossibly—what it might mean to read Keats in the absence of his death. It wonders 
how the time of poetry might scan beyond the rhythms of living and dying, extending outward to 
the moment “when this planet’s sphering time doth close” (2.251). 
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